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A bstract
This thesis develops three dynamic quantitative equilibrium models with heterogeneous 
agents, tackling issues related to the criminal participation of individuals and the labor 
market.
The first chapter studies the effect of hard drugs addiction on property crimes and 
hard drugs selling in the US. A dynamic equilibrium model quantifying how much of the 
observed property crime rate is accounted for by hard drugs addiction is specified and esti­
mated. The model is framed in both a rational addiction and a rational crime participation 
environment. The results show tha t a substantial part of property crimes, approximately 
26%, is accounted for by predatory crime to finance addiction. The estimated model is in 
tu rn  used to quantify the economic consequences of a compulsory drug treatm ent scheme 
for all arrested felons, and the effects of a legalization policy. The first policy experiment 
suggests a decrease in the property crime rate by 11%. while under the new legal regime 
the property crime rate is found to decrease by 18%.
The second chapter studies the effects of both labor market conditions and asset 
poverty on the property crimes involvement of American males. The property crimes 
arrest rate has consistently been four times higher for black males if compared to white 
ones. Another set of stylized facts show for the first demographic group lower educational 
levels and worse labor market performances. A dynamic equilibrium model is developed, 
exploiting these facts to quantitatively assess the race crime gap. The model is calibrated 
relying on US data and solved numerically. Simulation results show tha t the observed 
poverty and labor market outcomes account for as much as 90% of the arrest rates ra­
tio. Finally, the model is used to compare two alternative policy experiments aimed at 
reducing the aggregate crime rate: increasing the expenditure on police seems to be cost 
effective, when compared to an equally expensive lump-sum subsidy targeted to the high 
school dropouts.
The last chapter studies the equilibrium welfare effects of introducing m andated sev­
erance payments in a labor market with costly mobility, where self-insurance through a 
riskless asset is the only way to smooth fluctuations in labor income due to unemploy­
ment shocks. The framework allows for wage flexibility at the level of the individual 
firm-worker match. Wages vary with both tenure and productivity of the workers. When 
severance payments are introduced, the firm can potentially undo their effect by modify­
ing the wage profile. Workers entry wages fall by the expected present value of the future 
payment. However, because of incomplete markets, workers are unlikely to be indifferent
about the slope of the wage profile. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to 
the US economy. We compare a welfare measure for the baseline economy, i.e. without 
severance payments, to those of a series of counterfactual economies where the severance 
payments are introduced at increasing levels. Welfare gains and costs are heterogeneous 
in the population but seem to be quantitatively small for plausible values of the severance 
payments.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The following three chapters, which constitute the original contributions of this thesis, 
specify, parametrize and numerically solve heterogeneous agents economies tackling is­
sues related to hard drug abuse, criminal participation, the role of specific labor market 
institutions, and the equilibrium evaluation of public policies.
Although the questions asked in each chapter are intrinsically different, there are sev­
eral common themes linking the various parts of the dissertation.
The first shared feature is the framework in which each model is built. This thesis relies 
on economies with incomplete markets: this assumption is a crucial one if the goal of the 
researcher is to address questions related to distributional issues, welfare consequences of 
public policies and heterogeneous outcomes.
The heterogeneity of the agents interacting in the model economies is another common 
feature, closely related to the one just introduced. The heterogeneity has always two 
layers: the individuals differ both from an ex-ante perspective and from an ex-post one. 
The stochastic processes capturing the uncertainty in the various economies are such 
tha t the inviduals are going to differ in an ex-post sense in several dimensions. More 
precisely, changes in the labor market status are going to be affected by a series of shocks 
tha t the agents face during their lifetimes. Moreover, the agents are going to differ in 
some endogenously accumulated state variable, the stock of habits in a model of rational 
addiction, and the asset holdings in both a model of property crimes and in a model of 
insurance against the labor market risk.
The equilibrium concept will be in all three models the recursive stationary competitive 
one. The equilibria w*e are going to  look at are the ones characterized by a stationary
13
distribution over the state variables.
Given the richness of the models, their analytical characterization cannot be obtained. 
The models are then solved relying on sophisticated numerical techniques and simulation 
procedures.
The three chapters provide a combination of calibration, classical regression analy­
sis and structural estimation to parametrize the models. When simple techniques are 
not deemed appropriate, or are not applicable because of lack of data, more challenging 
and rigorous estimation procedures are implemented, which try  to take into account the 
selection and endogeneity problems arising in the set-up under consideration.
Finally, the overlap among the models is also represented by their attem pt to evaluate 
several public policies on the basis of counterfactual analysis. The parametrized models are 
used both as a measurement device to quantify the relative importance of several factors in 
accounting for the observed outcome under analysis and to assess the equilibrium response 
arising from a change in public intervention, aimed at improving the welfare of the agents.
Interestingly, as far as the demographic structure is concerned, the models span all 
possibilities: overlapping generations, the dynastic framework and the perpetual youth 
model. The choice is dictated by the question addressed and by the superior tractability 
tha t one of the alternatives ensures if compared to  the others.
More in detail, this thesis develops three dynamic stochastic equilibrium models to 
analyze issues related to the criminal participation of individuals and the labor market.
The second chapter studies the effect of hard drugs addiction on property crimes and 
hard drugs selling in the US. A dynamic equilibrium model quantifying how much of the 
observed property crime rate is accounted for by hard drugs addiction is specified and 
estimated. The model is framed in both a rational addiction and a rational crime partici­
pation environment. We exploit information on drug use in the American population, hard 
drugs expenditure, property crimes and drug abuse violations, obtained from the National 
Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the Surveys of Inmates, and the Uniform Crime Re­
ports of the FBI, respectively. The equilibrium features of the model allow to pin down the 
response of hard drugs consumers to changes in prices, as well as to compute the revenues 
from drug selling, variables which are not available in the existing data. Moreover, the 
equilibrium framework allows to exploit data asked exclusively to inmates: by taking the 
selection problem explicitly into account, the model can predict moments which are rep­
resentative of the whole population. The results show that a substantial part of property 
crimes, approximately 26%, is accounted for by predatory crime to finance addiction. The
14
estimated model is in turn  used to quantify the economic consequences of a compulsory 
drug treatm ent scheme for all arrested felons, and the effects of a legalization policy. The 
first policy experiment suggests a decrease in the property crime rate by 11%, while under 
the new legal regime the property crime rate is found to decrease by 18%.
The third chapter studies the effects of both labor market conditions and asset poverty 
on the property crimes involvement of American males. The property crimes arrest rate 
has consistently been four times higher for black males if compared to white ones. Another 
set of stylized facts show for the first demographic group lower educational levels and worse 
labor market performances. A dynamic equilibrium model is developed, exploiting these 
facts to quantitatively assess the determinants of the racial crime gap. The model is 
calibrated relying on US data and solved numerically. Simulation results show tha t the 
observed poverty and labor market outcomes account for as much as 90% of the arrest 
rates ratio. Finally, the model is used to compare two alternative policy experiments 
aimed at reducing the aggregate crime rate: increasing the expenditure on police seems 
to be cost effective, when compared to an equally expensive lump-sum subsidy targeted 
to the high school dropouts.
The last chapter studies the equilibrium welfare effects of introducing mandated sev­
erance payments in a labor market with costly mobility, where self-insurance through a 
riskless asset is the only way to smooth fluctuations in labor income due to unemploy­
ment shocks. The framework allows for wage flexibility at the level of the individual 
firm-worker match. Wages vary with both tenure and productivity of the workers. When 
severance payments are introduced, the firm can potentially undo their effect by modify­
ing the wage profile. Workers entry wages fall by the expected present value of the future 
payment. However, because of incomplete markets, workers are unlikely to be indifferent 
about the slope of the wage profile. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to 
the US economy. We compare a welfare measure for the baseline economy, i.e. without 
severance payments, to those of a series of counterfactual economies where the severance 
payments are introduced at increasing levels. Welfare gains and costs are heterogeneous 
in the population but seem to be quantitatively small for plausible values of the severance 
payments.
15
Chapter 2
Hard Drugs A ddiction, Drug  
V iolations and P roperty  Crimes in  
the US
2.1 In tro d u ctio n
Drug use. drug selling and property crimes are im portant phenomena in the US. Given 
the size of the US criminal justice system and the number of inmates convicted for these 
offenses, it is clear that they are very expensive and affect the lives of many Americans. 
For example, in 2003, the total justice expenditure attributable to those crimes was above 
170 billions and more than one and a half million people were behind bars because of such 
crimes, US Dept of Justice (2003). Moreover, these numbers heavily underestimate the 
actual economic costs of drugs and crime: as suggested by Miron (2004), the income losses 
of the victims of crimes, the health costs induced by drug abuse, the foregone production 
of both convicted criminals and drug abusers should be added to the previous figure. Some 
economists and criminologists estimate the total burden for the US economy at more than 
300 billions.
Despite widespread interest in the topic, little is known on the relationship among 
hard drugs addiction, drug selling and property crimes. This chapter provides an attem pt 
to shed more light on these complex phenomena. More in detail, we want to address 
the following questions: How much of the property crime rate is accounted for by hard 
drugs addicts stealing in order to pay for their consumption of drugs? W hat would be
16
the effect on both the property crime rate and the drug violations of effective treatm ent 
schemes targeted at arrested felons? How do hard drugs prices and consumption respond 
to policies tha t modify the severity of the criminal justice system? W hat would be the 
consequences of legalizing such substances?
The following analysis tries to answer these questions in the context of both the ra­
tional addiction theory of Becker and Murphy (1988) and the rational crime participation 
framework of Becker (1968). A dynamic equilibrium model of hard drugs addiction, hard 
drugs selling at the street level and involvement in property crimes is specified and esti­
mated. This represents a novelty in the economics of crime literature, surveyed for example 
in Dilulio (1996), Ehrlich (1996), and Freeman (1996), since the previous contributions 
have focused mainly on the role of unemployment, poor legitimate economic opportunities, 
effectiveness of police and severity of the punishment in shaping the criminal decisions.1
This paper considers a channel complementary to the ones outlined above, namely 
hard drugs. Hard drugs are extremely expensive goods, a fact which has been mainly 
attributed, by Miron (2003) among others, to their illegal nature. Not only are hard drugs 
expensive, but also they are addictive, Leshner (1997), implying that regular hard drugs 
users spend an increasing share of their income to finance their habit. Studies conducted 
on convicted criminals, as reported by Chaiken and Chaiken (1990). show tha t hard drugs 
abusers spend up to 90% of their to tal income to finance their addiction, considering both 
legal and illegal sources. On the other hand, hard drugs represent also a source of income, 
since addicts tend to be involved in drug dealing at the street level, Reuter, MacCoun 
and Murphy (1990) and Wilson and Abrahamse (1992). In light of these considerations, it 
seems reasonable to think tha t hard drugs play an important role in affecting the number 
of property crimes in the US.
The nexus between hard drugs and property crimes has been studied extensively in 
the sociology and criminology literatures, as surveyed by Wish and Johnson (1986). Quite 
surprisingly, unlike in other disciplines, the economics research has devoted far less atten­
tion to the relationship between drugs and crime, even though there seems to be a growing 
interest in this phenomenon, Becker, Murphy and Grossman (2006), Caulkins, Reuter and 
Taylor (2006), Corman and Mocan (2000) and Grogger and Willis (2000). A plausible 
explanation is the lack of rich and large datasets, representative of the US population at a
1 Notable exceptions considering the effect of drugs on crime are Corman and Mocan (2000) and Grogger 
and W illis (2000). The strenghts and lim itations of these contributions, and the differences from this paper 
will be discussed in the related literature section.
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more detailed level than the national one. including information on both current and past 
drug abuse, variables necessary to conduct classical econometric analysis. At the available 
level of aggregation, it is impossible to  rely on any measure of punishment of the criminal 
justice system, making room for omitted variable bias in econometric models of crime.
Although there is no a definitive answer on whether drug abuse causes crime or the 
other way round, there seems to be a strong link between the two variables. From an 
empirical perspective, due to the lack of high quality longitudinal data on hard drugs use. 
it is very challenging to identify the direction of causation.2 From a theoretical point 
of view, there are mainly three possible hypotheses that can describe the relationship 
between crime and drug abuse. Possibly, the most common point of view is tha t drug 
abuse causes property crimes. According to this interpretation, drug users develop an 
addiction over time, which is both detrim ental for the likelihood of employment and very 
costly to finance, hence the involvement in property crimes. The second hypothesis is 
embraced mostly by behavioralist scholars, as discussed in Gruber (2001). In their view 
there are several environmental factors, such as growing up in a dysfunctional family, that 
drive youths to get involved in risky behaviors. Youths start from minor misdemeanors 
and. by climbing the risk ladder, step by step they get into abusing drugs. Notice tha t, in 
their view, drug use is also made possible thanks to the (small) amount of money made 
during this "criminal career". The th ird  hypothesis considers drug abuse and crimes as 
interrelated phenomena, which are determined through the evaluation of similar trade-offs.
This paper relies on a framework which is somewhat in between of the first and third 
interpretations. Agents choose in each period of their finite lives whether to be involved 
in income generating crimes and in using drugs. The consumption of hard drugs involves 
the accumulation of a stock of habits, which affects the likelihood of employment. The 
higher the stock of habits, the more likely an agent is to be unemployed. Moreover, 
individuals are hit by shocks during their life-cycle, which affect the utility they get from 
using hard drugs. In this sense, the model extends the rational additional framework, 
allowing for both a stochastic marginal rate of substitution between drugs and (legal)
‘ The m ajority of studies discussed in W ish and Johnson (1986) are based on samples of small size and 
that rarely satisfy basic criteria of representativeness. U sually the unit of analysis are people taking part 
in various treatm ent programs, that is they are part of a choice based sample. The NLSY is one of the 
few longitudinal studies providing information on both drug use and crime. However, it seems likely that 
sample attrition does not happen randomly, being the hard drug abusers more probable to drop out from 
the study as tim e goes by. For a study based on UI< data see Pudney (2003).
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consumption and for stochastic legitimate opportunities tha t depend on the accumulated 
stock of habits. People who consume drugs heavily accumulate a large stock of habits: this 
increases the probability of an unemployment spell and, at the same time, the likelihood of 
being convicted through a reinforcement effect. The latter implies tha t drug consumption, 
drug selling and property crimes are all increasing functions in the stock of habits. Due 
to the presence of uninsurable unemployment risk, addicts in this framework are not 
necessarily "happy". Ex-ante they make rational choices taking into consideration all the 
negative effects of both drug consumption and involvement in criminal activities. Ex-post, 
according to the realization of the shocks, they can be "unhappy".
In order to assess the effect of hard drugs abuse on property crimes a quantitative 
equilibrium framework is developed. The model considers the endogenous response of 
the market for hard drugs, which is affected by several elements. The likelihood of the 
punishment for each illegal activity and the related severity of the criminal justice system, 
the competition between street level drug sellers together with the conditions of demand 
affect the hard drugs equilibrium price and quantity. Notice that the equilibrium features 
of the model allow to pin down both the response of hard drug consumers to changes in 
prices and to compute the revenues from drug selling, variables which are not available 
in the existing data. Moreover, the equilibrium framework allows to exploit information 
asked exclusively to inmates: by taking explicitly into account the selection problem, the 
model can predict moments which are representative of the whole population.
The model is estimated in two steps. First, a subset of the parameters are obtained 
directly from several data sources. Second, a Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) 
procedure. Hansen (1992) and Gourieroux and Monfort (1996). is implemented to search 
for the set of parameters tha t minimizes the weighted distance between a set of empirical 
moments and the same moments obtained by simulating the model. Once estimated, 
the model is then used as a measurement tool and as a device to perform counterfactual 
analysis.
The results show that a substantial part of property crimes, about 26%, is accounted for 
by predatory crime to finance hard drugs addiction. This value is obtained by comparing 
the property crime rate of the baseline economy (4.3%) to tha t of a counterfactual economy 
where hard drugs do not exist (3.18%). This finding provides a measure of the magnitude 
of a specific kind of negative externalities, the ones driven by predatory crime, which make 
room for public intervention.
We consider policy experiments aimed at reducing the property crime rate, by affecting
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the conditions in the market for hard drugs. Namely, the economic consequences of an ideal 
drug treatm ent scheme for all arrested felons are computed: such a policy would decrease 
the property crime rate by 11%. Finally, with another counterfactual experiment, we 
assess the effects of a legalization policy: under this new regime, the property crime rate 
would decrease by 18%. Such counterfactual analysis gives a sense of the potential benefits 
and the detrimental effects of policies alternative to the current ones and called by many 
commentators and scholars, e.g. Friedman (1991), MacCoun and Reuter (2001) and Miron
(2004).
2 .1 .1  R e la te d  L itera tu re
Several contributions are related to this paper. We briefly discuss them in what follows.
One of the most influential papers on addiction in the economics literature is Becker 
and Murphy (1988). Becker and Murphy develop a theory of rational addiction: agents 
are assumed to be fully rational when deciding on the consumption of addictive goods, 
taking into account the future (negative) effects of their choices. One of the most impor­
tant implications of this framework is the lack of usefulness of public policy interventions. 
Individuals make optimal choices, hence any attem pt to forcefully reduce their drug con­
sumption would lead to a welfare loss. The rational addiction framework has been tested 
empirically by Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994), among others, with an application 
to cigarettes smoking. Their findings are in favor of the rational addiction model. Another 
contribution, Adda and Lechene (2001), structurally estimates a version of the rational 
addiction model: also their results support the empirical validity of the rational theory of 
addiction.
The empirical successes of the rational addiction hypothesis notwithstanding, the 
paradigm has been challenged by several authors.
In a series of papers. Orphanides and Zervos (1994), (1995) and (1998). the two authors 
assess one of the main critiques to the rational framework: in Becker and Murphy's theory 
addicts are happy, i.e. there is no possibility of regret for their addiction. They do so by 
introducing either a learning framework or a myopic one. Notice tha t our model allows 
for addicts to be "unhappy", given the presence of uninsurable unemployment risk, which 
is affected by the hard drugs consumption decisions. Ex-post some addicts, in particular 
the heavily addicted ones, experience long unemployment spells, with associated low levels 
of consumption. These agents, when comparing their level of utility to tha t of employed
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ones, regret the fact of having accumulated a large stock of habits, which at the same time 
makes them to participate more often into criminal activities and, in turn, spend more 
time in prison.
Another paper, Gruber and Koszegi (2001), depart from the rational addiction ap­
proach. by assuming that individuals have time inconsistent preferences. In their frame­
work young individuals show a higher degree of impatience, since they discount the future 
consequences of their actions more heavily. The main message of this contribution is tha t 
people seem to be forward-looking with respect to addictive behaviors, but the policy im­
plications of their model are very different from the standard rational addiction approach. 
Public intervention should take into account not only the externalities of consumption of 
addictive goods, but also what Gruber and Koszegi call "internalities", or the effects of 
addiction on the future selves.
Bernheim and Rangel (2004) propose a model of addiction based on some lessons 
learned from psycholog}7, neuroscience and clinical practice. The model takes into ac­
count the fact tha t use among addicts can be a mistake, that drugs consumption leads 
to the development of environmental cues th a t trigger these mistakes, and that addicts 
understand and are capable of managing these cues. However, notice that in order to be 
implemented in an empirical study, this framework needs data on both the decision of 
consuming the drugs and the presence of the cues. To the best of our knowledge, this kind 
of data are not currently available, making the empirical test of the model and the study 
of its quantitative predictions very hard to implement.
More recently, Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) have developed a theoretical framework 
where agents can develop harmful addictions. They define a good as addictive if its 
consumption leads to more compulsive consumption of the same good, where consumption 
is compulsive if the individual would have made a different choice had commitment been 
available. The authors find tha t taxing drugs decreases welfare, while prohibition policies 
might increase it.
This paper relies on the rational addiction framework for at least two reasons: a) it is 
relatively simple, making the empirical implementation of the model more neat, b) there 
is evidence th a t hard drugs abusers (even the ones who recognize to have developed a 
tolerance to the drug) do not check-in into rehab programs, doing so only when forced 
by the criminal justice system. National Research Council (2001). This behavior can be 
considered consistent with rational drug users.
In an applied study. Corman and Mocan (2000) consider the relationship between
21
crime, deterrence and drug abuse in New York City. They rely on a high frequency time 
series framework over the period 1970-1990. Their results show that two out of three 
property crime categories are positively affected bv a proxy of drug abuse, i.e. the growth 
rate of drug related deaths. However, their findings show a stronger effect on the crime 
rate of a deterrence variable, namely the growth rate of police officers. Unfortunately, the 
measure of drug use the authors rely on is far from being an ideal one. The change in 
the number of drug related deaths could have been due to the documented increase in the 
purity of hard drugs, which makes unexperienced users more at risk of physical damages, 
rather than to an increase in the population of hardcore users, possibly the relevant one 
for studies related to property crimes. To deal with such issues, our framework models 
explicitly the addiction process, making the stock of habits, i.e. the degree of addiction, 
endogenous.
Another empirical study of the effect of drugs on crime is Grogger and Willis (2000). 
The authors study whether the arrival of crack cocaine in inner cities is responsible for 
the rise in urban crime rates in the late 80's and early 9Cfs. They rely on two different 
sources of information to date the emergence of crack in 27 metropolitan areas in the 
US and implement a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Grogger and Willis 
consider the difference in the urban crime rate before and after the arrival of crack as 
the effect of the treatm ent. The second stage of differencing is taken with respect to the 
growth rate in crime in the suburbs of the same metropolitan area, which represents the 
outcome of the non treated group. The results show that the emergence of crack lead 
to a substantial increase in property crimes. Notice, however, tha t a likely effect that 
would imply biased estimates is the "migration" of criminals from inner cities to suburban 
areas. If the criminals substituted the targets of their crimes because of the response 
of police to an increased inner city crime, a general equilibrium effect would have taken 
place, contaminating the outcome of the control group: this would make the "Diff-in-Diff" 
estimator inconsistent.
Becker, Murphy and Grossman (2006) propose an analysis of illicit markets, with a 
focus on drug markets. They find that when the demand for a good is highly inelastic, 
the optimal policy to fight drug use consists of legalizing the good and taxing it. rather 
than prohibiting its legal use. Our analysis provides a quantitative comparison of these 
two different regimes.
Another stream of literature related to ours is the one trying to assess the price elastic­
ity of addictive goods. Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1991) and van Ours (1995) are two
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of the most widely cited references. The former contribution puts more emphasis on the 
theoretical considerations, while the la tter provides empirical estimates for a particular 
drug (opium), in a particular period of time (1923-1938), in a particular place (Dutch East 
Indies).
Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1991) point out tha t the price elasticity of addictive 
goods is higher in the long run rather than in the short run, since the stock of addictive 
capital is fixed in the short run.
The beauty of van Ours (1995) consists of considering a period and a place where 
opium was legal, so that, in the empirical strategy, he can exploit quite reliable time series 
for both the price and the quantity consumed. His findings suggest an estimate of the 
short run elasticity of -0.7 and of the long run one of -1.0, corroborating the predictions 
of the rational addiction model.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first contribution developing a dynamic 
general equilibrium model of drug addiction, drug selling and property crimes.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some general facts 
related to crime participation and hard drugs use in the US. The theoretical model is 
presented in Section 3. while Section 4 is devoted to the definition of the equilibrium 
concept used in the model: the recursive competitive equilibrium. Section 5 presents the 
estimation procedure. Section 6 provides the main results and predictions of the model, 
while Section 7 concludes.
2.2  H ard D ru gs and  C rim e in  th e  US: th e  E m p irica l E v i­
d en ce
This Section is devoted to discuss the main facts about hard drugs and crime in the US. 
It consists of two parts. The first one provides a short description of the datasets tha t are 
going to be used in the empirical implementation of the model. The second one presents 
some descriptive statistics obtained from these datasets.
2 .2 .1  D a ta  S o u rces
In the US there are several data sources providing information about hard drugs and crime. 
This paper exploits data taken from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, the 
Surveys of Prison and Local Jail Inmates, the System To Retrieve Information on Drug
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Evidence, the Uniform Crime Reports, the National Crime Victimization Survey and the 
National Corrections Reporting Program. Details on each dataset follow.
•  National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA)
The NHSDA, US Dept of Health and Human Services (1998), is designed to produce 
drug use incidence and prevalence estimates and to report the consequences and patterns 
of use and abuse in the general US civilian population aged 12 and older. Questions 
include age at first use, as well as lifetime, annual, and past-month usage for several 
drugs. Respondents are also asked about several demographic variables, including gender, 
race, age, ethnicity, level of education, job status, income level and household composition.
Public files are available for the period 1979-2004. However, the survey has been con­
ducted on a yearly basis only since 1990. The NHSDA oversamples youth and minorities 
and implements several procedures to decrease the likelihood of under-reporting.
• Surveys of Prison and Local Jail Inmates (SI)
The SI, US Dept of Justice (2001) and US Dept of Justice (1999), provide nationally 
representative data on persons held in local jails, in state prisons or in federal correctional 
facilities. D ata cover individual characteristics of inmates, current offenses, sentences and 
time served, criminal histories, jail/prison activities, conditions and programs, prior drug 
and alcohol use and treatm ent, and health care services provided while in jail/prison.
The surveys are available for the period 1977-2002, but they have been conducted 
irregularly, roughly every 5/6 years.
•  System To Retrieve Information on Drug Evidence (STRIDE)
Since the 7(Ts. the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has been recording in STRIDE 
evidence obtained from seizures, purchases, and other drug acquisition activities conducted 
by undercover agents and informants. The database collects information on the type of 
drug obtained, the price paid, the quantity, the location and the date of purchase, together 
with the purity of the drug sample, an analysis performed in DEA laboratories.
The drug acquisitions data are available for the 1974-2003 period.3
^Horowitz (2001) and National Research Council (2001) discuss the lim itations of the ST R ID E  data. 
N otice that, for the purpose of this study, the focus will be on the cross sectional distribution of prices 
in 1996, elim inating the problem of non com parability of prices over time. Still, relying on just one year,
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•  Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
Since 1930, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has compiled the UCR to serve as 
periodic nationwide assessments of reported crimes not available elsewhere in the criminal 
justice system. Each year participating law enforcement agencies contribute reports to 
the FBI either directly or through their state reporting programs. The UCR provides 
information on (reported) property crimes and the number of arrests by type of crime.
The period covered is 1930-2004.
•  National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS)
The NCVS is the primary source of information on criminal victimization in the US. 
Each year, data are obtained from a nationally representative sample of about 42,000 
households comprising nearly 76,000 persons on the frequency, characteristics and conse­
quences of criminal victimization in the United States.
The period covered is 1973-2004.
• National Corrections Reporting Program (NCRP)
The NCRP. US Dept of Justice (1998), provides a comprehensive description of pris­
oners entering and leaving the custody or supervision of state and federal authorities. The 
information included in the NCRP consists of the list of offenses the prisoners were con­
victed for, the actual time spent in prison (for the individuals leaving custody) and the 
maximum and minimum sentence length.
This reporting program began in 1983.
Finally, all labor market related statistics are computed from the Current Population 
Survey.
does not guarantee that the STRIDE represents a random sample of the drug market sales. In order 
to  avoid the major problem of this dataset (the limited number of small size purchases and the debated  
representativeness of street level transactions) the model is going to specify explicitely the supply of drugs 
at the street level, making the price of hard drugs endogenous for these sales. N otice that the m odel is 
going to keep the drugs prices for high level dealers exogenous: however, these are likely to be the kind 
of dealers the ST R ID E  has been developed to keep track of. Moreover, the usual argument put forward 
by researchers relying on the STRIDE applies also in this case: the DEA undecover agents have to make 
their purchases at credible prices, otherwise they would endanger both them selves and the likelihod of 
success of the undercover operation. Finally, notice that these data currently represent the best source 
of information about prices of illegal drugs in the US. Other studies relying on the same dataset are. for 
example, Caulkins and Padman (1993), Dave (2004) and Kuziemko and Levitt (2004).
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• Current Population Survey (CPS)
The CPS is a monthly survey of about 50.000 households conducted by the Bureau of 
the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The survey has been conducted for more 
than 50 years. It is the primary source of information on the labor force characteristics 
of the US population. The sample is scientifically selected to represent the civilian non- 
institutional population.
As a final remark, notice that all datasets, but STRIDE, are a representative sample 
of the population of interest, with a sufficiently large number of observations. Possibly, 
the major limitation of these data is related to the expenditure on drugs. This variable 
has been asked in the SI only once, in 1996, and refers to the 30 days before the arrest. 
As a consequence, in order to exploit such information, the empirical implementation of 
the model will focus on that year.
The following Section presents some descriptive statistics obtained from the datasets 
outlined above. The reported facts represent the characteristics of drug consumption and 
crime participation tha t motivate some modelling assumptions.
2 .2 .2  S o m e B a s ic  F acts
For the sake of the analysis, it is necessary to take a stand on what a hard drug is. We 
consider as hard drugs the three following illegal substances: cocaine, crack and heroin.4 
As a m atter of fact, studies on the potency of drugs, as discussed in Kaplan (1985) and 
Edwards and Lader (1991). provide evidence that these three are the most addictive ones, 
in increasing order. Moreover, they are by far the most commonly used and their prices are 
available in the STRIDE, unlike other less common drugs. A comprehensive description 
of both the production steps and the addictive properties of cocaine, crack and heroin can 
be found in Miron (2003) and UNODC (2003).
Notice tha t, when available, sample weights were used to compute the statistics re­
ported below.
4M etham phetam ine, or Meth, has become in more recent years quite a diffused hard drug. Unfortu­
nately, in the NHSDA they started collecting information on this drug only after 1996.
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Prevalence o f Hard D rugs U se (U S P opu lation  V s. Inm ates, 1996)
Tables 1 and 2 provide estimates for the year 1996 of the prevalence of hard drugs use 
for both the general US population and the inmates one, respectively. As for the non- 
institutional population, such information is computed from the NHSDA.
Hard Drugs Use - Population Lifetime Last Year Last Month
Heroin 2.137o 0.297c 0.147c
Crack 3.827c 1.137c 0.57%
Cocaine 17.57c 3.227c 1.53%
Table 2.1: Prevalence of Hard Drugs Use - US Population, Males 16+ (Source: NHSDA 
1996)
The information on inmates is taken from the SI, and refers to periods of time before 
the arrest took place. To be consistent with the focus of the paper, only the inmates 
charged with Property Crimes (PC) or Drug Violations (DV) were selected. Notice that 
in both surveys only males at least 16 year old were kept in the sample.
Hard Drugs Use - Inmates Lifetime Lifetime - PC Last Month Last Month - PC
Heroin 20.277c 19.11% 6.96% 5.27%
Crack 38.64% 36.90% 13.97% 13.01%
Cocaine 46.31% 44.65% 10.56% 9.23%
Table 2.2: Prevalence of Hard Drugs Use - US Inmates, Males 16+ (Source: Survey of 
Inmates 1996)
As it is clear from the two tables, the most commonly used substance is cocaine, with 
a prevalence rate in the civilian population much higher than for the other two drugs. 
Notice also tha t this gap is less drastic for the inmates, and tha t in terms of prevalence 
rates there are no substantial differences between DV criminals and PC ones, the latter 
category being reported in the columns with the PC  label. Not surprisingly, there are also 
major differences between the prevalence rates of the general non-institutional population 
and tha t of the convicted criminals. Part of this gap is due precisely to the fact tha t hard
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drugs use is illegal in the US. However, notice that the size of the gap remains almost 
unchanged when focusing on the property crime felons.
From this set of figures we learn tha t most American males never use hard drugs, not 
even once, during their lifetime. They might be doing so for several reasons: 1) they 
don't like these substances; 2) hard drugs might hurt their employability, partially com­
promising their investment in human capital; 3) there might be informational problems, 
i.e. the actual addictive properties of these goods are not known and people abstain from 
consumption not being able to predict how they would be affected if they were to use 
them; 4) hard drugs use it's illegal, hence they refrain from consumption in order to avoid 
the punishment of the criminal justice system.
We also learn that people with the highest prevalence rates might be convicted and 
that the prevalence rate is decreasing in the potency of the substance.
Hard D rugs U se (A ge Profile)
Figure 2.1 plots the age distribution of the respondents who declared to have used at 
least once a hard drug in 1996. a question included in the NHSDA. This Figure suggests 
tha t hard drugs use has a clear age dimension. Virtually all the action seems to take place 
between the age of 12 and 43. It is interesting to notice that hard drugs use declines as the 
labor market rewards increase. On the one hand, as outlined in the previous paragraph, 
people might want to treasure the returns on the accumulated human capital, reducing 
the likelihood of being fired and/or getting into troubles with the criminal justice system. 
On the other hand, as people age they also have more money to be spent on consumption; 
nevertheless, they do not seem to use their economic resources on hard drugs. Notice 
tha t with a quantitative equilibrium model it is possible to single out the effect of habit 
formation vis-a-vis higher wages as people age on the hard drugs consumption.
Hard D rugs U se (A ge at First U se)
The NHSDA includes a set of questions related to the age at first use of cocaine, crack 
and heroin. Figure 2.2 shows its distribution.5
J Notice that if people declared to have used more than one hard drug, we selected the lowest reported 
age at first use.
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Figure 2.1: Cocaine, Crack and Heroin Use - Age Distribution (Source: NHSDA 1996)
Also this graph conveys a clear message: age is a crucial factor as far as the first contact 
with hard drugs by American males is concerned. In the civilian population, everything 
seems to happen between age 12 and 42, with about 90% of the hard drugs users reporting 
that they tried those substances for the first time between age 16 and 35.
By comparing different waves of the NHSDA, we get to discover quite an interesting 
fact: the distribution of age at first use seems to be stationary. For the waves carried out 
between 1979 and 1990, depicted in Figure 2.3, the distributions lie almost one on top of 
the other, with the only noticeable differences shoving up at age 25.6
Hard D rugs V iolations (Breakdown by type of violation)
From the criminal justice statistics point of view, what are the main facts related to hard 
drugs? Figure 2.4 shows two pieces of information that refer to the 1977-2002 period. 
First, the time series for the number of arrests made (whose most serious mention was 
either the possession or the sale/manufacturing of hard drugs) is plotted. Second, the 
time series of the percentages for the two types of drug violations, possession and the 
sale/manufacturing, are shown. A couple of comments are in order. From the Figure, it
6 Although available, we dropped the 1982 wave of the NHSDA. For budget reasons, the sample size for 
that year was extrem ely small, making some of the estim ates based on that sample clearly unreliable.
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14
--1 9 7 9  
1985 
1988 
—  1990 
-•1991
12  -
10
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Figure 2.3: Cocaine - Age at First Use (Source: NHSDA, several years)
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is clear tha t the number of arrests rose dram atically between the early and late 80's. This 
period of time corresponds to the crack epidemic, th a t hit the US in tha t period of time. 
Interestingly, irrespective of the crack epidemic, the share of the arrests has not shown 
any trend. Moreover, it is worthwhile to  point out tha t the assumption of stationarity 
th a t will be made in the model seems to be a good approximation also for this part of the 
problem.
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Figure 2.4: Number and shares of arrests, by type of Drug Law Violation (Source: UCR, 
several years)
In m ates H ard D rugs E xpend iture (M onth before the arrest)
A m ajor problem with the data on the use of illegal substances is the lack of information 
about the amount consumed. In the NHSDA, only in very few years the respondents 
were asked to  report the quantity consumed. Unfortunately, even in the years where the 
quantity used was asked explicitly, the questionnaire specified this question only for the 
use in the last month and almost exclusively for cocaine. As we have seen already, quite a 
limited number of people report to have used hard drugs in the month before the interview 
took place, making estimates about the quantity used de facto very unreliable.
Luckily, in the 1996 wave of the SI a question was included asking the inmates to report 
their expenditure on drugs in the month before the arrest. Given tha t the percentage of
800000 
700000 - 
600000 — a—  Sale/Manuf
500000 Possess
400000
 Total
— e—  Sale/Manuf % 
300000 — ^—  Possess %
200000
100000
A - A -  A - A - A ' a " A ‘ A
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
31
convicted people using hard drugs is high, the number of observations for people reporting 
positive hard drug expenditures is also relatively large, allowing for a meaningful analysis.'
Figure 2.5 plots the Cumulative D istribution Function for the expenditure on hard 
drugs in the 30 days before the arrest th a t led to  the current conviction took place. A 
couple of points are worth being stressed: 1) the top quartile spent in a month more than  
$2,500, a very large amount of money given the limited economic legal prospects of the 
people under consideration (young adults, poorly educated and likely to be unemployed); 
2) there seems to  be a lot of heterogeneity in the reported expenditures. To a certain 
degree, such large dispersion holds true also conditioning for other observables, such as 
age, education and employment sta tus.8
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Figure 2.5: Inmates Hard Drugs Expenditure (Source: Survey of Local Jails Inm ates 1996)
' N otice th at the expenditure data is available only for the local jail inm ates. However, th is does not 
seem  to  be a major issue, since a non negligible share of local jail inm ates are there only w aiting to  be 
relocated to either a state prison or a federal one. To som e extent, the fact that the question is asked to  
local jails inm ates is better. This way the problems of recall for state and federal prisoners are reduced  
som ewhat: usually, the crim inals who transit to  state and federal prisons have been in a local jail for a 
relatively short period o f tim e, if compared to  the average state and federal prison term.
sFor som e unknown reasons, the expenditure question has not been included in the latest wave o f the  
SI, which was released in April 2006 and refers to  the year 2002.
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Em ploym ent S tatus by Hard D rugs U se
As seen above, the involvement of american males with hard drugs displays a strong age 
dimension. One of the possible explanations can be linked to the risk of unemployment 
related to hard drugs abuse. This issue has already been studied by DeSimone (2002). 
who finds in the NLSY 1979 sample tha t cocaine use reduces substantially the likelihood 
of employment. The following Tables 3 and 4 present additional evidence supporting this 
claim. Table 3 refers to the inmates, while Table 4 to the general US population. The 
unemployment spells refer to the month before the arrest for inmates, and to the month 
before the interview for the NHSDA sample. W hen comparing the unemployment rates 
by hard drugs use, we notice a clear jum p if the person was using hard drugs. As for 
inmates, heroin and crack show rather strong patterns, while for cocaine (not reported in 
the Table) the pattern is less clear.
Unemployment rates - Inmates No Heroin Heroin No Crack Crack
All 33.30% 48.11% 34.47% 36.83%
High School Dropouts 36.63% 49.12% 37.93% 38.38%
High School Graduates 26.54% 46.07% 27.22% 34.17%
College Graduates 9.82% 42.92% 13.07% 16.69%
Table 2.3: Unemployment Rates by Drug Use - US Inmates (Source: Survey of Inmates 
1997)
As displayed in Table 4, in the US non-institutional population the unemployment 
rates of hard drugs users are more than twice as much as those of people who did not 
consume any hard drugs in the year 1996. Notice that the gap in the two unemployment 
rates is present for many age categories, while it seems to decrease for older individuals.
Unemployment rates - Population No Hard Drugs Hard Drugs
All 4.15% 11.09%
Age: 1 6 - 2 5 7.57% 16.30%
Age: 26 - 35 4.01% 10.38%
Age: 35+ 3.12% 4.48%
Table 2.4: Unemployment Rates by Drug Use - US Population (Source: NHSDA 1996)
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It is worth mentioning that, for some job categories, it is legal for employers to test 
their employees for drug use: a worker testing positive constitutes ground for dismissal.
Inm ates Fired B ecause o f D rug U se
The previous Table has provided some indirect evidence on the disruptive effects of hard 
drugs on the employment status of illegal substance users. The following Table reports 
more direct information on the same phenomenon. A question in the SI asked explicitly 
if the inmate was fired because of his drug use. Table 5 reports the percentages of people 
answering affirmatively, by type of drug and frequency of use. We defined "regular" users 
those who used hard drugs at least once every two days. Notice that the share is increasing 
in the potency of the drug, which is what one would expect. Moreover, the likelihood of 
having being fired is higher for people using the substances more often.
Hard Drug % Fired % Fired "Regular" Users
Heroin 43.22% 46.54%
Crack 38.85% 43.90%
Cocaine 34.56% 42.36%
Table 2.5: Fired Because of Drug Use (Source: Survey of Local Jails Inmates 1996)
P rop erty  Crim es and D rug V iolations A rrest R ates (A ge Profiles)
Figure 2.6 plots the age profiles of both the property crimes and drug violations arrest rates 
in the US for males in the year 1996.9 The arrest rate for the drug violations considers 
the arrests for both drug selling and possession, the related percentages being 30% and 
70%, respectively.
From Figure 2.6 it is evident that the arrest rates for both crime categories peak early, 
before age 20 and then decline monotonically. Notice that they become virtually zero for 
people older than  50. Interestingly, the same patterns hold, at least qualitatively, for these 
age profiles since the 70's.
9 The arrest rates are computed as the number of people arrested per 100.000 individuals belonging to 
a specific age category.
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Figure 2.6: Property crime (PC) and Drug abuse violations (DV) arrest rate by age 
(Source: UCR 1996)
D ata Lim itations
We conclude the Section on the empirical evidence with a discussion on the limitations of 
the data used.
The first caveat refers to the extent of under-reporting. Dealing with illegal behaviors, 
chances are tha t some people tend to  under-report their participation, wrhile others to 
over-report it. Notice tha t the teams in charge of designing these datasets paid a lot 
of attention to this problem, US Dept of Health and Human Services (1998), US Dept of 
Justice (1999) and US Dept of Justice (2001). The questionnaires were developed carefully, 
relying on the ordering and the phrasing of the questions that was thought to induce tru th  
telling, based on the results of previous studies in the field. Notice also tha t for the most 
delicate questions the respondents were given the opportunity to answer wiiile being on 
their owm, and th a t the principal investigators were granted by criminal justice authorities 
the right for the collected information not to be used as evidence against the respondents. 
Such special arrangements were told clearly by the interviewer before the surveys wrere 
administered. Irrespective of such efforts, it is likely that some under-reporting took place 
anyway. However, its extent is unknowm. As a positive remark, notice tha t the response 
rates for the NHSDA are high and almost identical to the CPS ones, while the response 
rates for the SI are rather impressive and about 95%.
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Another potential problem when relying on data taken from several surveys is the issue 
of comparability. Strictly speaking, the NHSDA and SI universes do not coincide. The 
discrepancy is represented by the presence in the SI of people who were homeless and on 
the street at the time of the arrest. For obvious reasons, it is very hard for this demographic 
group to be included in a random sample representative of the US population. However, 
notice that: 1) the homeless living in a shelter are included in the NHSDA universe, and 
2) in the SI only 7% of jail inmates and 4% of prison ones declared to be homeless in the 
month before the arrest.
As pointed out already, data on hard drugs consumption in the US are not currently 
available. The only available information, contained in the NHSDA and to some extent in 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), is on the frequency of consumption, 
which does not allow to understand what happens both to the individual consumption 
and to the aggregate one when prices change.
This lack of data is one of the reasons why a theory of drug consumption and addiction 
is needed, that is a model has to be developed to understand the response of consumption 
to changes in prices. Such a model will be presented in Section 3.
Notice also tha t the lack of drug consumption data problem is more severe than  it 
might seem. Unfortunately, there are no representative data for the US on the economic 
value of drug selling. The only available studies, Reuter, MacCoun and Murphy (1990). 
Wilson and Abrahamse (1992), Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) and Kinlock, 0 ‘Grady and 
Hanlon (2003). focus on a large city, namely Washington DC. Los Angeles, Chicago or 
Baltimore, and obtain estimates which are quite different from one another, ranging from 
few hundred dollars to several thousand a month. If at least the aggregate consumption 
of drugs were to be known, it would be possible to obtain an estimate of how much the 
average drug sales are worth, a value which can be computed in our equilibrium model.
Notice also tha t standard econometric techniques would be inappropriate with the 
information included in the SI dataset. By construction, the people surveyed are a selected 
sample, so tha t it is crucial to take care of the selection issues, in order to draw inferences 
valid for the general population. The model developed in this paper represents a feasible 
way to address the selection problem.
The next Section is devoted to discuss a simple economic model of rational drug ad­
diction. drug selling and property crimes.
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2.3  T h e M od el
In order to study the determinants of hard drugs addiction, drug selling and property 
crimes, a simple dynamic general equilibrium model is developed. The main features of 
the framework are discussed briefly in what follows.
Since both crime involvement and hard drugs use are not evenly distributed in the 
population, Freeman (1999) and Freeman (1996). agents are assumed to be heterogeneous 
along several dimensions.
First, agents differ with respect to their age. denoted by i € X =  {1 ,...,/} : every 
individual goes through a life-cycle, whose main aspects are related to both the legal 
earnings opportunities and the likelihood of being a hard drugs user. By assumption, the 
illegal opportunities do not change as the individuals age. This assumption seems to be 
supported by the relevant empirical evidence presented in Blumstein et al. (1986).
Second, agents differ in their employment status, denoted by s € S  = {e,u}: in every 
period of time, some agents are employed (e). while others are unemployed (u). Becoming 
unemployed is modeled as an idiosyncratic shock, i.e. the shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. 
among different individuals.10
D ata limitations do not allow to consider a time period short enough to model ex­
plicitly the labor market dynamics, as for example in Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003). 
Alternatively, it is assumed that agents who turn  out to be unemployed, will be so only 
for a fraction of the period.
Third, since the empirical evidence, discussed for example in Lochner (2004). and 
Lochner and Moretti (2004), shows tha t the bulk of property crimes are committed by 
people with poor educational achievements, we assume that agents differ in their educa­
tional level. Education is denoted by ed £ ST> =  {hsd,hs,col}. the three possible levels 
being high school dropouts (hsd), high school graduate (hs ), and college graduate (col). 
For tractability, individuals enter the economy with a predetermined educational level, 
which does not vary over time. This aspect is admittedly a simplification of the analysis, 
however, allowing for an endogenous educational choice would increase considerably the 
complexity of the problem. As long as the decisions of dropping out of high school are
10Notice that allowing for aggregate shocks would com plicate the analysis substantially, since the whole 
distribution of habits would enter the agents' problem. This would make the model no longer tractable, 
unless lim ited rationality assumptions are made, in the spirit of Krusell and Smith (1998), or the habits 
distribution is given an explicit parametric form, in the spirit of den Haan (1997).
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not caused by drug addiction and/or crime involvement, our results would not be affected 
much even if we were to consider education as endogenous.
Fourth, it is assumed tha t in every period agents receive a taste shock (s), which shifts 
the marginal utility of hard drugs.11 We might think of these shocks as transitory events, 
such as the divorce of the parents, or the death of a friend, or the relocation in a new 
city, or some kind of health shock, tha t are likely to affect the utility attached to the 
consumption of hard drugs.
By assumption, consumption of drugs is addictive, i.e. it entails the accumulation of 
a stock of habits, denoted by h. The more the agents consume of the addictive good, the 
higher the level of the stock of habits an addict will transfer to the next period. Notice 
tha t the agents are assumed to be rational.
An incomplete markets framework is assumed. Agents cannot buy insurances against 
two risks: the unemployment risk and the taste shock risk.12 As for the former assumption, 
it is a well known fact that felons convicted because of a property crime were more likely 
to be unemployed at the time of the offense. This state dependent outcome suggests that 
people cannot fully insure against the unemployment risk. As for the latter assumption, it 
is sufficient to rely on a moral hazard argument to justify the absence of such an insurance 
scheme.
In order to keep the notation simple, we assume that agents can buy an insurance 
against the risk of being victim of a property crime. The insurance sector is assumed to 
be perfectly competitive, hence in equilibrium the price will simply reflect the probability 
of being victimized and the amount of lost income.
Studies on convicted drug abusers and property crime offenders, e.g. Kinlock, O 'Gradv 
and Hanlon (2003) and Wilson and Abrahamse (1992). show a small degree of specializa­
tion: criminals tend to be involved in many different income generating felonies, with drug 
selling being the most lucrative one. Hence, in the analysis every individual can choose 
whether to be involved in stealing from other agents and in selling drugs.
Finally, notice that by assumption there is no aggregate uncertainty: every random 
event is idiosyncratic, and given that there is a continuum of individuals in each state.
11 We chose to m odel unobserved heterogeneity in this way for the following reasons: it gives the agents 
a high degree of flexibility in the choice of entering and exiting drug use, it helps in generating highly  
heterogeneous expenditure profiles and it is com putationally tractable.
12Strictly speaking, also going to prison is a risky event, which is not insurable. However, it is the 
punishment related to a public policy, and, as such, it is uninsurable by law.
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a law of large number applies. As a consequence, the economy at the aggregate level is 
deterministic.
2 .3 .1  D em o g ra p h ics
As discussed in Section 2, the participation in property crimes, in drug violations and 
the use of hard drugs are higher for young individuals. It is of paramount importance 
to consider explicitly in the analysis the age of the offenders. Hence, an overlapping 
generations structure is assumed. The economy is populated by I  overlapping generations, 
whose measure is normalized to one. People age deterministically.
2 .3 .2  P re feren ces
Agents’ preferences are defined on both the numeraire good c and hard drugs d. Moreover, 
in each period every individual receives a taste shock e. which is assumed to be normally 
distributed. Preferences are separable over time in c, d and h taken together, with h being 
the stock of habits. Due to the habit forming nature of the d good, they are not when 
only c and d are considered, pc stands for the number of property crimes and ds for the 
amount of drug sold in the drug market.
Each individual solves the following problem:
I
max U(ci, ..,d i, ..,h i, . . , s i , ..) =  max Ep ^  8l~l [u(cj, dj, hj, g,)]
[ci.d-i ,h{ -|-i ,pci.ds^ {ci.di,hi+i .pc^  } t = 1 ^ ^
where Ep represents the expectation operator over all the possible histories generated by 
the employment opportunity shocks (s £ S  = {e, u}). the distribution of the taste shock 
c, the probability of being victim of a crime ttv, and the probabilities of apprehension 
if property crimes or drug abuse violations are committed { 7^ ,  7TqS, 7rf}; 7TqC stands for 
the probability of being apprehended if a property crime is committed, stands for 
the probability of being apprehended if involved in drug selling and stands for the 
probability of being arrested because of drug possession. j3 £ (0,1) is the subjective 
discount factor.
I11 every period each agent decides on how much to consume of the numeraire con­
sumption good c, how much to consume of the habit forming good d, whether to commit 
property crimes pc and whether to sell drugs ds.
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Assume tha t the per period utility is as follows:
u (c, d, h, e) = QfccC2 +  a cc +  a ddd2 +  (ad +  5 ) d +  a dhdh
and the parameters are such tha t they guarantee concavity of the utility function.13 
We chose a quadratic specification because: 1) it is rather flexible, 2) it can allow for zero 
consumption of both d and c, 3) it is customary in the rational addiction framework. We 
assume a dh > 0, for the model to be capable of generating a crucial feature of addictive 
goods, i.e. a reinforcement effect or tha t drug consumption is increasing in the level of 
habits. Possession of hard drugs is illegal: with some probability hard drugs consumer are 
caught and put into prison. For simplicity assume a linear relationship for the probability 
of apprehension x f(d) =  7r^d, with 0 < < 1. This implies that there is an upper bound
for drug consumption in a period, since for d > a drug user is caught with certainty.^a
The taste shock s affects the marginal utility of hard drugs (i.e. the MRS between c 
and d), by shifting the line up or down. The rationale for the taste shock is twofold: on 
the one hand, we don't observe all people in a given state making the same hard drugs 
consumption decisions. W ithout the taste shock the model would imply counterfactual 
drug consumption choices. On the other hand, it allows for very rich patterns of drug 
consumption over the life cycle: withdrawals and relapses are triggered by the interaction 
between economic incentives and the realization of the taste shock. Such phenomena 
would be very complicated to get otherwise. Assume that N  (0, cr2£) .
We denote the stock of habits by h, and we assume tha t it can take values on a 
compact set 7~L = [h,Ji\ ,h  > 0.14 Habits evolve according to a deterministic law of 
motion, which depends on the depreciation of the current stock of habits. Ah. and on 
the current consumption of the addictive good, d. Following the literature, Becker and
13Notice that in this model it would not be appropriate to rely on the usual arguments to justify a 
"log" utility function. The environment does not allow for savings, making the elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution a concept not well defined. W hat is well defined is the risk aversion. Moreover, the part 
of the utility  function related to drugs allows for utility to be bounded when addicted individuals are 
incarcerated, i.e. when they receive a zero quantity of the good. Finally, the parameters are identified  
through the variation in the hard drugs expenditure, and the prevalence rates of drug use.
14The upper bound for habits h can be easily obtained. More precisely, h is age specific, i.e. h, and 
corresponds to the stock of habits when all income is spent on drugs, with the agent com m itting the 
maximum number of property crimes and selling the maximum amount of drugs, w ithout being arrested.
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Murphy (1988) and Orphanides and Zervos (1995), the specific functional form is assumed 
to be h' =  (1 — A) h +  d.
Addicts are happy, from an ex-ante perspective, in the sense that they make optimal 
choices, given their budget sets, the criminal opportunities and the characteristics of the 
criminal justice system. Notice tha t individuals are rational and use all the information at 
their disposal in the best possible way. From this perspective, any public policy aimed at 
reducing consumption would be welfare decreasing for the agents that decide to consume. 
Public interventions, in the form of constraints to consumption, can be justified only 
relying on esternality arguments, e.g. if hard drug addicts rely on property crimes to 
finance their consumption. A costly justice system, the income losses, the psychological 
traum as of the victims and their related health costs are the relevant externalities to be 
evaluated in the property crimes case.
Notice that we do not allow for agents to die because of their addiction. The most 
common cause of death is the inability of consumers to assess the purity of the substance 
they are using. Either the drug being mixed with toxic chemicals or its excessive purity 
relative to the level of tolerance already developed can cause a deadly reaction. Essentially, 
the cause of death lies in an asymmetric information problem, which for simplicity we do 
not model.
2 .3 .3  E n d o w m en ts
Agents are endowed with exogenously given efficiency units, , which vary with age 
and education level.10 Notice tha t the efficiency units only affect the legal income received 
by the agents, while they do not influence the illegal earnings possibility.
Agents receive every period a stochastic employment opportunity, which depends on 
age. education, employment status and the stock of habits.
The employment opportunities follow a first order Markov process. The transition 
function of the employment opportunity state is represented by matrices which depend 
on age, education and stock of habits Il{ ed (h ; s, s') = [iT{ ed (h ; k , j ) ] , where each element
1 'Unlike in Becker and Murphy (1988), the stock of habits does not affect wages. The available empirical 
evidence on this m atter has proven quite elusive: in a study on the effect of cocaine on wages, Kaestner 
(1991) finds a positive effect. However, his findings could be driven by both sample attrition issues and 
several potential sources of simultaneity. Also the 2SLS procedure im plemented could lead to unsound 
findings, given the difficulty of finding reliable instrum ents for the endogenous regressors.
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Ki.ed {h; k , j )  is defined as 7rLed (h; k , j )  =  P r {st+i = j \ s t = k} , fc, j  =  {e, u}. By assump­
tion, ^ K i ,ed(h) > 0  and 7r^ed(.) has a logistic functional form:
_  exP (7 +  7hh +  7ji +  7 » i2 +  l eded)
?ri,ed 1 +  exp ( 7  +  7 hh +  7 ,i +  7 zl22 +  l eded)
where the 7 *s are parameters to be (structurally) estim ated . 16
Being the unemployment probability increasing in the stock of habits, the agents face a 
trade-off between hard drugs consumption and labor market rewards. The higher the cur­
rent consumption of d, the higher the probability of being unemployed tomorrow. Given 
that the efficiency units are increasing over the life-cycle, the opportunity costs of consum­
ing hard drugs increases with the age of the agent. For a given level of the taste shocks, 
this mechanism generates hard drugs consumption functions which are decreasing in age, 
a prediction of the model which is consistent with the empirical facts discussed above.
If an agent is unemployed during a period of time, he receives an unemployment benefit, 
with a given replacement ratio equal to  o. Employed agents contribute to the insurance 
benefits with a proportional tax Ty on their labor earnings. All agents pay for the costs of 
the criminal justice system with a proportional tax r  j  011 their legal earnings. To simplify 
the notation, denote the agents' legal income with ysdted, with ye,i.ed — (1  — ~u ~  
and yu,i,ed =z 0  (I — Tj)
As a side comment, notice tha t the relationship between unemployment and crime 
has been studied extensively in the literature, e.g. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001). 
Allowing for agents to be unemployed is crucial if we are to explain the crime participation. 
Agents in the model need to face the appropriate economic incentives, that is they need 
to compare the benefits and costs of crime, by taking into consideration their current legal 
income.
2 .3 .4  C r im in a l O p p o rtu n itie s
As far as the criminal side of the economy is concerned, w*e extend the framew’ork first 
proposed by Becker (1968) and implemented in a dynamic environment by Flinn (1986)
16 The 7 parameters are identified through the variation in the unemployment rates by age, education, 
incarceration status and drug use.
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and Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004). Every agent has access to two types of income 
generating criminal opportunities: property crimes and drug selling. These are considered 
in turn.
P roperty  Crim es
Every agent can engage in property crimes in every period of his life, irrespective of his 
employment opportunity. The modeling strategy related to this criminal choice generalizes 
Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004). There exists a criminal technology, y (pc), that 
maps the number of crimes into criminal earnings. We chose to allow for multiple crimes 
because there is evidence in the Rand Inm ate surveys, discussed in Wilson and Abrahamse 
(1992), that the bulk of crimes are committed by a minority of offenders: these observations 
suggest that the intensive margin is a relevant one. We assume that committing crimes 
corresponds to stealing a constant fraction p of the average legal income in the economy 
y times the number of crimes pc. T hat is. we assume that y (pc) = pypc. Notice that 
y' (pc) > 0 and y (0) =  0. that is the technology is linear and people who decide not to be 
involved in property crimes get zero illegal income. A crime attem pt is always successful. 
However, with probability 7TqC (pc) criminals are caught and incarcerated for Tpc periods 
at the beginning of the period, while with probability (1 — 7r%c (pc)) they remain free and 
can use the additional economic resources pypc. obtained through theft. For simplicity 
assume a linear relationship for the probability of apprehension 7T^(pc) = ir^pc, with 
0 < 7 <  1 being a parameter. A nice feature of this formulation is to have an upper 
bound for the maximum number of crimes in a period, since for pc > a criminal is7T a
caught with certainty. This bound, together with the linearity of the criminal earnings 
technology, allows for a simple sufficient condition for the aggregate feasibility condition 
of property crimes, i.e. the condition that ensures that criminals do not steal more than 
what is available in the economy. In our framework this condition boils down to p < 7r^0.1'
Notice tha t committing crimes does not entail any direct cost, neither monetary nor 
in terms of time; the only cost is the opportunity cost of being apprehended. W ith 
endogenous probability 7r£c (wffiich in equilibrium corresponds to the aggregate crime rate) 
an agent is victim of a crime and loses py units of his disposable income, tha t is a flat
11 To get this inequality first compute the highest possible crime rate in the economy, which is obtained  
when every agent com m its exactly pc  =  crimes. Then im pose feasibility, or that the stolen incom e is 
less than the average legal income, i.e. y (pc) =  p y —w  <  y.
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am ount.18 Notice that we assume th a t an agent can be victimized at most once in a period 
of time. Moreover, both the criminal earnings function and the apprehension technology 
are the same for every agent in the economy.19
D rug Selling
Beside property crimes, another income generating illegal opportunity is available: drug 
selling. We assume that drugs are not produced in the economy, but are imported from 
another Country.20 Every drug seller in the economy acts as an atomistic agent, i.e. he 
is a price taker, and obtains the illegal substance from non resident international drug 
dealers. Since the focus of the paper is not on international drug dealing, we assume both 
tha t the international drug dealers do not have any active role in the domestic economy 
and that their supply function is perfectly elastic at an exogenously given price pd-21 The 
assumption of perfect competition for the domestic drug sellers is consistent with the 
actual structure of the US drug selling business at the street level: 92% (86%) of state 
(federal) drug prisoners reported in the SI tha t they were not part of any organized criminal 
group. It is worth stressing tha t this seems to be compatible also with the gang structure 
discussed in Levitt and Venkatesh (2000): in the Chicago based gang they analyze, the 
majority of people involved in selling drugs are not gang members, but they appear only 
in their ranks, tha t is they can buy drugs from gang members to be resold in a location 
different from the gang’s turf.
Notice that the returns from drug dealing are endogenous, and depend on the dimension 
of the market, i.e. on the aggregate drug demand and on the number of people that 
decide to sell drugs. It is assumed tha t every person selling drugs decide how many 
units of hard drugs (ds) he is willing to sell. His revenues are given by the amount
18This assum ption is justified from the data contained in the NCVS: som ewhat surprisingly, there is a 
zero correlation between the v ictim ’s income and the amount stolen.
19 Notice that by assum ption there is no income loss from fencing the stolen goods. We justify this choice 
by noting that: 1) there are no data available on this issue, 2) since the mid 90's virtual markets such as 
E-bay have increased the likelihood of selling a stolen good for its market value.
20For hard drugs this assumption is based on the actual characteristics of this phenomenon, as discussed  
in UNO DC (2003). The most important hard drugs producers and exporters to the US are A fghanistan  
for heroin, and Colombia for cocaine.
21 D om estic drug sellers are to be interpreted as street-level drug dealers. For a study on the fight 
against the producers of illegal hard drugs, what we refer to as international or high level drug dealers, see 
Grossman and Mejia (2005).
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sold times the domestic market price p j, net of the money given to the high level drug 
dealers to obtain the good, i.e. the net profits are (pj — Pd) ds. Just like for property 
crimes, there is an exogenous probability of being incarcerated for Tds periods because 
of drug selling for each unit sold. For simplicity assume a linear relationship for the 
probability of apprehension 7r^(ds) =  ir^ds, with 0 < 7r J  < 1 . As for the other illegal 
activities, also in this case there is an upper bound for drug selling in a period, since for 
ds > -5 7  a drug seller is caught with certainty. It is worth stressing tha t this feature^ a
allows for an (endogenous) domestic market price p j which is above the international 
one pd, irrespective of the assumption of perfect competition and free entry. Even if the 
supply function of international drug dealers is flat at pd. the domestic supply function 
is positively sloped. The intuition for this result is simple: since individual drug sellers 
decide not to sell hard drugs in excess of in order to satisfy the demand agentsa
with different characteristics (age, employment status, habits, taste shock) enter the drug 
market as the quantity increases. Since the opportunity costs of being caught for these 
agents is progressively increasing, they ask for a higher compensation for this risk, making 
the supply function an increasing function of the price. In this economy every agent can 
buy hard drugs at the constant price pd from foreign drug dealers and resell them  at 
the price p j in the domestic market. For simplicity there are no liquidity constraints or 
informational frictions on the location of the drug markets.
2 .3 .5  G ov ern m en t
The role of the government in this economy is twofold.
First, it runs the unemployment insurance benefits scheme, by taxing the labor in­
come of the employed workers at rate tjj and subsidizing the unemployed workers at the 
replacement rate O. Q is a policy parameter exogenously given, while Ty is set residually 
to ensure in equilibrium a self-financing scheme.
Second, the government runs the legal system, providing the costless apprehension 
technologies th a t allow to detect and punish a fraction of the crimes committed. Detected 
criminals are immediately incarcerated: while in prison they all consume a constant level 
ca, which is financed through a proportional tax r  j  paid by all the agents in the economy. 
Also T j  is set such that the scheme is self-financing. Notice tha t drug addicts receive a 
zero quantity of the drug while in prison.
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2 .3 .6  T ech n o lo g y
The production side of the model is kept as simple as possible. There is a 1-to-l constant 
returns to scale technology F(L), which relies on aggregate labor L  to produce the out­
pu t.22 Aggregate labor is defined as the sum of the employed agents' efficiency units: as a 
consequence, the wage rate per efficiency unit is equal to one, w = 1. and labor earnings 
for each individual are equal to their efficiency units endowment.
2 .3 .7  T im in g
The timing of the model is assumed to be the following: 1) A random fraction of inmates 
get out of jail; 2) Both the idiosyncratic unemployment shocks and the taste shock are 
realized and observed by the agents; 3) Production takes place, with the employed people 
working for a wage and with the unemployed receiving a subsidy; 4) The crime and 
consumption decisions are simultaneously taken; 5) A random fraction of agents involved 
in illegal activities are arrested and incarcerated.
As a final remark, notice that agents cannot save in this framework. It should be noted 
that a-priori this is not a shortcoming of the model. On the one hand, in an economy with 
savings agents hit by the unemployment shock could rely on their asset income to smooth 
consumption, reducing the likelihood of being involved in crimes. However, on the other 
hand, if debt was allowed, negative asset income would increase the likelihood of either 
drug selling or property crimes. Hence, the overall effect is ambiguous: unfortunately, 
the computational burden of allowing for another continuous state variable would increase 
substantially.
2 .4  E q u ilib rium
In this Section we first define the problem of the agents in their recursive representation, 
then we provide a formal definition of the equilibrium concept used in this model, the 
recursive competitive equilibrium. Notice that the vector representing the individual state 
variables is defined as x = (?, ed, s, fi, s, J ) , whose entries are age i £ X. education level 
ed £ £T>, employment status s £ S ,  stock of habits h £ 7i, taste shock a £ 3?, and
22 This assum ption is made mainly to give the negative endowment shock the interpretation of an unem ­
ploym ent spell.
46
conviction status J  £ J  = {0,1}. The optimal value functions are defined as V^ed (s, h, s) 
for the agents not in prison and J{ed (h, t ) for the inmates.
2 .4 .1  P r o b le m  o f  th e  a g en ts
In recursive form the problem of the agents can be represented as follows:23 
Vi'ed(s,h,S) =
max {Eu(c,d, h,s) + fiE£ne Y ,s' ^i.edih'is, s') l^+i.ed (s', h ',s ')}  =c,d,h' .pc.ds
= dmax (1 — n^pc)  ( l — n ^ d s )  ( l  — 7rfd)
{u(ys,i,ed +  rfypc +  ( p j - p d ) d s -  pjd, d, fr, s)
+pEs'\e Y.S’ ((1 -  A) h +  d; s, s') Vi+1_ed (s', (1 -  A) h +  d, c')}
+  [l -  (1 -  7TaCpc) (1 -  7r f  ds) (1 -  Trfd)] {u(ca, 0, h, s) +  l3Ji+hed ((1 -  A) h, 0)} 
s.t.
c + p2d + pj < ysMd +  pypc + (pd -  Pd) ds
h! =  (1 -  A) h +  d
s ~ . V ( 0 , a 2)
h\ given , c > 0, d > 0, pc >  0, ds > 0
bi.ed (5i ~) stands for the optimal value functions of an agent of age i, education ed.
with employment status s, with an accumulated stock of habits h and with a current period
taste shock s. Notice that we have substituted the explicit expression for the expectation,
the individual budget constraint and the law of motion for the habits.
Ji,ed (h, t) is the value function of a convicted felon, who has spent already t periods in
jail. Notice tha t these agents do not take any decision. The expressions for the inmates
value functions are the following.
2,1 In order to save on space, in this section only a simplified version of the problem will be presented. We 
are im plicitly assum ing that all crimes are punished with the same prison term, or that Tj =  T, Vj. This 
implies that there is just one value function for inm ates, J ... (. , . ) . irrespective of the crime the offender 
has been caught for. The complete problem is reported in appendix A.
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Ji.ed — ^(^a5 0, h, 0) ~)~ /3Ji-\-l,ed (^b t 4" 1)
Jied (h, T  - I )  = u(ca, 0, h, 0) +  /3 {QE£,\£ X L  *i+i.ed (h': s, s') V;+Le(* (s', /i', s') 4- 
(1 -  0  Ji+l,ed(h\T)}
(2 .2 )
A ed (L  T ) =  u (ca , 0, /l, 0) +  /3££/|e X s ' ^t+l.ed S, s ')  K +l,ed («', s ')
S.t.
h1 = ( l - X ) h  
s ~  N  (0, cr )^
T stands for the maximum number of periods a felon has to spend in prison because 
of his criminal charges, while £ represents the probability of being released after T  — 1 
periods (prison time does not coincide with T  model periods). Notice tha t £ is not a state 
in the J  value functions, because of the i.i.d. assumption and the specific utility function 
used.
2 .4 .2  R ecu rs iv e  S ta t io n a r y  E q u ilib r iu m
D efin ition  1 For a given set of policies {6 \  ca} , apprehension probabilities {7TqC, 7rf5, it*}  , 
prison time by type of crime {Tj}  , hard drugs retail p r icep d, and efficiency units {iOjed},  
a recursive stationary equilibrium is a set of individual value functions  {V*,e£f (s, ft, s ) , 
Ji.ed (h, t ) }  , decision rules {ci ed (s, ft, s) , dued (s, ft, e )  , cri ed (s, ft, s ) , d s i ed (s, ft,s)} , prices  
fo r  hard drugs and the property crime insurance { pd. pj } ,  taxes average legal in­
come y , aggregate victimization rate 7^ , and stationary distributions j/ij ed(s -> b^ e )-> /i fed(^) 
such that:24
•  Given relative prices {pd,Pd,Pi} ■> government policies {<?, ca}, taxes {t u , t j } and 
{ tt^ , 7r£c, 7r j ,  7rf, y, £Ji?ed}, the individual policy functions {ci,ed (s, ft, s ) , («, ft, - ) ,
i 4c,,ed (s, h. e) : X x ££> x <S x 74 x -3? —> denote the numeraire consum ption functions, d ,.ed (s, h . e ) : 
X x £X> x <S x 7i  x 9? —» jo, j denote the hard drugs consum ption functions, cr,,e(j (s, h. e) : X x £X> x S  x
74 x 9? —► [0, j denote the property crime functions and d s ue(j (s. h .e )  : X x £T> x S  x 7i x  —► |^ 0, j 
denote the drug selling functions.
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cri ed (s, h, 5 ), dsi ed (s , /j, s)}  solve the households problem (2.1)-(2.2) and { V ^  (s, /i, 5 ), 
Ji.ed { h , t ) }  are the associated value functions.
•  The stationary distributions /^ ed W }  satisfy:
M t+i,ed(s / > V )  =
"  *?Pci,'d(.s,h,s)) (1 -  TTfdst,ed(s.h ,e))
(2.3)
(! -  ni<ii,ed(s,h,s)) iri+i,ed ( t i ; s , s ' ) d n ited(s, h,s)/i(e')+
^ i + l . e d f i  ) “  J h : h ' = ( l - \ ) h  (  ^ — ^ ^ i . e d i ^ 1) ' ^
Y . S h : h ' = d , M s - h . e W - > - ) h x S l  t1 -  ( !  -  *Fp* .ed(s ,h ,s))  ( l  -  (s, h, e ) )  (2.4)
s
(1  -  Kdadi.ed (s, h, s))] dyted(s , h, £)
In equilibrium the measure of agents in each state and age is time invariant and con­
sistent with individual decisions.20
• The aggregate crime rate (i.e. the victimization probability) is given by:
criM (s,h,£)iiied(s,dh,d£).
s.i.ed ’
• The average legal income y is equal to:
V = y 2  ys,i.ed^i.ed(s ^dh^ ) -
s. i .ed
•  The measure fif of hard drugs consumers by age is given by:
2o/i(e') stands for the CDF of e, that is a normal random variable w ith mean zero and variance cr\.
where x  [^,ed(0 > 0] stands for an indicator function equal to 1 if hard drugs consump­
tion di'ed(-) is strictly positive and equal to zero otherwise.
The measure pds of hard drugs sellers is given by:
pds I X [dsi.ed(s, h, s) >  0] /q ed(s, dh , ds).
s lid  ''H ®
where \  [^5i,ed(0 > 0] stands for an indicator function equal to 1 if hard drugs con­
sumption dsi_ed(.) is strictly positive and equal to zero otherwise.
• Pd is such that there is market clearing in the hard drugs market, i.e. it is such that:
V ]  /  dshed(s ,h ,s )p ied(s,dh,(te) =  V  /  dted(s, h, s ) ^  ed(s, dh, ds).
s,i.edJ H aj l dj H*
•  The labor market clears:
i,ed JH  *
•  The aggregate resource constraint is equal to:
F (L ) = y z  ^i.edl^i.edie, dh , ds) =
i.ed JH*
T  /  [ci,ed(s, K e] +  Pddsi,ed(s , h, t-)l /q ed(s, dh , ds). 
cs.t .ed
•  The average labor income y is equal to:
• The price for the property crime insurance pj  is equal to:
P i  =  r j y w v
Since by assumption the insurance sector is competitive, the price pj depends only on 
the probability of being hit by a criminal and the amount of stolen income.
• The unemployment insurance benefits scheme is self-financing:
E  QVe.i .ed Jfl ft P i . e d ( u i dh, ds) 
i .ed
TU =  ------------------ ~-------------------- •
y
tha t is the proportional tax rate Tu is set such that the total expenditure for unem­
ployment benefits are exactly equal to the revenues from taxation.
• The proportional tax rate r j  is given by:
Cq E  J H P i , e d ( d h )
i.ed
Tj = -------- =-------- •
y
or the revenues from this tax cover for all the criminal justice expenses.
2.5  S M M  E stim a tio n  an d  N u m erica l S o lu tion
The model, even for very simple functional forms, does not possess a closed form solution. 
As a consequence, it has to be solved numerically and simulated on a computer.
Being the agents finitely lived, the problem can be solved backwards. Starting from 
age I  and exploiting the assumption tha t Vi+iv ( .,.,.)  =  J /+ i , . (.) =  0 the problems of the 
agents are solved for each point in the state space (e d ,s ,h ,s ) at each age i, until i = 1 is 
reached.
Once the value functions and the policy functions are computed, the stationary distri­
butions can be obtained, relying on the recursions (2.3) and (2.4).
The policy functions and the stationary distributions are then used to compute all the 
aggregate statistics of the economy, in particular the property crime rate and the total 
demand and supply of drugs.
•51
In order to simulate the model, param eter values need to be specified. The parameters 
are divided into two groups. The first group consists of those parameters that correspond 
to a variable which has a natural empirical counterpart, hence they can be obtained directly 
from the data. For the second kind of parameters, the ones which do not map directly into 
observable variables, we rely on a Simulated Method of Moments estimation procedure. 
Hansen (1992) and Gourieroux and Monfort (1996). The Simplex method (Nelder-Mead 
algorithm) is implemented to search for the set of parameters that minimizes the weighted 
sum of squares of the difference between the moments predicted by the model and the 
actual ones. Since several datasets are exploited at the same time, choosing the weighting 
m atrix is not an obvious task. For simplicity, the identity matrix is used: under this 
specification, estimates are consistent, but not necessarily efficient.
•  First step - Parameters obtained directly from the data:
— Number of periods of economic active life.
— Share of the population in each educational level.
— Probability of conviction if a property crime is committed.
— Value of a property crime.
— Consumption in jail.
— Unemployment benefit replacement ratio.
— International price of a unit of hard drugs at the average purity.
— Age-education profiles for the efficiency units.
— Prison period length for the various offenses.
•  Second step - SMM, Moments used in the estimation:
— Selected percentiles that lie in the interquartile range of the hard drugs expen­
diture distribution (to decrease the effect of outliers).
— Prevalence of drug use by age for both the inmates and the non institutional 
population.
— Persistence of drug use.
— Unemployment rates by age, education and drug use.
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— Inmates composition by age, education and type of crime.
— Share of population in Prison.
2 .5 .1  S ou rces o f  Id en tifica tio n
This Section provides an informal discussion on the identification of the parameters of the 
model.
As outlined before, the first set of param eters are exogenous to the model and are 
observable. It follows that they can be recovered directly from the available data. These 
are reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8.
The model period is one year, there are 50 years of active economic life and the param­
eter j3. the discount factor, is fixed at a standard value of 0.989.26 The educational shares 
in the population are computed from the 1996 CPS. In tha t year, 15.21% of the male 
population were high school dropouts, 59.15% were high school graduates and 25.64% 
had at least some years of college education. The policy parameter <p, i.e. the unemploy­
ment benefit replacement rate, is set to replicate the actual unemployment benefit scheme 
operating in the US. i.e. o =  0.5. The probability of apprehension for property crimes 
7TaC is obtained dividing the number of convicted property crime felons by the number of 
property crimes reported to the police, and included in the UCR in 1996. We normalize 
the average disposable legitimate earnings y to 1. This is done by appropriately rescaling 
the efficiency units u .^ed- The actual value in 1996 was $28,513. The parameter related to 
the earnings from crime is set to r] = 0.0439, to replicate the value of $1,253, the average 
value of a property crime computed from the UCR in 1996.
Following Imrohoroglu. Merlo and Rupert (2000) the exogenous consumption when in 
jail ca is set at $2,600, i.e. this leads to ca = 0.0984.2'
For tractability, the model considers only one type of hard drug. As long as the 
addictive properties of powder cocaine, crack and heroin are similar, an aggregation of the 
three drugs is a reasonable step. In order to obtain a hard drug price pd representative 
of high level transactions, the quantities and prices for the three types of drugs should
26We chose not to estim ate the discount factor, relying on a standard value for OLG models w ith a one 
year tim e period. The reason being that it is hard to argue that this parameter can be separately identified  
from the depreciation of the habits stock.
2'N otice that in the economy there are no agents with a legitim ate income less than cQ.
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Figure 2.7: Cocaine and Heroin shares in the DEA seizures (Source: US Dept of Justice 
(2003))
be used. Unfortunately, as stressed also in Section 2, the available data do not allow for 
such a procedure. A different approach is taken. Thanks to the drug reporting systems 
managed by the DEA, there exists data  on hard drugs seizures by the police. These data 
provide, for each year, the substance and the quantity seized. For our purposes, as shares 
of each drug we consider the respective shares in the seizures. This method is valid under 
the assumption that the drug seizures are a random sample of the actual drug markets. 
Notice tha t the shares, as shown in Figure 2.7, have been rather constant since the mid 
80’s. The values for 1996 are 98.4% for cocaine and 1.6% for heroin. Finally, to get 
the drug price at the retail level, we proceed as follows. First, for all the transactions 
included in the STRIDE above 5 grams, we divide the price by the purity. Then we 
compute separately the average price per pure gram for cocaine, crack and heroin. Next, 
we multiply the average price of each substance by its average purity. Then, we assume 
tha t crack and cocaine have the same market share, and weight cocaine and heroin prices 
by their respective shares in the DEA seizures. The final retail price for the representative 
transaction is $48.68: this is the price per gram of the artificial composed illegal substance 
sold in the model economy. This implies that the price pd, at wThich the domestic dealers 
can buy the substance to be resold in the street level markets is equal to 0.1532 (for a 100 
grams transaction).
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Parameter Value Target
Model Period 1 year
I 50 Active population from 16 to 65 year old
0 0.989 Standard
P h sd 15.21% Share of High School Dropouts - from CPS data
T h s 59.15% Share of High School Graduates - from CPS data
M col 25.64% Share of College Graduates - from CPS data
P 0.5 US unemployment benefits scheme
P d 0.1532 Average drug price at the average purity (100 grams)
IT ? 0.0492 Data from the UCR
V 0.0439 One property crime is worth $1,253
C-a 0.0984 Inmates consumption =$2,600
k ' i.ed See Table 7 Predicted values of a wage regression on CPS data
Ti,Cj See Table S Actual (mean) time served in prison
Table 2.6: First Stage - Calibration
Table 7 reports the log wage regression from CPS data, which provides the efficiency 
units by age and educational level. The regressors are a quartic polynomial in age, edu­
cation dummies (with the high school dropouts being the omitted group) and a constant. 
Notice that the efficiency units profiles are hump shaped over the life-cycle and increasing 
in education.28
Every illegal activity faces a probability of detection and incarceration. For simplicity, 
the model abstract from stigma effects on both the labor market and the criminal justice 
system of previous convictions. Moreover, given the nature of the punishment, it is as­
sumed tha t arrests per-se do not matter: what matters for the criminal choices are the 
incarceration probabilities and the level of consumption while in jail. Notice also tha t an 
implicit assumption we are making is that every individual knows the true probability of 
incarceration for every crime.
In the model the police investigations are independent for each crime. Given tha t there 
are three illegal activities in the model economy, it follows that there are seven possible 
combinations of successful detection and incarceration. The prison terms, tha t is the time
28The efficiency units ujued are obtained as the predicted values of the OLS regression, and are then  
rescaled to normalise the average disposable labor income to 1.
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P aram eter Log Wage
Age 0.0292
(3.10)
Age2 0.00117
(3.33)
Age3 -0.000034
(-6 .29)
Age4 2.l i e  — 07
(6.99)
High School 0.2303
(43.82)
College 0.3956
(51.15)
Constant 0.8944
(10.21)
N. Obs 45640
Adj. R 2 0.301
Table 2.7: Log Wage Regression, t statistics in parenthesis (Source: CPS 1996)
Offense Type Parameter Time (Months) Parameter Probability
Property Crime (PC) Tpc 17.8 Cpc 0.48
Drug Selling (DS) T ds 16.4 Cds 0.37
Drug Use (DU) Td 15.0 Q 0.25
PC  & DS Tpc.ds 20.5 t p c .d s 0.71
DS & DU Tpc.d 18.7 Cpc.d 0.56
PC & DU T ds.d 19.1 Cds,d 0.59
PC & D S & DU Tpc.ds,d 23.3 Cpc,ds.d 0.94
Table 2.8: Actual Prison Time and Probability of Leaving Prison After One Period, By 
Offense Type (Source: NCRP 1996)
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a convicted felon has to spend in prison for his charges, are computed using data on actual 
time spent in correctional institutions in the US. The source is the 1996 wave of the NCRP: 
for each possible combination of crimes, the prison time by offense type is obtained as the 
mean time spent by inmates of state prisons released in the year 1996. Table 8 reports the 
actual time spent in prison. Notice tha t, quite surprisingly, 1) there is no much variation 
in time served in prison: all actual served sentences range between 15 and 23.3 months, 
2) contrary to what the conventional wisdom and the popular press have been claiming, 
the actual time served in prison is well below the statutory minimum sentences, 3) the 
offense punished -with the shortest prison term  is drug use, with a punishment not very 
different from the others. Notice also th a t all prison terms are included between 12 and 
24 months, hence Tj = 1 for all j  £ J  =  {pc, ds, d, (pc, ds) , (pc, d) , (ds, d) , (pc, ds, d)}. 
From the computed punishments T), it is trivial to get the probabilities Q , tha t is the 
probability of exiting prison after one period. These are reported in Table 8 as well.
The set of parameters which need to be structurally estimated are the ones related 
to the taste shock (i.e. its variance), to the law of motion for the habits, to the utility 
function, to the unemployment probability, and to the conviction probabilities.
The standard deviation of the taste shock a £ and the depreciation of habits A are 
identified by the prevalence rates of drug use by age, computed from the NHSDA, and 
the persistence of hard drugs use.29 The observed values for the prevalence rates and the 
persistence of use are reported in Table 10.
As for preferences, the parameters a  appearing in the utility function are identified by 
the moments of the hard drugs expenditure. It is worth stressing that the expenditure 
refers to the inmates, before their arrest took place. More precisely, the amount consumed 
d multiplied by the equilibrium price at the street level p j is computed for all agents who 
will eventually be apprehended in the end of the period. Notice that the model and the 
data  are consistent, since we compare statistics obtained from a selected sample, where 
the model represents the selection mechanism. Agents in the model decide how much 
hard drugs to consume, hence how much to spend on that good, moreover they decide 
on their participation on illegal activities. A random fraction of people involved in crime 
are caught, and for those agents we compute their hard drugs expenditure when still free.
J9As for the latter, there is no information on the persistence of use on a year-to-year basis. We use 
instead the people in the NHSDA that used hard drugs in the month before the survey divided by the ones 
who used them  in the year before the survey, i.e. the ratio of the values reported in the second and third 
colum ns of Table 1.
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The moments of the expenditure distribution used in the SMM estimation procedure are 
the 25th, 40th, 50th, 60th and 75th percentiles (see Figure 2.5 and Table 10). We selected 
five moments since we have five parameters in the utility function, and we focused on 
percentiles included in the interquantile range to decrease the importance of outliers.
As for the unemployment probabilities, notice tha t it is not possible to run a regression 
of employment status on age, education and drug use for two reasons. First, the CPS does 
not contain information on hard drugs use, but in the sample there are also individuals 
who are drug users. Second, the stock of habits is unobservable, and in the model it is 
endogenous. The parameters in the probability of unemployment are identified by the 
average unemployment rates by age. education and. drug use (i.e. the values reported in 
Table 4).
As for the conviction probabilities, the only one tha t can be computed directly from 
the data is the one related to property crimes. This can be done since there are data  on 
both the number of convicted property criminals and the total number of property crimes. 
Notice that the second variable is not available for drug selling or drug use: these crimes do 
not involve a victim, hence there is no one reporting them to the police. The apprehension 
probabilities for drug possession and drug selling are identified by the inmates composition 
by type of crimes. Table 9 reports the value of the parameters estimated with SMM and 
which source of variation in the data  allows their identification.
2 .5 .2  M o d e l F it
In this Section we discuss the fit of the model.
First, in Figure 2.8, the equilibrium decision rules for property crimes are plotted. The 
graph displays the choices of high school dropouts agents, who are employed and whose 
current taste shock corresponds to the average of s. To improve the readability of the plot, 
only some ages were selected, namely ages 16, 20, 25, 37, 40 and 50. A few comments are 
in order. The property crimes functions are increasing in the stock of habits and are close 
to linear. This implies that the more intense the level of addiction, the higher the number 
of crimes tha t the agents are going to commit. Another interesting feature is the effect 
of age on the property crimes involvement. The policy functions are decreasing in age. 
Notice that age 37 is the first age such tha t if an agent does not have a positive stock of 
habits, he will not be involved in property crimes. Notice also tha t at ages 40 and 50 the 
agents need to have accumulated a strong addiction to steal from the other agents.
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P aram eter Value Source of Identification
Utility Function Moments of the Drugs Expenditure
&CC -0 .5 7
Ole 52.12
O dd -0 .35
O d 16.62
Otdh 35.73
Taste Shock and Habit Depreciation
o £ 3.99 Prevalence Rates of Hard Drugs Use
A 0.83 Persistence of Hard Drugs Use
Unemployment Probability Unemployment Rate Profiles
'V 0.27
I h 1.09
7 i -0 .13
7 n 0.001
7 hs -0 .68
7col -1 .41
Apprehension Probabilities Inmates composition by type of crimes
* da 0.009
7Tds 
n a 0.068
Table 2.9: Second Stage - SMM Estimation
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Figure 2.8: Property Crimes - Policy Functions by Age (Employed - Drop Outs - Average 
Shock)
The main features outlined above are shared also by the decision rules of agents with 
higher educational levels, with different levels of the taste shock as well as by the unem­
ployed.
Qualitatively, also the decision rules for drug consumption and drug selling behave in 
a similar way. In the interest of space, we do not report them.
Table 10 reports both the moments obtained by simulating the model and the corre­
sponding moments computed from the data. The simulations are based on 200,000 arti­
ficial individuals, behaving according to the optimal decision rules implied by the model. 
Notice that, in order to maximize the efficiency of the simulations, a oversampling proce­
dure is carried out. We simulate 30,000 individuals tha t are college graduates, 70,000 that 
are high school graduates, while the remaining 100,000 are high school dropouts. This is 
done because the latter group is the most crime prone one, and one wants to compute their 
crime involvement with some accuracy. Notice that the moments obtained by simulating 
the model are then weighted, in order to get the appropriate educational shares in the US 
population.
The model overall delivers a good fit. The model overpredicts the prevalence rates of
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hard drugs use for youths and underpredicts them for older agents. The persistence of 
drug use is also somewhat higher in the model. The hard drugs expenditure distribution 
predicted by the model is fairly close to the actual one. Notice tha t the listed moments 
are the ones used in the SMM estimation procedure, that is the 25th, 40th, 50th, 60th 
and 75th percentiles. The discrepancy between model and data seems to increase with the 
value of the drug expenditure. A plausible explanation is related to the model time period. 
A yearly period does not allow to capture the short run dynamics of the addiction process. 
Heavily addicted individuals spend large amounts to pay for their addiction, however, it 
is quite likely that this subset of people will be arrested and convicted after a short time 
period, possibly much shorter than one year.
As for the unemployment rate by hard drug use, the difference between the model and 
the data is small, less than one percentage point.
The next set of moments reported in Table 10 refer to the inmates composition by type 
of crime, considering the most serious offense in case of multiple crime charges. Notice 
tha t we are considering drug selling the most serious charge, followed by property crimes 
and then by drug possession. The model underpredicts the share for this last category of 
crimes. There are two likely reasons for this result. The first one is related to the criminal 
justice system, i.e. it stems from a data  classification problem. It is quite possible that 
drug sellers caught with small amounts of illegal substances were convicted for a minor 
crime, i.e. drug possession, rather than  drug selling. This would also explain why the 
prison time for drug possession does not differ much from the prison time for drug selling. 
The second explanation is related to the prevalence rates of drug use. If the probability 
of apprehension for drug possession is sufficiently high, the agents will abstain from using 
hard drugs. The only way for the model to perform well both in the hard drugs expenditure 
distribution and in the prevalence rates profiles by age is to have a small probability of 
apprehension tt^ . Notice tha t the two remaining shares, for property crimes offenders and 
drug dealers, are higher in the model than in the data.
To conclude with. Figure 2.9 depicts the unemployment rates profiles by age and 
educational achievement. The model replicates successfully the main patterns, with the 
unemployment rates being very high for the young adults, and decreasing with both age 
and education.
The mechanism at work in the model is relatively simple and can be summarized 
as follows. The involvement in crimes is driven by several factors. The first one is the
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Variable Data Model
Prevalence Rates of Hard Drugs Use:
Age: 16 - IS 6.5% 8.7%
Age: 19 - 21 5.6% 7.1%
Age: 22 - 24 7.4% 6.0%
Age: 25 - 27 3.9% 5.2%
Age: 28 - 31 5.3% 4.4%
Age: 32 - 35 5.8% 3.7%
Age: 3 6 -4 0 3.5% 3.0%
Age: 40 + 0.4% 1.0%
Persistence of Hard Drugs Use 48.2% 57.1%
Hard Drugs Expenditure Distribution:
25th percentile $250 $277
40 th percentile $560 $503
50th percentile $900 $782
60th percentile $1,400 $1,116
75th percentile $2,750 $2,124
Hard Drugs Users Unemployment Rates 11.09% 10.21%
Inmates Composition:
Property Crimes 52.6% 56.7%
Drug Selling 34.9% 40.7%
Drug Possession 12.5% 2.6%
Table 2.10: Model Fit - Simulations Vs. Data
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Figure 2.9: Model Fit - Unemployment Rates by Age and Education
life-cycle dimension, which affects the crime decisions in two opposite ways. On the one 
hand, as people age, the reward to legal activities increases, since the efficiency units are 
increasing over the life-cycle. This provides an incentive not to commit crimes because of 
the high opportunity cost of being apprehended and because people with a higher legal 
income have a lower marginal utility from consumption. The second channel goes through 
hard drugs consumption. The same comments apply also in this case. The prevalence 
rate of drug consumption is declining over the life-cycle, because people are deterred by 
the increased likelihood of being unemployed.
The property crime rate obtained in model is equal to 4.3%, a value which tracks well 
the actual one for 1996, 4.6%.
Finally, notice that the model implies a price p j = 0.187, or an equilibrium street level 
price for hard drugs which is 22% higher than the retail one.
In the following Section a series of counterfactual experiments are carried out, to 
understand the effect of hard drugs on property crimes.
2.6  R esu lts
This Section presents the main results of the paper. First we compute the percentage of 
property crimes tha t is accounted for by hard drugs. Then two policy experiments meant
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Counterfactual Property Crime Rate Change
1) Economy without Habit Formation -22.3%
2) Economy without Hard Drugs -26.1%
Table 2.11: Hard Drugs Vs. Property Crimes
to decrease the property crime rate are presented.
2 .6 .1  H ard  D ru g s V s. P r o p e r ty  C rim es
How much of the property crime rate is accounted for by hard drugs addicts stealing in 
order to pay for their consumption of drugs? Answering this question is not a trivial task. 
In order to do so we propose two different exercises, based on counterfactual analysis. In 
the first laboratory economy hard drugs are assumed to be non addictive, tha t is they are 
no longer a habit forming good, while in the second economy hard drugs are assumed not 
to exist. We compute the property crime rates in these two economies and compare them 
to the baseline one, which is 4.3%.
The results of Table 11 show tha t a substantial part of property crimes, between 22% 
and 26%, are accounted for by predatory crime to finance hard drugs addiction.
In the first exercise, hard drugs are assumed to be non addictive: this leaves just 
the temporary hard drugs demand, leading to a drop in the equilibrium price for hard 
drugs and in the revenues from drug selling. This general equilibrium effect prevents the 
property crime rate to fall even further, the drop being equal to 22.3%.
In the second economy we consider another extreme case, tha t is we assume tha t hard 
drugs do not exist. In this economy the property crime rate drops by 26%. In this case 
agents cannot consume hard drugs and they cannot be involved in drug dealing. The 
only forces driving their property crime decisions are the poor legitimate opportunities. 
Young adults in either employment status and unemployed individuals decide to steal 
some money, because of their high marginal utility of consumption. This channel seems 
to be the most im portant one, accounting for no less than 74% of the property crime rate.
The results of this Section suggest tha t hard drugs play a non negligible role in shaping 
the US property crime rate. Below we consider two policy experiments aimed at reducing 
the property crime rate by changing the US drug policy.
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P olicy Experim ent P roperty Crim e Rate Change
Treatment (for Inmates) -11.1%
Table 2.12: The Effects of an Ideal Treatment
2 .6 .2  T h e  E ffects  o f  an  Id ea l T rea tm e n t T ech n o lo g y
The first policy experiment considers the effect of an ideal treatm ent technology. Assume 
tha t in the economy suddenly a perfect and costless treatm ent technology capable of 
eliminating the habit stock of treated individuals becomes available. Assume also that all 
convicted felons with a positive stock of habits are treated. W hat would be the indirect 
effect on the property crime rate of such a treatm ent?
As shown in Table 12, this policy would decrease the property crime rate by 11.1%. 
The reduction in the stock of habits reduces both the demand for drugs once the convicted 
felon is released and increases the likelihood th a t a taste shock will make this person no 
longer a drug user in the future.
Notice that in the baseline model economy agents do not have a treatment technology at 
their disposal, while in the US economy there are several treatm ent schemes available both 
for inmates and for the non-institutional population. However, most of the treated people 
relapse into hard drugs abuse in a very short period of time after having being treated, 
usually in less than six months. Notice also tha t it is pretty common for addicted criminals 
diverted to treatm ent centers to escape from these institutions, not returning there unless 
they are arrested again. Furthermore in 1996, the baseline year, the available treatm ent 
procedures were still under assessment, with a lot of disagreement among practitioners on 
which one was most effective.
2 .6 .3  A  L eg a liza tio n  E x p e r im e n t
The last counterfactual we consider is a hard drugs legalization policy. From an a-priori 
perspective the result of a legalization policy are not clear. Such a policy would make 
drug consumption legal and, at the same time, it would decrease the price at which hard 
drugs consumers can purchase these goods. On the one hand, there is a non trivial effect 
on the reaction of consumption. Both the prevalence rates and the quantity consumed are 
likely to change, inducing complicated (and hard to forecast) dynamics of addiction. On 
the other hand, heavily addicted individuals loose the income deriving from selling drugs
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Experim ent P roperty Crim e R ate Change
Legalization -18.6%
Table 2.13: A Hard Drugs Legalization Policy
to casual consumers. Understanding the overall effect is then an empirical question. If 
the government were to choose a price equal to p j, tha t is the price observed for high level 
transactions, the simulations show tha t such a policy would decrease the property crime 
rate by 18.6%, as reported in Table 13.
Legalization of hard drugs might seem to some people a rather extreme measure. 
However, notice that there have been other places and times where the consumption and 
the production of some kind of hard drugs were legal. Two such examples are the Opium 
Regie analyzed in detail by van Ours (1995), and the US experience before the Harrison 
Act, as discussed in MacCoun and Reuter (2001).
The discussion presented in Friedman (1991) and Miron (2004) shows that many com­
mentators and academics have called for a drastic change in the existing US policy related 
to illegal drugs. Those in favor of legalization argue that the costs induced by prohibition 
are large and th a t the money saved by making drugs legal could be used to set up awareness 
programs and to improve treatm ent services. The findings of this policy experiment offer 
a quantification of the potential benefits of such an alternative policy regime. Freeman 
(1996) suggests that the direct losses of the victims of crime are about $3,000, including 
both the health costs and the lost income. A 18% decrease in the property crime rate 
would save almost 7 billions to the American households. To this value also the reduced 
costs of a lighter criminal justice system should be added: if the figure reported in the 
introduction, 170 billions, is a good approximation, other 90 billions would be saved from 
the decriminalization of hard drugs possession and from the elimination of drug selling, 
and other 17 billions would be saved from the decreased conviction rates for property 
criminals.
Certainly the results are to be taken with some caution. The answers provided in 
this paper represent a first attem pt to tackle this complicated phenomenon and to better 
inform policy making. Under the specific type of legalization studied here, the government 
is free to choose to sell hard drugs at any price considered appropriate, according to some 
principle. We chose the price observed for retail drug purchases, since it is likely that 
such a price would be enough to eliminate illegal drug dealing. Such a price is pretty
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similar to the prices for legal cocaine and heroin tha t are currently used in the US for 
medical and scientific purposes, as computed by Miron (2003). However, notice tha t for 
even lower prices the response of consumption could be so strong to overcome the effects 
of a decreased price on the total expenditure and, in turn, on the property crimes. Even 
if this were not to be the case, under legalization the agents loose one of their income 
generating activity, i.e. drug selling, which, as discussed above, is not negligible at least 
for the consumers who are heavily addicted. This other channel might lead some criminals 
to substitute drug selling with property crimes.
2 .7  D iscu ssion  and  C on clu sion s
This chapter has contributed to the literature on the economics of crime, furthering our 
understanding of the determinants of criminal participation. The analysis has looked at 
property crimes, drug selling and drug abuse through the lens of an equilibrium model, in 
the spirit of Flinn (1986), Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000), and Imrohoroglu. Merlo 
and Rupert (2004).
A striking feature of property crimes, drug selling and illegal substance abuse in the US 
is the size of these phenomena. Literally millions of people are arrested each year either 
with a property crime charge or a drug violation one. These are quantitatively relevant 
both in terms of the number of people involved and in terms of the related economic costs. 
Not only there are about one and a half million inmates whose most serious charge was 
either a property crime or a drug violation, but also there is an "army" of probationers 
and parolees tha t might easily become convicted felons, if a policy change making the 
criminal justice system tougher ware to be enacted.
In the chapter a model of rational addiction and rational crime participation has been 
specified, parametrized and solved numerically. In the model, agents can be involved in 
several illegal behaviors, namely property crimes, hard drugs use and hard drugs selling: 
this modeling assumption is based on the lessons learned from the RAND inmates survey, 
studied by Wilson and Abrahamse (1992) among others.
The model is able to generate a declining criminal participation over the life-cycle, as 
observed in the UCR data. The mechanism tha t generates this outcome is very simple: the 
labor market rewards increase as agents age, making the opportunity cost of a prison term 
higher. This prevents older agents to be involved in income generating illegal activities.
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Another interesting feature of the model is the presence of an upward sloping supply 
of hard drugs at the street level. This is obtained irrespective of the assumptions of 
perfect competition for street level drug sellers and of a perfectly elastic supply of drugs 
for the international drug dealers. The supply curve is upward sloping since drug sellers 
are caught with certainty if they decide to sell drugs above a certain threshold. This 
assumption allows for drug sellers with different characteristics to participate in the drugs 
market: as the price of drugs increases, more agents find profitable to enter the market. 
Since the agents can be ranked in increasing order with respect to their opportunity costs 
of being apprehended, the supply increases smoothly in the price.
We argued that hard drugs addiction play a significant role in accounting for the ob­
served property crime rate. In the model, agents abusing drugs experience unemployment 
spells more frequently than people who don't. The unemployment risk, being uninsurable, 
is the force tha t induces some agents to abstain from consumption and that increases the 
likelihood of involvement in crimes for others.
The results show that a substantial part of property crimes, about 26%, is accounted for 
by predatory crime to finance hard drugs addiction. This value is obtained by comparing 
the property crime rate of the baseline economy (4.3%) to tha t of a counterfactual economy 
where hard drugs do not exist (3.18%). This finding provides a measure of the magnitude 
of a specific kind of negative externalities: the ones driven by predatory crime. Even if the 
model is a rational addiction one, there is room for public intervention due to the negative 
externalities induced by hard drugs addiction.30
Given that the number of property crimes accounted for by hard drugs is non negligible, 
we consider policy interventions alternative to the "War on Drugs" which is currently 
fought. Namely, the economic consequences of an ideal drug treatm ent scheme for all 
arrested felons are computed: such a policy decreases the property crime rate by 11.1%. 
Finally, with another counterfactual experiment, we assess the effects of a legalization 
policy: under this new’ regime, the property crime rate is shown to decrease by 18.6%.
It goes w’ithout saying th a t the findings of this analysis hinge on a number of assump­
tions: some caveats are in order.
The first caveat is related to the estimation of preferences. It is w’orth pointing out 
that the results of the counterfactuals are valid only under the maintained assumption 
tha t the primitives of the model are policy invariant. However, a legalization policy might
'10Notice, however, that the analysis focuses on the externalities related to the criminal justice system , 
while it does not consider other externalities such as the health costs related to drug abuse.
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affect also the “forbidden-fruit" type of consumption. If there are people consuming hard 
drugs mainly for the fact that they are illegal, the structural parameters would violate the 
policy invariance assumption. To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies assessing 
the plausibility of the “forbidden-fruit” hypothesis.
Second, the model does not allow for peer effects, which might be an im portant di­
mension for drug abuse. However, notice th a t there is some information contained in the 
NHSDA that could be exploited to better understand if this channel is a relevant one.
Third, in the legalization experiment the potential indirect costs induced by this policy 
are neglected. It is likely that phenomena such as Driving While Intoxicated and violent 
crimes, such as assault and rape, would increase as a consequence of the increase in hard 
drugs consumption. Admittedly, these costs are potentially very high.
Fourth, the policy experiments are implicitly assuming tha t the government is rebating 
the saved criminal justice costs to the households, namely it is not using the resources made 
available by the policy changes to increase the expenditure on police, affecting the likeli­
hood of an arrest for property crimes. This implies tha t the results of the counterfactuals 
are to be considered as lower bounds.
Fifth, in the model the structure of the drug market is very simple. It is reasonable 
to think tha t the international supply of drugs is not flat, but positively sloped. D ata 
limitations on the hard drugs expenditure, namely the fact tha t these data exist only 
for the year 1996. do not allow to solve the model for more than one year, making the 
identification of a cost function not possible. As long as the price elasticity is sufficiently 
high, the results should not be much affected. Furthermore, in the drug markets there 
are no frictions: there are no fixed costs of drug dealing, such as licensing or buying 
some weapons, and there is no imperfect information, tha t is everyone knows where the 
international drug dealer is and everyone knows where the domestic drug market is located. 
A question in the NHSDA asked the following "How difficult do you think it would be for  
you to get each of the following types of drugs, i f  you wanted some?". The percentage 
answering tha t it is almost impossible to get hard drugs is lower for people who already 
used illegal substances in the past. This might suggest tha t some people know where the 
drug market is, while others do not.
To conclude with, an interesting exercise tha t can be easily implemented in the frame­
work developed here is to search for the “optimal1' price under legalization: a sensible 
value could be the one tha t minimizes the property crime rate, that is the one minimizing 
the hard drugs criminal externalities.
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2.8  A p p en d ix  A  - T h e  Full R ecu rsive  R ep resen ta tio n
For the sake of readability, in the text we reported only a simplified version of the Bellman 
equations and stationary distributions. Their complete formulation follows.
Bellman equations:
Vited(s,h,£) = 
max (l — 7Tdd) (1 — 7r^pc) ( l — n ^ d s )  {u(c, d, h, s) +
c,d,pc,ds
+0Ee>\e U s' ni+l.ed (h!\ S, s') Vi+hed (s', h!, -')}
7Tdad  (1 -  7TPaCpc) ( l -  7i f d s )  |u (c a, 0, /l, s)  +  0  j f +1_ed ((1 ~  \ )  h , t  =  0) j  +
(1 -  TTdad) TT^pc (1 -  7r^d s)  |u ( c a, 0, h, e) +  f i ed ((1 -  A) h, t -  0)} +
(! -  K d) (1 -  Tffpc) n dasds ju ( c a, 0, h, s) +  ((1 -  \ ) h , t  = 0 ) |  +
ndd7T^pc(l - 7 r fd s )  |u ( c a , 0, h, e) +  /3 j f ^ ed ((1 -  A) h, t = 0)} +  
irdd (1 -  Tffpc) 7Tf d s  |u ( c a, 0, h, s) +  /3J?£sed ((1 -  A) M  =  0)} +
(l -  7Tdd) 7T^pciTdsds |u ( c a , 0, /j, s) +  /3J^_-dsed ((1 -  A) h, t = 0 ) |  +
Tidad'K^pcTTdsds ju (c a, 0, h, s) +  0 j f ^ e d  ((x -  A) /l, t =  0)} 
s.t.
c + Pdd + p i < ys,i,ed +  Tjypc + (pd -  Pd) ds 
h! = (1 — A) h +  d
s ~  N  (0, , or more generally s ~  N  (p (i) ,0 e  (0)
h\ g iven , c > 0, d > 0, pc > 0, ds > 0
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J l e d  ( h i *) =  U(C«’ ° ’ h ’ °) +  P J i + l , e d  ( h ' 1 +  X)
J l e d  ( h > T J - 1 ) =  U °> h > °)  +  { K j E e'\e Y . s ’ ^t+l .ed O ' -, «') K + h e d  («' , h \  s ' )  +
J l e d  T 3 ) =  U(C<*> ° ’ h ’ °)  +  P E £’\e U s '  ^t+l.ed O' :  S, s') K +i,ed (s', V,  £7)
S . t .
h1 = (1 — X)h  
£  ~  TV (0, cr^ )
j  € J  =  {d, pc, c/s, (cZ, p c ) , (d, d s ) , (pc, d s ) , (d, pc, ds)}
Where J \ed (h ) stands for the value function of an offender convicted because of crime 
j ,  Tj  stands for the maximum number of periods a felon has to spend in prison because 
of the same crime, while Qj represents the probability of being released at Tj — 1 (prison 
periods do not coincide with model periods).
Stationary distributions (Non convicted agents):
Mi+l.ed(s'> ft'. -') = E  Ih.h'=d, ' du.h.E) + n-* )h  ^ p c L e d  («, ft. e)) (1 — *■?dSi.ec, ( s , h , s ) ) -
s
• (1 -  7T^ di ed (s, /l, 5)) +  TTi+i.ed (/l7; S,  S7) dpi>ed(s, /l, s ) //^ ')  +  p(s') = CddTted(h )
+  / / (£' )  . W  = ( i _A)h C +  /*(*' )  Jh :h ' =  { l - \ ) h  ( d s d f l - £ ( h )
+ / i (£/) Jh:h’ =  ( l - \ ) h  ^d.pcd-H-i^d ^ Q 1) +  ) Jh:h' — ( l  — X)h ( d :d s d T i } d  ^ )  +  
M £') Jh:h' =  ( l  — \ ) h  C +  M £') f h:h/ =  (1. X)h Q , p c . d s ^ t (d PC,dS)( h )
w i t h  •) =  7 ^ ’Vi,ld(h) = ° ’ x  ed'ii e 5
Stationary distributions (Inmates charged with a drug possession offense):
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M / + 1  , e d ( h ' )  =  J  h:h'=(  1 - X ) h  ( *  :hf—dt c ^ ( s , / i , £ )  +  ( l  — A ) / i x 8 ?
s
[7rf^,ed (5, £) (1 -  n f d s Led (s, /j, s)) (1 -  7ipacpcLed (s, /i, s))] dpied(s, h, s)
with p f Jed(h) = 0, Vj x ed\ j  € J
and similarly for all the other possible criminal charges j  E J .
2 .9  A p p en d ix  B  - U C R
D escription
The Uniform Crime Rate (UCR): is developed and maintained by the FBI. It can be ob­
tained at h t t p : / / 1 4 9 .1 0 1 .2 2 .4 0 /d a ta o n l in e /S e a r c h /C r im e /S ta te /S ta te b y S ta te . cfm
The FBI property crime category was amended, excluding Arson and considering robberies 
as a property crime rather than a violent one. More precise definitions follow.
• Robbery - The taking or attem pting to take anything of value from the care, custody, 
or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by 
putting the victim in fear.
• Burglary - breaking or entering - The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a 
felony or a theft. A ttem pted forcible entry is included.
• Larceny-theft (except motor vehicle theft) - The unlawful taking, carrying, leading, 
or riding away of property from the possession or constructive possession of another. 
Examples are thefts of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplifting, pocket-picking, 
or the stealing of any property or article which is not taken by force and violence 
or by fraud. A ttem pted larcenies are included. Embezzlement, confidence games, 
forgery, worthless checks, etc., are excluded.
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• Motor vehicle theft - The theft or attem pted theft of a motor vehicle. A motor vehicle 
is self-propelled and runs on the surface and not on rails. Motorboats, construction 
equipment, airplanes, and farming equipment are specifically excluded from this 
category.
•  Drug abuse violations - State and/or local offenses relating to the unlawful posses­
sion, sale, use, growing, and manufacturing of narcotic drugs. The following drug 
categories are specified: opium or cocaine and their derivatives (morphine, heroin, 
codeine); marijuana; synthetic narcotics-manufactured narcotics that can cause true 
addiction (demerol, methadone); and dangerous nonnarcotic drugs (barbiturates, 
benzedrine).
2 .10  A p p en d ix  C - S o lu tio n  A lg o r ith m
The computational procedure used to solve and estimate the model can be represented by 
the following algorithm:
• Guess the vector of param eters 0o;
• Generate discrete grids over the state space [hmin, ..., hmax] x [5mjn, ...,£max];
• Guess the aggregate crime rate 7rro;
• Guess the average legal income y 0;
• Get the equilibrium tax  rate on labor income tu \
•  Guess the criminal justice tax  rate r  jo;
• Compute the insurance price pj = rjyqTTvO'i
• Guess on the hard drugs price p^Q\
• Get the:
— Drug consumption functions (s, /i, c ) ;
— Property crime functions p c ied (s , /i, e) ;
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— Drug selling functions d s ied (s, h, e ) ;
•  Get the numeraire consumption functions q  ed (s, h, s ) ;
•  Get the stationary distributions Hi ed(s, h ,e)  and f i jed{h)'.
•  Compute the hard drugs excess demand exd = j  [d_ (.) — ds.,. (.)] /f ..(■)>
• Check hard drugs market clearing;
• Update pdl = (1 4* zjexd )pd0 (with zu arbitrary weight);
•  Iterate until hard drugs market clearing;
• Get the average non criminal income
• Update y'0 = +  (1 — k) y 1 (with k arbitrary weight);
• Get the aggregate crime rate 7rr i;
•  Update 7r(,0 =  vttvq +  (1 — l') 7rr i (udth v  arbitrary weight);
• Get the criminal justice tax  rate t j \\
•  Update t 'jq = ltjq +  (1 — l) t j \ (with l arbitrary weight);
• Iterate until convergence;
• Check numeraire good market clearing;
• Compute the predicted moments and evaluate the sum of squared deviations from 
the data;
• Update the vector of parameters 0 i  with the Nelder/Mead simplex method;
•  Iterate until a minimum is found.
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Chapter 3
Accounting for th e  Racial 
Property Crim e Gap in the US: A  
Q uantitative Equilibrium  Analysis
3.1 In trod u ction
In the US a striking fact about property crimes is the high participation of one minority 
group: the African American males. For example, in 1996 the property crimes arrest rate 
(per 1.000 males) was equal to 5,35 for white males and 24,0 for black ones. In the same 
year 2% of the US white population was under correctional supervision, while the same 
figure for blacks was 8.9%. Such drastic gaps can be explained in several ways. If, for 
some reasons, legitimate economic opportunities are correlated with demographic traits, 
the group facing the worse situation can resort to crime more often, to partially overcome 
the economic disadvantage, as discussed in Bound and Freeman (1992) and Anderson 
(1999). Alternatively, peer effects and social interactions among people belonging to the 
same demographic group can influence heavily criminal choices, as proposed by Sah (1991) 
and Glaser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996). Finally, it can be claimed tha t the criminal 
justice system has practices which are discriminatory with respect to minorities, a hypoth­
esis tested for example in Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) and Hernandez-Murillo and 
Knowles (2004).
This paper takes the first point of view, assessing the importance of both labor market 
conditions and asset poverty in accounting for the observed racial crime gap. In a world
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with no peer effects or discriminatory criminal justice, this contribution quantitatively 
evaluates to what extent worse legal opportunities can be considered responsible for the 
high crime involvement of black American males. A dynamic general equilibrium model 
of rational crime participation is developed to  study the impact of more diffuse poverty, 
higher unemployment rates, lower educational achievements, lower wages and lower labor 
supply on the crime behavior of black males in the US. In order to focus on crimes tha t are 
mainly driven by economic forces, violent crimes are neglected altogether. The analysis 
considers only property crimes, or the class of crimes tha t are more likely to be motivated 
by an economic evaluation of the potential gains, i.e. the value of the stolen goods, and 
costs, i.e. the chances of being apprehended together with the severity of the punishment.1 
The theoretical model extends Becker (1968) framework to a dynamic environment, along 
the lines of Flinn (1986) and Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004). It then exploits 
the information related to  the labor market characteristics to quantitatively assess the 
differences in crime behaviors between agents facing different legitimate opportunities, 
namely blacks and whites.
An infinitely lived agents model is developed, allowing for several layers of heterogene­
ity: race (captured by the labor market opportunities), education, employment status and 
asset holdings. Each dimension of heterogeneity is a channel that gives different incentives 
to commit a property crime: these are studied altogether and, by means of counterfaetual 
analysis, one at a time. Given the richness of the model, an analytical solution cannot be 
obtained: the model is calibrated relying on US data and solved numerically.
Simulation results show th a t the observed poverty and labor market outcomes account 
for as much as 90% of the black/white arrest rates ratio. The model captures well relevant 
dimensions of the crime phenomenon, such as the inmates composition by race, employ­
ment status and education. The equilibrium features of the framework allow to perform 
counterfaetual analysis with an endogenous response of the individuals to different pub­
lic policies. The calibrated model is used to compare two alternative policy experiments 
aimed at reducing the aggregate crime rate: increasing the expenditure on police seems 
to be cost effective, when compared to an equally expensive lump-sum subsidy targeted 
to the high school dropouts.
The following section surveys the literature related to this chapter.
P ro p erty  crimes (defined as the sum of burglaries, larcenies, motor vehicle thefts and robberies) re­
ported to the police and included in the FBI Uniform Crime Reports have historically accounted for more 
than 90% of to ta l known crimes in the US.
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3 .1 .1  R e la te d  L ite ra tu r e
This chapter is related to at least two strands of literature, the first one being the studies on 
the economics of race and the labor market, the second one being the economics literature 
on crime.
As for the economic analysis of the different labor market conditions according to race, 
the empirical literature in particular is vast. Here the focus wall be on the black-white 
differentials only.2 Some of the most relevant contributions are Altonji and Blank (1999), 
Donohue and Heckman (1991) and Neal and Johnson (1996).3
Altonji and Blank (1999) provide a survey of the empirical evidence on the differentials 
by race in the US labor market in the recent past. They discuss and test the theories of 
discrimination developed in the literature, suggesting tha t some discrimination is indeed 
at work. However, from this survey, it seems safe to conclude tha t there is no consensus 
on the magnitude of this phenomenon.
Donohue and Heckman (1991) study how the economic status of blacks relative to 
whites has been improving from the 40’s to the late 60’s, eventually stagnating from 
the mid 70’s. The authors explain the more recent lack of convergence in the economic 
outcomes of the two demographic groups with the decline in the relative wages paid to 
unskilled versus skilled workers th a t has occurred in tha t period of time.
Finally, Neal and Johnson (1996) find tha t the discrimination in the labor market is 
very limited, once among the determ inants of wages a control for workers’ skills (i.e. the 
AFQT test) is included. They argue tha t the wage gap reflects mainly a skill gap, in turn 
determined by different family backgrounds and school environments, tha t is by premarket 
factors.
In this respect, notice tha t the model proposed in this paper will be silent on the origins 
of the labor market differentials by race. In this sense, it can be considered consistent 
with both a difference in the quantity of human capital and a discrimination behavior 
determining the different labor market conditions.
As for the literature on crime, it is possible to distinguish between the mainly empirical 
contributions and the mainly theoretical ones. From an empirical point of view, there have
2We can justify  this choice by noting that in the US hyspanic people show labor market outcom es 
which are halfway from the blacks and whites. Also their involvement in property crimes is in this middle 
position. Moreover, blacks and w hites account for more than 90% of the prison population.
JThis list is by no means exaustive. For a more comprehensive one see the references included in the 
papers mentioned here.
been several studies assessing the effects of unemployment rates on property crimes. The 
effect has been found to be consistently positive, even though some studies claim tha t it 
is small in size.4 The empirical evidence discussed in Lochner (2004) and Lochner and 
Moretti (2004) shows tha t the bulk of property crimes are committed by people with 
poor educational achievements, with the high school dropouts being the most crime prone 
group. As for the role of race as a determ inant of property crimes, the findings appear to 
be more controversial. More in detail, some studies find a significant effect of belonging to 
a minority, e.g. Grogger (1998) and W itte and Tauchen (1994), some other studies do not 
find any significant effect, e.g. Lochner (1999), and some others find a significant impact 
of race on the participation in criminal activities depending on the specification adopted, 
e.g. Kelly (2000) and Levitt (1996). Notice th a t a potentially important variable tha t is 
missing in all these studies is a measure of wealth.
Both the theoretical and quantitative research on the economics of crime have been 
particularly active in the recent years. Some contributions of interest are Burdett, Lagos 
and Wright (2003), Glaser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996), Imrohoroglu, Merlo and 
Rupert (2000). Imrohoroglu. Merlo and R upert (2004), Persico (2002) and Verdier and 
Zenou (2004).
Burdett. Lagos and Wright (2003) extend the standard search theoretic framework to 
allow for criminal activities. They study the effect of crime on both unemployment and 
inequality, showing th a t the possibility of committing a crime has non trivial effects on 
both variables.
In Glaser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) social interactions are introduced in order 
to explain the high variance of crime rates in cities and over time. They specify and 
estimate a model where agents im itate the behavior of people living close to them. Their 
estimates suggest the presence of social interactions.
The contribution of Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000) studies the endogenous 
determination of crime, redistribution and police expenditure in a majority voting political 
economy framework. They analyze how these variables are affected by changes in the 
income distribution and the criminal apprehension technology. Their framework accounts 
for the correlation among redistribution, police expenditure and property crimes observed 
in the US data.
Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004) study in a OLG model which factors account
4See for instance the papers by W itte  and Tauchen (1994) and Raphael and W inter-Ebmer (2001).
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for the oscillating behavior of the US property crime rate observed in the mid 70’s to mid 
9CTs years. They show th a t the aging of the population, the stronger economy and the 
higher apprehension probability explain the drastic drop in the aggregate crime rate that 
took place in the 90’s.
Persico (2002) studies the effect of racial profiling by police in the search for criminals. 
This study shows tha t a fair system, th a t is a system tha t audits different racial groups 
with the same intensity, can lead to a lower amount of crime if compared to an unfair 
system.
To conclude with, Verdier and Zenou (2004) demonstrate how stereotypical beliefs on 
crime involvement together with location in a city can lead to a discriminatory equilibrium, 
with the minority group committing more crimes, living further away from productive 
activities and earning lower wages. The mechanism at work in this economy is of the 
self-fulfilling type.
As a final remark, notice th a t none of these papers deals with race, poverty, labor 
market conditions and property crimes in a quantitative framework, which is the focus of 
this paper.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some stylized facts 
related to crime behaviors and labor market conditions for the male population in the US. 
The theoretical model is presented in section 3, while section 4 is devoted to the defini­
tion of the equilibrium concept used in the model: the recursive stationary competitive 
equilibrium. Section 5 presents the calibration used in the simulations. Section 6 provides 
the main results and predictions of the baseline model, including the comparison of two 
policy experiments and the discussion of counterfaetual analysis. Section 7 concludes. The 
algorithm used for the solution of the model is described in the appendix.
3.2  E m p irica l E v id en ce
In this section we document and discuss some stylized facts about property crime involve­
ment in the US.
Figure (3.1) plots the time series of the property crimes arrest rates by race from 
1965 to 2001. These data  are collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigations and are 
expressed as the number of property crimes arrests for 100.000 individuals belonging to 
tha t race. From the figure we can see tha t both races have shown similar trends over time,
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Figure 3.1: Property crimes arrest rates per 100.000 males by race (Whites, blue line and 
right scale). Source: Uniform Crime Reports, FBI
possibly suggesting tha t a) the police did not change its apprehension strategy, b) people 
of different races respond to the same incentives as far as property crimes are concerned. 
However, the levels are drastically different: for whites, the arrest rate has been oscillating 
from 300 to 650, w’hile for blacks from 1.464 to 3.180. Even though there seems to be a 
slow convergence taking place, figure (3.2) tells us that the arrest rate ratio is still above 
4.
Figure (3.3) merges data taken from the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau. This figure plots the property crime rates reported 
to the police in the year 2000 in each American state versus the share of black people 
living in those states.5 This graph can only suggest a positive correlation between the 
two variables. States with higher black people shares also tend to have higher property 
crime rates, the sample correlation being equal to 0.49 if Washington DC is included in the 
sample and to 0.34 if it is excluded.6 Obviously, this simple plot cannot imply any causal
5 For a detailed definition of property crimes see appendix B.
6 This relation appears to be stable over time. See appendix B for the same plot using 1990 data. 
Moreover, the sam ple including DC could provide a better representation of this phenomenon, being DC  
a metropolitan aerea. Indeed, data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics show that the vast majority of 
property crimes are perpetrated in m etropolitan areas, while data from the Current Population Survey 
show that in 1996 black households lived m ostly in metropolitan areas with at least one million of residents 
(the precise figure is 60%, versus only 45% of white households). See appendix B for the corresponding
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Figure 3.2: FBI Arrest Rates By Race Ratio
link from one variable to the other. One more feature suggested by the plot is the presence 
of a fairly high degree of non linearity in the data. A linear regression with a common 
specification in the literature displays an R2 equal to  0.4, with race being significant across 
several specifications.7
Another source of information on the differentials in crime participation between blacks 
and whites in the US is the National Crime Victimization Survey (N C VS).8 Table 1 shows 
a variable included in the NCVS. This provides information about robberies: a sample 
of persons victim of a robbery were asked to identify the race of the criminals attacking 
them. Table 1 refers to robberies carried out by a single offender.
The table shows an interesting pattern: irrespective of the decline in the number of 
total robberies over time, black individuals were recognized to be the offenders in a robbery 
far more often than people belonging to other races. Moreover, not only these figures do 
not simply reflect the share of black people in the population (around 12%), but also they 
represent the highest rate.
So far only indirect evidence of the crime involvement of African Americans has been
plot using data from the US cities w ith a population of at least 200000 people.
7 The dependent variable is the property crime rate and the regressors are the per capita income, the male 
unemployment rate, the share of people between 16 and 24 years old, the per capita justice expenditure, 
the percentage of people below the poverty line, the share of black residents, the percentage of high school 
dropouts and a constant.
8 See appendix B for more details on this survey.
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Figure 3.3: Property Crime Rates and Share of Blacks in the US states, 2000.
Year Robberies Whites (%) Blacks (%) Other N /A
1996 655800 36.8 51.5 7.5 4.2
1997 565010 38.1 43.0 14.8 4.2
1998 547500 44.3 39.6 10.1 6.0
1999 465430 42.4 46.5 7.0 4.2
2000 407490 37.1 47.7 12.3 2.8
2001 340910 44.9 47.4 6.1 1.6
Table 3.1: Race of Robbery Offenders - NCVS
provided. Two longitudinal studies, the NLSY79  and the NLSY97, represent a source 
of more direct evidence: the young people randomly selected in the samples were asked 
whether they participated into criminal activities and, if so, in which crimes.
As for the NLSY79, the original sample consisted of 14-22 year-old people and the 
questionnaire included only in the year 1980 a self administered section with questions 
on crime involvement. These data  show tha t no clear racial pattern arises. However, 
subsequent cross validation studies suggested that black respondents underreported their 
crime participation, Freeman (1999).9
As for the NLSY97, the original sample consisted of 12-16 year-old people. In each
9 A detailed description of the criminal activities by race of the N LSY79  respondents is contained in 
Grogger (1998), table 2 pag. 769.
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Blacks Whites
Ethnic (rescaled) share in the N LSY97 33.4% 66.6%
Stolen something worth less than $50 29.5% 70.5%
Stolen something worth more than $50 36.0% 64.0%
Other Property Crimes 35.2% 64.8%
Table 3.2: Property Crimes in the NLSY97 - 2001
round the questionnaire has included self administered questions on the crime involvement 
of the respondent. Table 2 reports the data  for the year 2001.10 Similarly to the NLSY79  
black youths did not report to participate into property crimes strikingly more often than 
white youths, even though they tend to  show a slightly higher involvement, as Table 2 
shows.
A possible interpretation of this result calls for the short labor market experience of 
the youths in the NLSY97.
Finally, on a more indirect ground, from the Survey of Inmates in State and Fed­
eral Correctional Facilities, 40.4% of the prison population in 1997 convicted because of 
property crimes consisted of black males, while they represented only 11.4% of the male 
population.11 It would be possible to argue tha t the judicial system is racially biased, as 
in Donohue and Levitt (2001): this is not the line of research pursued here. In this work 
it is assumed tha t the judicial system is fair, or tha t it is blind to race. Irrispective of his 
race, every criminal faces the same probability of being caught.
The empirical evidence presented above focuses on the crime involvement of the two 
main racial groups in the US. Next, some stylized facts about both the economic conditions 
and the labor market outcomes for the same racial groups are presented.
Figure (3.4) reports the time series for the unemployment rates of white and black 
males 20 years old and over (data are from the Bureau of labor Statistics) in the period 
1976-2003. The top line represents the black unemployment rate. W hat is striking in 
the graph is the stable relationship between the two unemployment rates. Black males
10 The year 2001 was selected in order for all the people in the sample to be old enough to participate in 
the labor market.
11 According to the US Bureau of Justice, in 1995 more than 90% of the prison and jail population  
consisted of males. This suggests to drop women from the relevant population, in order to focus on the 
main forces driving the decisions of becom ing a criminal.
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Figure 3.4: Black (top) and W hite (bottom) Men (16+) Unemployment Rates
have suffered an unemployment rate which has always been at least twice as much as 
the corresponding figure for white males.12 Beside the higher incidence of unemployment, 
black males have consistently had also longer average unemployment spell. Figure (3.5) 
plots the time series for both the average and median unemployment durations, expressed 
in weeks. Another sharp difference between blacks and whites is related to the rewards in 
the labor market. As reported in Altonji and Blank (1999), data from the March 1996 CPS 
show that there was a substantial gap in annual earnings: white males earned on average 
$36,169, while black males earned as little as $23,645. Obviously, part of these gaps are 
explained by the different educational achievements of the two groups. In 1996, 14.56% 
(20.17%) of white (black) males did not have a high school degree, 58.37% (65.14%) had 
at least a high school degree but did not had a college one and 27.06% (14.68%) had at 
least a college degree. These facts suggest that black males have experienced worse labor 
market conditions and outcomes in the recent past. On a different perspective, relying on 
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Wolff (1998) has provided evidence on the 
racial wealth disparities: the average asset holdings of white households has been around 
five times higher than the corresponding figure for black households in the last 20 years. 
Large wealth differentials might be due to differences in inheritances, as studied by Altonji 
and Doraszelski (2005), or by different rates of enterpreneurship, as discussed in Fairlie 
and Meyer (1996). Moreover, Wolff (2000) shows that in 1995 31.3% black households had
12 Notice that considering the unemployment rates by education groups does not alter the picture.
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Figure 3.5: Males Average and Median Unemployment Durations
a negative value  for the net worth, while the percentage for white households was 15%.
From this set of empirical facts it is possible to argue that African Americans face 
very different incentives to commit a property crime if compared to the white population. 
The next section develops a theoretical model aimed both at exploiting these stylized 
facts and explaining the higher involvement of African Americans in illegitimate activities. 
Notice that the concept of race adopted is extremely naive. It is a characteristic which 
is perfectly observable by all economic agents at no costs and relates only to different 
legitimate opportunities.
3.3 T he B aselin e  M o d el
In this section we propose a dynamic general equilibrium model of crime, along the lines 
of Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2004), with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents.13 It 
extends the framework proposed by Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) to include an en­
dogenous crime choice, agents belonging to two different races (i.e. Blacks/Whites), three 
levels of education (i.e. high school dropouts, high school degree and college or higher de­
gree), a self-financing unemployment insurance benefits scheme and a self-financing judicial 
system. The model is framed in an incomplete markets environment. More specifically, 
agents in the economy face three idiosyncratic risks: 1) being unemployed, 2) being victim
13Other GE models of crime are developed in Fender (1999), Furlong (1987), Grossman (1995), Sala-i- 
Martin (1992). An interesting partial equilibrium contribution is Davis (1988).
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of a property crime, and 3) going to jail if involved in property crimes. The former is 
assumed to be uninsurable, the second is insurable in a competitive market and the latter 
is not, since it is the outcome of a public policy.14 As for the former assumption, it is 
a well know fact tha t felons convicted because of a property crime were more likely to 
be unemployed at the time of the offense. Together with the usual arguments motivating 
incomplete markets, this state dependent outcome suggests that people cannot fully insure 
against the unemployment risk.10 Time is discrete and the economy lasts forever.
3 .3 .1  D em o g ra p h ics
The economy is populated by infinitely lived agents whose measure is normalized to  one.16 
Agents are ex-ante heterogenous with respect to both their race and their educational 
achievement. Race is denoted with ra £ 7ZA = {wh,bl}  while education level is denoted 
with ed £ £ V  = {hsd,hs,col}. More in detail, agents of different race/education pairs 
differ in the probability and duration of employment opportunities, exogenous labor supply 
hra,ed and labor efficiency units £ya,ed- The param eter ^Va,ed represents the share of (ra, ed) 
workers. Obviously the shares must add up to one, tha t is ^  ipraed = 1- There is no
ra,ed
population growth and the ibrae(i do not change over time. As mentioned before, in 
this framework race boils down to exogenous labor market related characteristics and 
endogenous asset distributions. Notice also tha t at this stage there is no feedback from 
the criminal market to the labor market.
14The assumption of insurability of property crimes is made mainly to keep the notation simple. In 
previous versions of the m odel we assum ed that alle risks were uninsurable, obtaining results with no 
relevant differences.
lDAn alternative explanation could be linked to ability. People of 1ow t ability could be more likely to be 
unemployed hence they could self select into criminal activities, showing at the same tim e high incarceration  
and unem ploym ent rates. For the latter kind of argument to go through, the concept of ability adopted  
should be a kind of ability rewarded by the labor market, but not necessarily linked to the criminal ability. 
Otherwise less able criminals would spend more tim e in jail, making crime economically less attractive.
16 The infinitely lived agents assum ption is made to give both the wealth distribution and the exoge­
nous borrowing lim its a sharper role, w ithout resorting to arbitrary assumptions on the initial wealth 
distribution, assum ptions that would be needed in a standard OLG framework.
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3.3.2 Preferences
Agents’ preferences are assumed to  be represented by a time separable utility function 
U(.). Agents’ utility is defined over stochastic consumption sequences their aim
is to choose how much to consume (c*), how much to save in an interest bearing asset 
(at+i) and how many property crimes to commit (crt ) in each period of their lives, in 
order to maximize their objective function.1' The agents problem can be defined as
DO
max £7(co, c i , ...) =  max E q p tu(ct)
{c/,a1+ i,crt}~0 {ct,a*+ i,crt }f° l0 “
where E q represents the expectation operator over all the possible histories generated 
by the employment opportunity shocks (s € S  =  {e, it}), the probability of apprehension 
if crimes are committed (7ra ) and the probability of being a victim of property crimes 
carried out by other agents (7rr ); j3 € (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. We assume 
that u(.) : C —> R, the period utility function, is strictly increasing, strictly concave and 
satisfies the Inada conditions. Notice th a t there is no direct disutility neither from work 
nor from incarceration, hence labor supply is fixed.
3 .3 .3  E n d o w m en ts
Agents are all born with the same asset endowment ao-18 In every period they can be em­
ployed (e) or unemployed (u). If employed they supply inelasticallv a constant fraction of 
their time endowment (hrated). The stochastic employment opportunities follow a two state 
first order Markov process. The transition function of the employment opportunity state is 
represented by the race/education dependent matrices HraM  (s, s') = [^ra,edi},j)] , where 
each element TTra_ed (i, j )  is defined as 7Tra e^d( i J )  =  P r{ sm  = j \ s t = i} , i , j  = {e, u}.19 
Finally, every agent is endowed with exogenous efficiency units denoted as eraM-
1' W ith some abuse of notation, in the sequential representation of the problem we dropped the history of 
shocks (/i*) as an argument of the choice variables. The process for consum ption should read {c* (h ,) } ^ 0 
and similarly for savings and property crimes.
18 Notice that the specific initial value does not play any role, since the analysis will focus on stationary  
equilibria, which do not depend on the initial condition.
19 Hereafter the prime sym bol / denotes future variables.
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3 .3 .4  P r o p e r ty  C rim es
Every agent can engage in property crimes in every period of his life, irrespective of his 
employment opportunity. The modeling strategy related to the crime choice generalizes 
Imrohoroglu, Merlo and R upert (2004). There exists a criminal technology, y (cr), that 
maps the number of crimes into criminal earnings. We assume tha t committing crimes 
corresponds to stealing a constant fraction 77 of the average non-asset income in the econ­
omy y times the number of crimes cr. T hat is, we assume tha t y (cr) = rfycr. Notice 
that y' (cr) > 0  and y (0 ) =  0 , th a t is the technology is linear and people who decide 
not to be involved in property crimes get zero illegal income. A crime attem pt is always 
successful. However, with probability 7ra (cr) criminals are caught and incarcerated at the 
beginning of the period, while with probability (1  — 7ra (cr)) they remain free and can use 
the additional economic resources rjycr, obtained through theft. For simplicity assume a 
linear relationship for the probability of apprehension 7ra(cr) =  7racr, with 0 < 7Ta < 1 
being a parameter. Notice tha t com mitting crimes does not entail any direct cost, neither 
monetary nor in terms of time; the only cost is the opportunity cost of being apprehended. 
W ith endogenous probability ttv (which in equilibrium corresponds to the aggregate crime 
rate) an agent is victim of a crime and loses yy  units of his income.20 Notice tha t we 
assume that an agent can be victimized at most once in a period of time. Moreover, both 
the criminal earnings function and the apprehension technology are the same for every 
agent in the economy.
3 .3 .5  G o v ern m en t
The role of the government in this economy is twofold.
On the one side it runs the unemployment insurance benefits scheme, by taxing the 
labor income of the employed workers at rate Ty and subsidizing the unemployed workers 
at the replacement rate <t>. 0  is a policy parameter exogenously given, while t j j  is set 
residually to ensure a self-financing scheme.
On the other side, the government runs the legal system, providing the apprehension 
technology th a t allows to  detect and punish a fraction nacr of the crimes committed. The 
justice system is costly and we assume tha t there is a cost J  per arrest made.
20This assum ption is justified from the data contained in the NCVS: somewhat surprisingly, there is a 
zero correlation between the v ictim ’s incom e and the amount stolen.
Detected criminals are immediately incarcerated: while in prison they all consume a 
constant level ca. J  consists of both inmates consumption and other expenditures (e.g. 
judicial expenditures), which are financed through a proportional labor income tax  t j  paid 
by all the agents in the economy. Also r  j  is set such tha t the scheme is self-financing.
3 .3 .6  T ech n o lo g y
The production side of the model is extremely simple. There is a constant returns to scale 
technology of the Cobb-Douglas form, which relies on aggregate capital K  and labor L  to 
produce the final output Y  21
Y  = F { K , L) = B K aL 1~a .
Capital depreciates at the exogenous rate J and firms hire capital and labor every 
period from competitive markets. From the first order conditions of the firm we obtain 
the expression for the net real return to capital r  and the wage rate per efficiency unit w:
f  L \  1-Q
r  =  J - 6 ,  (3.1)
U, =  ( l - a ) B ^ V .  (3.2)
3 .3 .7  O th er  m ark et a r r a n g e m e n ts
The final good market is competitive. Moreover, every agent must satisfy an exogenous 
borrowing limit, denoted by d > bra. Notice tha t we allow for borrowing limits to be race 
dependent. Finally, it is not possible to insure against the unemployment shock, while all 
agents buy a property crime insurance at price pj.
21 Since the analysis will focus on steady-states only, tim e indexes are om itted, for the sake of notational 
clarity.
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3.3.8 Tim ing
The timing of the model is assumed to be the following: 1) The idiosyncratic unemploy­
ment shocks are realized and observed by the agents; 2) Production takes place, with the 
employed people working for a wage and with the unemployed receiving the subsidy; 3) 
The crime, consumption and saving decisions are taken; 4) A random fraction of criminals 
are caught and immediately incarcerated; 5) Inmates get out of jail.
Notice that by assumption the implied model period length corresponds to the average 
time spent in prison by a criminal: hence, the population eligible to work is stationary 
and equal to 1 in every period.
3.4  E quilibrium
In this section we first define the problems of the employed and unemployed workers in their 
recursive representation, then we provide a formal definition of the equilibrium concept 
used in this model. Notice th a t the vector representing the individual state variables is 
defined as x  = (ra,ed,a, s), whose entries are race ra € 7ZA = {wh,bl}, education level 
ed € EV = {hsd , hs , col}, individual asset holdings a € A  = [d, oo) and employment status 
s € <5 =  {e, u}. The optimal value functions are defined as V{ (a, s), where for notational 
simplicity i £ E,A  x ET>. The stationary distributions over the vector x  are denoted as 
Mi (a,5)-
3 .4 .1  H o u se h o ld s ’ P r o b le m  
Problem  o f th e unem ployed  workers
The value function for the unemployed workers of a given race/education pair i and with 
asset holding equal to a can be w ritten as:
Vi ( a ,  u) = max {Eu(c)  +  /3EY^S> tt* ( u ,  s ' )  Vi ( a 7, s')} (3.3)
c.a'.cr
More in detail
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Vi(a,u)  = maxa»)Cr{[l -  7ra(cr)] u (( l +  r) a +  (1 -  Tj)<j)whi£i +  y(cr) - a '  -  pi) +
7Ta(cr)u(ca) +  / 3 £ s, 7Ti (a, s') {[l -  7ra (cr)] V*(a',s') +  7Ta(cr)V^(a, s')}} 
s.t.
ao given , c >  0, a' > d, cr > 0
Notice tha t we have substituted the explicit expression for the current expected util­
ity Eu(c) =  [1 — 7ra(cr)] u (c) -f 7ra (cr)u(ca), the expected continuation values and the 
individual budget constraint c +  a ' +  p / <  (1 +  r) a +  (1 — t j ) dwhiSi + y(cr).
Problem  o f th e em ployed  workers
The value function for the employed workers can be w ritten as:
Vi (a, e) =  max {Eu{c ) +  /3 ^  (e, s>) V {a\ s')} (3-4)
c.a'.cr
More in detail.
Vi  ( a ,  e )  =  maXfl»iCr { ( 1  -  7ra ( c r ) )  u ( ( l  +  r )  a  +  (1  -  t v  -  t j ) w h ^ i  +  y ( c r )  -  a ’ -  p j )  +
7Ta(cr)u(ca) + /3 Y ,s’ (e> s ') {I1 “  7ra(cr)] Vi (a', s') +  7ra(cr)Vi(a, s')}} 
s.t.
ao given , c >  0, a' >  d, cr > 0
Notice th a t the individual budget constraint in this case reads c +  a' +  p / <  (1 +  r) a-f- 
(1 -  Tu -  Tj) whiSi +  p(cr).
Is it worth stressing the assumption tha t if a criminal is detected he is immediately 
convicted. To avoid prisons to act as a forced savings mechanism, we assume that the
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legal resources of a criminal are seized and destroyed by the government. It follows tha t 
convicted felons cannot rely on their earned legal income for their consumption/saving 
plans. More precisely, in this case, savings are equal to the current asset level, or a' = a.
It is now possible to define the recursive competitive equilibrium. Moreover, the anal­
ysis will be restricted to steady-states only, tha t is to prices, endogenous variables and 
distributions over the state variables which are stationary over time.
3 .4 .2  R ecu rs iv e  S ta t io n a r y  E q u ilib r iu m
D efin ition  2 For a given set of policies {<^;ca}, apprehension probability na, cost per 
arrest J , race/education shares labor supplies hi and efficiency units Si, a recursive 
stationary equilibrium is a set of individual decision rules {c^(a, s), a'/a, s), c r /a , s)} , value 
functions {V /a ,  s)}, prices { r ,w ,p j} ,  taxes { t u , t j } ,  average labor income y , aggregate 
victimization rate ttv, cost of criminal justice J  and stationary distributions s)} such
• Given relative prices {r, government policies {<p;ca}, taxes and
{tTq, ?Tt, y, J, hi, Si}, the individual policy functions {ci(a, s), a '(a , s), cr /a ,  s)} ,
that.-22
•  Relative factor prices {r, u’} solve the firm’s problem and satisfy equations (3.1)
solve the households problem (3.3)-(3.4) and {Vi(a, s)} are the associated value func­
tions.
• The labor market clears:
• The asset market clears:
i,s
22ct (a, s )  : A  x S  —> R+  denotes the consum ption functions, a '(a , s) : A  x S  —> A  denotes the saving 
functions and crt (a, s) : A  x S  — denotes the crime functions.
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• The final good market clears:
F (K ,  £ ) =  V  xpi J [l TiacTi(^ cL^  s)] c (^ci, s)dfii (a, s) “I- 6K  “I- J.
iX Ja
• The stationary distributions {/q(a, s)} satisfy:
s') =  7Ti (s, s ') < / 1 - 7 Tacri (a,s)dfii (a,s) +
s [ia :a '(a ,s)= a '
/ 7racri(a, s)dfii (a, s) +  > .
J  a:a—a f J
In equilibrium the measure of agents of each race in each state is time invariant and 
consistent with individual decisions.
• The criminal justice expenditure is equal to:
J  = j Y '  7/^ / iracri(a, s)d/ii (a, s).
u  J a
• The aggregate crime rate (i.e. the victimization probability) is given by:
7TV = Y '  ri>i /  cri(a, s)d/ii (a, s) . 
i,B J a
• Average non-asset legitimate income y is equal to:
y = /  ysdfii(a , s), with ye =  (1 -  t v  -  t j ) w, yu = (1 -  t j ) <pw.
i,s ^
• The proportional tax rate t j  is given by:
Jt j  = v=T7 T 7-----t —7----- 7 , with ye = w, yu =  (frw.l^tpihiSi JA ysd/ii (a, s)
i,s
or the revenues from this tax  cover for all the criminal justice expenses.
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• The unemployment insurance benefits scheme is self-financing:
f A dm(a,u)
  2
w J2^zh iS i JA dfi^a, e)
i
that is the proportional tax rate t j j  is set such tha t the total expenditure for unem­
ployment benefits are exactly equal to the revenues from taxation.
• The price for the property crime insurance pj  is equal to:
Pi = rjy^v
Since by assumption the insurance sector is competitive, the price pj depends only on 
the probability of being hit by a criminal and the amount stolen.
3.5  C alib ration  an d  C o m p u ta tio n
The model is calibrated relying on US data, focusing only on males of age 16 and above 
in the labor force.
One model period corresponds to the average prison term in the baseline year, or 12.3 
months in 1996.23 Notice th a t the choice of the model period allows for every person in 
the economy to be eligible to  work in every period of time.
As for preferences, the instantaneous utility function is specified as a Constant Relative
c1_<T —1Risk Aversion: u(ct) = tl_a. , with a = 1.0.
In order to pin down the efficiency units parameters £ r a ,ed, used the Current Popu­
lation Survey (CPS) monthly da ta  for 1996. More in detail for each month we run a linear 
regression with log wages as a dependent variable together with a constant term, a set of 
education dummies and a dummy for race as regressors.24 The reference group consisted 
of the whites high school dropouts. After taking the average of the parameters, from the
2,4 The year 1996 was chosen because the observed crime rate was close to the average rate over the period  
1970-2000.
24 Being the m odel an infinitely lived agents, there is no explicit role for age. However, we estim ated  
an alternative and more comm on specification which included also age and age squared as regressors. We 
then com puted the efficiency parameters by substituting the relevant average age. The final results were 
quite similar to  the ones in the text.
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predicted values of the regression we get the profile for the efficiency units, which is as 
follows: £wh,hsd—1-62, Swh,hs—2.0 i, Ewh.col—2.42, 6bl,hsd—1-4, Sbl.hs l . t8 and £bl,col 2.09.
The exogenous labor supply hra_ed was computed as follows. From the CPS we ob­
tained the average hours worked for each education/race pair. Following the literature 
on the time use, the average hours worked in the population was set to match the aver­
age share of available time devoted to market activities, that is 0.4. Rescaling the hours 
worked according to this value gives the following parameters hwh,hsd=0.369, hwh.hs=0.407, 
hwh,coi=0.426, hbihsd=0.355, hb^hs—0.382, and hbi^ooi=0.401.
Again from the 1996 CPS, data  related to the unemployment rates by race and educa­
tion category allow to pin down the entries of the transition matrices IIra.ed for the Markov- 
chain. We do not allow for state dependence of the unemployment shock, i.e. the proba­
bility of future unemployment is the same irrespective of the current occupational status. 
Figures for unemployment rates in 1996 were n whhsd 10.2%, irwh,hs (■■> u')=4.32%,
Kwh,col (.,u')=2.18% , 7rbijhsd(.,u')=19.77o, 7rbi,hs (•, u')=10.29% and 7rw>co/ (., u')=3.82%.
The race/education shares are obtained from the CPS, which gives the following val­
ues ^ ,^ = 1 2 . 8 9 % ,  il>whM=51.67%, 'ibwh_(X>i=22>.0b%, i])bhhsd=2.32%, ^ ^ = 7 .4 8 %  and 
V,W1coZ =  1-69^-
In the simulations the exogenous borrowing limit d is set at different levels for the 
two races. The values are chosen for the model to replicate in equilibrium the share 
of agents with negative net worth. As reported in Wolff (2000), table 7, in 1995 31.3% 
black households had a negative value for the net worth, while the percentage for white 
households was 15%. The values bbi = —1.151 and bwh = —0.655 allow to replicate these 
figures. This point deserves further discussion. First, even though there is some evidence 
of racial discrimination in credit markets, there are no definitive answers on the matter. 
Furthermore, our calibration strategy goes in the opposite direction of a natural borrowing 
limit concept, as in Aiyagari (1994). Having black agents lower legitimate earnings, relying 
on a natural borrowing limit would imply a borrowing limit more stringent for black agents 
than for whites. Notice, however, th a t the values for the borrowing limits we are imposing 
are more stringent than the ones implied by the natural borrowing limit concept.
We normalize the average disposable legitimate earnings y to 1. This is done by setting 
the TFP param eter B  equal to 1.047. The actual value in 1996 was $28,513.
Following Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000) the exogenous consumption when in 
jail ca is set at $2,600, i.e. this leads to ca = 0.0984.25
2oNotice that in the calibrated econom y there will be no agents with a total legitim ate income less than
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The policy param eter 0, i.e. the replacement rate, is set in order to replicate the actual 
unemployment benefit scheme operating in the US, i.e. <^=0.5.
From the FBI Uniform Crime Reports in 1996 we obtain the number of property 
crimes cleared with the arrest of the felon. From the NCVS, we compute the total number 
of property crimes committed in 1996.26 Accordingly, the apprehension probability per 
crime is set at 7ra =  0.0492. The param eter related to the earnings from crime is set 
to r) = 0.0439, to replicate the value of $1,253, the average value of a property crime 
computed from the Uniform Crime Reports in 1996.
The cost of justice J  is estim ated to be $10,610, i.e. J  = 0.3721. This estimate is 
obtained as follows. The actual expenditures on judicial, legal activities and corrections 
for 1996 are weighted by the appropriate percentages of property crimes, i.e. 14.39% for 
the first two and 31% for the last. This gives a total justice expenditure for property 
crimes equal to 24 billions. This amount is divided by the total number of property crimes 
cleared with an arrest in 1996, giving the value of $10,610.27
Both for the capital share param eter and the depreciation one, consensus values are 
used: a  = 0.36 and <5 =  0.08. Finally, we set the subjective discount rate ft = 0.958, to 
get an equilibrium interest rate in all computations at a value of about 4% on an annual 
basis.
The complete param eterization of the model is reported in Table 3.
3.6  R esu lts
This section starts presenting the optimal policy functions for both black and white agents. 
Then it moves on to describe the results related to the crime rates.
3 .6 .1  P o lic y  F u n c tio n s
In this simple model we have only three sets of decision rules: the saving functions, the 
consumption functions and the crime ones. These are considered in turn.
ca. The lowest value of legitim ate disposable income is 0.2.
26 The NCVS is considered to give more reliable estim ates for property crime victim isation of the american 
households.
2‘ N otice that ca is part of J .
96
Parameter Value Target
Model Period 12.3 months Average Prison term period
B 1.047 Average legitimate non-asset income= 1
a 0.36 Standard
6 0.08 Standard
P 0.958 Standard
a 1.0 Standard
hra ,ed See text Data from CPS
£ ra.ed See text From a regression on CPS data
ra.ed See text Data from CPS
buh -0 .655 15.0% of whites with negative net worth
hi -1 .152 31.3% of blacks with negative net worth
Ca 0.0984 Inmates consumption =$2,600
0 0.0439 One crime is worth $1,253
0.0492 Data from NCVS and UCR
J 0.3721 Expenditure per arrest =$10,610
<P 0.5 US unemployment benefits legislation
'Kra .ed  (-5 ^  ) See text Data from CPS
Table 3.3: Calibration
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Figure 3.6: Saving Functions (Whites - Dropouts)
Saving F unctions
Figures (3.6) and (3.7) show the saving decisions and the 45-degree line for both blacks 
and whites high school dropouts. One property of these functions is worth noticing: 
sufficiently poor unemployed individuals are borrowing constrained, while employed ones 
are not. Another property worth stressing is that these functions are non-decreasing. 
Unlike in simpler models, this is not guaranteed to hold. Actually, for quite extreme 
parameterizations, the saving functions become non monotone: they first decrease and 
then start to increase again. This pattern  is due to the interaction between the saving 
choice and the crime one. The intuition is simple. In the model only individuals with 
low asset levels choose to commit crimes. This decision provides them with additional 
resources: part of these are spent to buy the consumption good, part of them are saved. 
As the individuals get richer, they need to  resort less and less on stealing, explaining 
the decreasing part of the function. As the crime involvement vanishes, a more standard 
behavior is restored.
An interesting comment can be framed in a standard precautionary savings argument. 
For a given educational level, black individuals know that they will experience bad labor 
market conditions, as represented by the high unemployment rate. Since they are risk 
averse, they tend to  accumulate assets, in order to smooth consumption over the possible
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Figure 3.7: Saving Functions (Blacks - Dropouts)
states of the world: by doing this, when a bad shock is realized, they have enough resources 
to keep the consumption profile sufficiently stable and avoid the borrowing constraint. This 
buffer stock strategy can lead some blacks to consume less and save more than the whites. 
However, at the same time, black individuals receive an extremely low labor income that 
do not allowr them to save much. If on the one hand higher unemployment rates increase 
the incentive to commit a property crime for black individuals, on the other hand they 
tend to reduce the likelihood of this choice, since agents are induced to save a higher 
proportion of their income.
It is important to recall th a t the intersection between the 45-degree line and the saving 
function for employed agents gives the highest level of assets that in equilibrium the 
individuals will hold. These intersections occur in regions of the asset space tha t are not 
reported in the graphs: this was done only to make the figures visually clear.
Notice th a t the saving functions qualitative behavior is the same for all education 
levels, hence wre avoid to report them.
C o n su m p tio n  F u n c tio n s
Figure (3.8) plots the consumption functions for black individuals who are either high 
school dropouts or college graduate, for both occupational possibilities. Two things are 
interesting in this graph. First, for a given educational level, the consumption function of
99
CB(HS,E)
CB(HS,U)
CB(COL,E)
CB(COL,U)
0.9
0.5
-0.7- 1.2 0.3 0.8 1.3 1.8
Figure 3.8: Consumption Functions (Blacks - Dropouts and College)
the unemployed is below the employed one, with the distance decreasing in the level of 
assets. Second, by comparing the consumption functions of the agents with different ed­
ucation, they are unsurprisingly increasing in the education level. What is less obvious is 
that, for low level of assets, the distance between consumption when employed and unem­
ployed is lower for the high school dropouts. This is again due to the higher involvement 
in crime of people with a low educational attainment.
C rim e F unctions
In this subsection we move to consider the criminal behaviors implied by the model econ­
omy. Figure (3.9) plots the crime decision rules for black unemployed agents. The number 
of crimes depends heavily on both  the educational level and the degree of poverty. Higher 
educational achievements and higher asset levels imply less crimes. Consider in more de­
tail the most crime prone group: black high school dropouts. Figure (3.10) depicts their 
choices. It is interesting to  notice tha t for this demographic group also employed agents 
resort to crime relatively often.
By comparing figures (3.10) and (3.11) we can appreciate some positive predictions of 
the model. If compared to the whites, black agents do commit more crimes, tha t is for the
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Figure 3.9: Crime Functions (Blacks - Unemployed)
same asset level they perpetrate more crimes, and they decide to do so more often, that 
is their crime functions decrease more slowly.28
3 .6 .2  W h o  C o m m its  C rim es?
Given the optimal policy functions and the stationary distributions we can discuss the 
predictions of the model as far as the crime rates are concerned. First, we compute the 
percentage of agents th a t steal at least $50 dollars in a period, that is whose income from 
illegitimate activities is at least 0.00189. As for the black population, almost every high 
school dropout is involved in property crimes, defined as above. The precise figures are 
89.0% for employed people and 90.3% for the unemployed. As for the white high school 
dropouts, these values are somewhat different, being 68.3% for the employed and 75.7% 
for the unemployed. In comparison, as for the high school graduates, 8.0% of the black 
employed and 22.6% of the unemployed are involved in property crimes, while no white 
employed and 1.7% of the unemployed are. Finally, only 2.0% of black college graduates
28 Notice that, as far as crime is concerned, the presence of the wh workers in the economy is perceived 
as a positive externality by the bl workers, since wh workers receive a higher labour income in equilibrium. 
This rises the incentives for the bl agents to  com m it crimes. This is why it is crucial to include explicitely  
different races in the m odel rather than running separately the model calibrated in turn for the two races. 
The sam e com m ents apply for agents w ith low education levels when compared to people w ith higher ones.
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% Committing Crime Employed Unemployed
Blacks - Dropouts 89.0 90.3
Blacks - High School 8.0 22.6
Blacks - College 0 2.0
Whites - Dropouts 68.3 75.7
Whites - High School 0 1.7
Whites - College 0 0.7
Table 3.4: Shares of Specific Groups Committing Crimes
and 0.79c of white college graduates who are unemployed decide to resort to crime. These 
results are reported in Table 4.
These results deserve some further discussion. The numbers above highlight how bad 
labor market conditions and poverty can make criminal activities more appealing, lead­
ing black individuals to resort to stealing to overcome the economic disadvantage they 
are facing in the legitimate activities. This result is consistent with the stylized facts 
described before, which showed a definitely higher crime involvement for the black pop­
ulation. Moreover, this model shows th a t is possible to get big differences in criminal 
behaviors according to race even w ithout relying on a social interaction framework. The 
combination of the dynamic set-up. the limited legitimate rewards for the dropouts and 
the tem ptation induced by well paid workers are the basic ingredients that allow for this 
result. First, agents with poor labor market prospects accumulate little assets: this is due 
both to their low income and to the relatively frequent unemployment spells they experi­
ence. Poverty is then driving the stealing decisions. If it is possible to name the different 
labor market conditions with the term  discrimination, Bertrand and M ullainathan (2004). 
then it is clear how bad are the dynamic effects implied by it. which would be even greater 
if we were to introduce a stigma effect for the convicted criminals.
3 .6 .3  M o d e l V s. D a ta
In order to assess the performance of the model, we compare four variables of interest to 
the corresponding figures in the FBI and BJS data for 1996. Namely, we consider the 
ratio of the arrest rates by race, the percentage of inmates by education, the percentage of 
inmates by employment at the time of the arrest and the percentage of inmates by race.
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Variable Model Data
Arrest Rates Ratio (B /W ) 4.04 4.48
Inmates Dropouts 54.6% 57.5%:
Inmates High School 39.9% 36.3%
Inmates College 5.5%. 6.2%
Inmates Employed 86.8% 71.3%
Inmates Unemployed 13.2% 28.7%
Inmates Blacks 44.3% 40.4%
Inmates Whites 55.7% 59.6%
Table 3.5: Model Vs. D ata
Table 5 reports these variables.
As for the arrest rates by race ratio, the model implies a number very close to the data 
provided by the FBI: 4.04 versus 4.48. It is worth stressing that the large race crime gap 
is obtained only from the differences in labor market conditions and asset holding, that 
is without resorting to any im itation mechanism among agents. The different legitimate 
conditions account for 90% of the race crime gap observed in the data.
As for the inmates composition by education, the model tracks the data very well. The 
discrepancies between the model and the data are modest.
Finally, the model performs fairly well in accounting for both the employment status 
at the time of the arrest and the race of the 1997 prison population.
3 .6 .4  E x p e r im e n ts
This section is devoted to discuss some counterfactual experiments. First, some conceptual 
exercises are performed, where the heterogeneity between the two races is reduced. Then, 
two policies implying the same costs are compared.
As for the first set of exercises, the results are found in Table 6. The table reports both 
the race arrest ratio implied by the model under consideration and the percent change in 
the crime rate with respect to either the baseline model or a model where the two races 
are identical in every dimension. The exercises are divided into two groups. First, in the 
top part of the table, we report the results of making the two demographic groups equal in 
just one aspect. These are the models from 2 to 6. Then, in the bottom  part of the table.
104
we report the results of making the two demographic groups identical in every aspect but 
one. These are the models from 8 to 12.
In both types of exercise, the strongest effect on the criminal behavior is found to be 
due to the difference in efficiency units. Moreover, the results related to the change in the 
probability of unemployment are a bit misleading. In these cases the percentage of people 
with negative assets varies dramatically with respect to the benchmark case, explaining 
such big responses of the crime rate and the sign of the change.
It is useful to compare our findings to those in Grogger (1998). Relying on an Oaxaca- 
type decomposition applied to the N LSY79  data. Grogger (1998) finds that 26% of the 
racial differential in crime participation rates is due to the black-white wage gap. We find 
an even stronger effect, since model 9 accounts for 49% of the racial arrest ratio. As seen, 
the difference in efficiency units directly maps to earnings differential and affects heavily 
the crime decision. Understanding the determ inants of the wage gap is of paramount im­
portance. As remarked before, there are many competing explanations in the literature: 
the role of pre-market factors, taste discrimination, statistical discrimination and special­
ization into jobs with lower wage growth. In this version of the model we assumed the 
efficiency units gap to be exogenous. Considering explicitly the feedbacks from the labor 
market to the crime one and viceversa seems to be an appropriate way to endogenise the 
wage differences.
The second set of counterfactuals is aimed at understanding which public policy is 
more effective in reducing the aggregate crime rate. More precisely, a comparison between 
two policies implying the same cost is carried out. The first policy involves an increase 
in the income for the high school dropouts, tha t is an improvement for the group with 
the worst economic condition. In contrast, the second policy increases the likelihood of 
the punishment through an increase in the police expenditure. Notice that for the policy 
comparisons to be more informative, the most crime prone groups need to be modeled in 
a rather detailed way. This is one of reasons why it is very im portant to consider race 
explicitly. The results of such experiments are reported in Table 7.
For the first case, starting from the benchmark calibration, we compute the value of the 
high school dropouts non asset income. Then we give a lump-sum subsidy to all dropouts 
worth 2.5% of this value. Considering the number of people involved and the monetary 
value of the subsidy ($481). this policy would imply a cost in per capita term s of $73. 
Then we solve the model under this new specification. The new model economy implies a
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Model Arrest Ratio Crime Rate Change
1) Baseline 4.04 -
2) Equal Borrowing Limit 3.43 -5.15%
3) Equal Efficiency Units 1.75 -13.38%
4) Equal labor Supplies 3.09 -5.45%
5) Equal Unemployment 4.16 +2.17%
6) Equal Education 3.28 -4.27%
7) Everything Equal 1 -
8) Different Borrowing Limit 1.14 +  1.57%
9) Different Efficiency Units 2.22 +4.93%
10) Different labor Supplies 1.31 -0.07%
11) Different Unemployment 0.96 -1.69%
12) Different Education 1.23 -0.07
Table 3.6: Counterfactual Experiments
decrease in the crime rate equal to 6.8%.
Given the cost of the first policy, we consider another policy opposite in spirit to 
the first one. i.e. a policy which increases the likelihood of the punishment. Following 
Imrohoroglu. Merlo and Rupert (2000), we specify an apprehension technology of the 
form 7ra =  1 — with G being the public expenditure on police. To use this function, 
we need to estimate y. In order to do so. we consider the time series of the real per 
capita police expenditure and the time series of the property crimes clearance rates .~J 
For the clearance rate, as before, we take the number of crimes cleared with an arrest 
from the UCR and the total number of crimes from the NCVS. Then we rewrite the 
equation above as 1 — na = G —> l n ( l  — 7Tat) = —y i n Gt- Since both series are non 
stationary, we take first differences and estimate with OLS this equation in growth rates, 
i.e. A In (1 — 7rat) = — yA In Gt-
The point estimate for y is 0.04. Finally, increasing the police expenditure in 1996 bv 
$73. from a starting value of $127, we get the new value for 7ra=0.052. Then we solve the 
model with this higher apprehension probability: the crime rate drops by 18.6%.
The table has an immediate interpretation. In terms of decreasing the aggregate crime
"9This series is readily available from 1980 to 1999. see table 1.2 of the 2002 Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics, US D ept of Justice.
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Experiment Crime Rate Change
Lump-sum subsidy to dropouts -6.8 %
Increased apprehension probability -18.6%
Table 3.7: Policy Experiments
rate, the most effective policy is the one tha t increases the expenditure on police, making 
a prison term  more likely for the criminals.
3 .7  D iscu ss io n  an d  C o n c lu sio n s
In this chapter a model able to explain the observed differences in crime involvement be­
tween black and white American males has been discussed. A dynamic general equilibrium 
model presenting racial differences in legitimate opportunities has been developed.
The overall assessment of the model suggests tha t it succeeds in generating the race 
crime gap. or the higher involvement in crime of black versus white individuals. Blacks do 
commit disproportionately more crime in the model: the model accounts for 90% of the 
race arrest ratio observed in 1996. In addition, on the basis of counterfactual analysis, the 
race wage gap seems to be the most im portant factor in shaping the crime differential, a 
channel already discussed bv Grogger (1998) and Machin and Meghir (2003). This chapter 
has argued that if we are to  understand the race crime gap it is of paramount importance 
to understand what forces drive the observed differentials in the labor market.
The next step in the research is to obtain endogenously the labor market differences 
according to race. It is reasonable to think tha t, given the dimension of the crime phe­
nomenon in the US. there are significant feedback effects going from the labor market to 
the crime market and viceversa. This kind of considerations are potentially very im portant 
for agents with low educational levels, whose criminal participation is particularly high. 
If training and hiring costs are non-negligible and if on the job learning is an im portant 
component of the worker's productivity, employers will accurately screen the workforce 
trying to form a match only with those workers that maximize the expected profits of 
the relationship, with duration playing an im portant role. Obviously, the incarceration of 
a worker represents an interruption of the employer/employee relationship. In the hiring 
process, given the high historical race crime gap. employers could use race as a signal, that 
is they could statistically discriminate among applicants on the basis of race. According
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to this story, unemployment, wage and crime differences by race should be persistent. 
However, this explanation begs for a question: where do the initial differences between 
races come from?
It goes without saying tha t the simple firms structure assumed in the current version 
of the model cannot accommodate such an extension. First, the value of a firm must be 
non-zero in order for the future to play a non trivial role on the current decisions. Second, 
the labor market should provide a wage per worker type, rather than a wage per efficiency 
units.
Furthermore, the model considered here cannot take into consideration some crucial 
aspects of the crime phenomenon. In first instance, crime is primarily committed by people 
of young age. Leung (1994). while our framework does not give age any role in determining 
the crime decisions. A feasible extension, in order to capture in a parsimonious way the 
life-cvcle dimension of the property crime participation, is to specify a perpetual youth 
model. This way the framework could allow easily for two different and im portant aspects: 
1) tem porary stigma effects in the labor market for convicted criminals: 2) changing labor 
market conditions over the life-cycle.
3 .8  A p p en d ix  A  - S o lu tio n  A lg o r ith m
The computational procedure used to  solve the baseline model can be represented by the 
following algorithm:
• Generate discrete grids over the asset space [6ra, ...,amax]:
•  Get the invariant distributions over s associated with IIra ej:
• Get the equilibrium tax  rate on labor income "£/:
• Get the aggregate labor supply L :
•  Guess the aggregate crime rate 7rro;
• Guess the criminal justice tax rate tjq:
• Compute the insurance price pj = rjyKvo'-
• Guess on the interest rate ro;
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•  Get the capital demand and the wage rate w.
•  Get the average non asset legitimate income y :
•  Get the crime functions crra ed (a, s ):
•  Get the saving functions a'ra ed (a, s ) :
•  Get the stationary distributions (ira ed(a, s):
•  Check asset market clearing; Get r\:
•  Update Tq =  zotq -f (1 — zu) r\ (with zu arbitrary weight);
•  Iterate until market clearing:
•  Check final good market clearing;
•  Get the aggregate crime rate 7rvi :
•  Update 7t'vq — ^ ttvq +  (1 — £) 7rr i (with £ arbitrary w’eight);
• Get the criminal justice tax  rate r  j i ;
•  Update t'jq = C 'jo  +  (1 — C) TJ\ (with £ arbitrary weight):
• Iterate until convergence.
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C hapter 4
Severance Paym ents: Equilibrium  
W elfare Effects in a M odel w ith  
H eterogeneous W orkers
4.1  In tro d u ctio n
Several labor market institutions are designed to provide insurance to workers facing shocks 
to their labor earnings, their employment status or their specific and general human cap­
ital. In this paper we consider a particular form of employment protection legislation 
(EPL). namely severance payments. Our contribution focuses on the equilibrium wel­
fare effects arising from their introduction in a labor market with costly mobility and 
heterogeneous workers.
Severance payments represent a direct transfer from the employer to the employee, 
paid when an employer initiated separation takes place. In several european Countries 
government-mandated severance payments have been a long lasting and distinctive feature 
of their labor markets. For the period 1956-1984. Lazear (1990) finds that, for a worker 
with ten years of tenure, the value of the severance payments in Italy, Spain, Norway 
and France was considerably high, being equal to 15.9, 13.6, 12 and 5.2 months of wages, 
respectively.
The debate on EPL is a long lived and rather extensive one. Several contributions, 
starting from the seminal paper by Lazear (1990), find large and negative effects of EPL. 
More in detail, he finds tha t stricter EPL is responsible for lower employment level and
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higher unemployment rates. His estimates suggest tha t an increase from zero to three 
months of severance pay would raise the unemployment rate by 5.5 percent in the United 
States.
Garibaldi and Violante (2005) argue tha t the most suitable conceptual framework to 
model firing costs is not a firing tax and, at the same time, provide evidence tha t the direct 
transfer component of EPL is quantitatively im portant. Garibaldi and Violante (2005) 
show, in the context of a search model with insider and outsider workers, the different re­
sults obtained when modeling the EPL as a firing tax  as opposed to severance payments. 
They stress how the impact of severance payments on unemployment is qualitatively dif­
ferent from th a t of firing taxes, and find th a t it varies according to the bite of the wage 
rigidity.
A recent contribution, Ljungqvist (2002), analyses how lay-off costs affect employment 
in three prototype frameworks: a search model, a matching model and a model with 
employment lotteries. The aim of the paper is to single out the common economic forces 
at work in these general equilibrium models. The employment outcomes differ, depending 
on the specific framework used: search and matching models show a positive employment 
effect, while with employment lotteries lay-off costs tend to be detrimental. However, 
notice that: 1) welfare effects are not taken into consideration. 2) lay-off costs are specified 
as firing taxes.
This chapter studies the equilibrium welfare effects of introducing mandated severance 
payments in a labor market w ith costly mobility, where self-insurance through a riskless 
asset is the only way to smooth fluctuations in labour income due to unemployment shocks. 
A similar set up has been analysed by Alvarez and Veracierto (2001).1 Alvarez-Veracierto 
assumed that there is only one market clearing wage for all types of workers in the economy, 
i.e. independently of their productivity. In their set-up, the SP has an insurance role for 
unemployed workers and im portant general-equilibrium effects: it reduces labor demand 
and wages, and since it insures workers it reduces precautionary savings with a further 
effect on the capital stock and w'ages. The novelty of our analysis is to allow' for wage 
flexibility at the level of the individual firm-worker match. More precisely, wages vary with 
both tenure and productivity of the workers. When severance payments are introduced, 
the firm can potentially undo their effect by modifying the wage profile. The introduction 
of severance payments is equivalent to the introduction of a compulsory actuarially fair
t h o u g h  in their m odel severance paym ents are a priori non-neutral in so far as a unique market wage 
applies for both  new hires and workers in surviving jobs.
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insurance scheme. Workers entry wages fall by the expected present value of the future 
payment. However, because of incomplete markets, workers are unlikely to be indifferent 
about the slope of the wage profile. In particular, young workers in an economy with 
long unemployment durations and long tenures could be adversely affected because they 
spend a long period unemployed before finding a job, so they are likely to be constrained. 
Moreover, once they find a job, for an initial period their wage will remain low as they 
are pre-paying a large expected severance payment, so their borrowing constraint might 
remain binding. For this group of agents the welfare costs of severance payments are 
potentially high. The model is solved numerically and calibrated to the US economy. The 
measure of welfare we rely on is the change in consumption needed to equate the expected 
lifetime utilities in the stationary equilibria of several economies: the baseline economy, i.e. 
without severance payments, and a series of counterfactual economies where the severance 
payments are introduced at increasing levels. Non trivial general equilibrium effects are 
also present, since the capital stock in the various economies varies. On the one hand, the 
precautionary motive for savings is reduced by the introduction of severance payments, 
since agents are better insured. On the other hand, the change in the wage profile is likely 
to reduce the savings of young individuals and increase that of older ones.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model. 
Section 3 is devoted to the definition of the equilibrium concept used in the model. Section 
4 presents the calibration procedure. Section 5 provides the main results and predictions 
of the model, while Section 6 concludes.
4 .2  T h e  E con om y
4 .2 .1  D e m o g r a p h ic s
The economy is populated by a measure one of agents (workers). W ith probability (1 — A), 
constant across individuals, an agent dies and is immediately replaced by an offspring of 
working age who starts life as an unemployed.
4 .2 .2  P r e fe r e n c e s
Agents' intraperiod utility function is defined over consumption c and search effort U as
U (c#, ‘ipt) = u(ct ) -  (4.1)
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and the future is discounted at factor 0  = 0 \  where 0  € (0,1) is the discount factor. We 
assume tha t u (.) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satifies the Inada conditions, 
and v (.) is strictly increasing, strictly convex. Effort choices are defined over the set =  
[0, ll. with v (0) =  0 and r ( l )  =  +oo. Agents do not value their offsprings’ welfare.
4 .2 .3  E n d o w m e n ts
Agents can be employed (e) or unemployed (u). If employed they supply labor inelas- 
ticallv. Newly born agents are endowed with ao units of the consumption good. Every 
employed agent of working age goes through a life cycle of I  labor productivity shocks 
i € X = { 1 ,2 ,.. .,/} .2 Let be the transition probability between productivity level i 
and z +  l of employed workers. We only allow jum ps between successive productivity 
levels until 2 =  7 — 1, thus 7 =  0. We index job tenure of an employed worker by t, 
with t G T  = {0,1,..., T}. Tenure increases with probability Tt = t  between succes­
sive tenure levels for all employed workers until t = T  — 1, and let t t  = 0. Denote the 
productivity level of a (?,£)-tvpe worker as where the pair stands for the agent's cur­
rent age-tenure levels. The set of (labour augmenting) productivity levels is denoted as 
£ = {sio, o20? -ll? •••? -if? •■•? - /r} -  Unemployed workers have zero tenure and transit
between productivity levels i and 2 — 1 (i.e. lose some of their skills) with probability 
until level i = 2. or = 0.
4 .2 .4  T ech n o lo g y
Each firm uses one worker and capital to produce output according to a common, constant 
returns to scale technology. The output of a firm employing a worker of productivity su 
and K 7t units of capital is Yu = F (K it,su ) .  The same production function in intensive 
units is y7t =  f  with klt =  K n / c i t ■ Capital depreciates at the exogenous rate S.
A V ith som e abuse of language, we are going to refer to i as the productivity or age of the agents. Since 
the m odel is a version of the perpetual youth model, and given the assum ptions on the stochastic evolution  
of ?. an individual can see her i decrease during an unem ploym ent spell. Strictly speaking, i does not 
represent either concept.
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4 .2 .5  S ea rch  fr ic tio n s  a n d  la b o r  m a rk ets
Every period unemployed workers of experience z meet a firm with an unfilled vacancy 
with probability Oj(z/’).3 Keeping an open vacancy is costless. In every period, after 
production has taken place, employed workers of type (z, t) may be separated from their 
employer and enter the unemployment pool with exogenous probability a lt > 0. Or, 
we can think of a competitive labor market with free entry of firms and workers who 
become unproductive with probability a a and productive again with probability Oj(b’), 
with o t (0) =  0. P i(l) =  1, and >  0.
The value of a firm with a filled vacancy, whose worker is of type (z, t ), is denoted with 
J  (i,t) . Notice tha t the worker's type fully characterizes the firms' state space: once the 
employee's "age"-tenure pair is known, also the value of the firm can be computed.
The considerations above related to the free entry of firms justify the condition J  (z, 0) =  
0, Vz. This set of equations imposes th a t the value of a firm who has just started an em­
ployment relationship with a worker of productivity i is equal to zero, irrespective of the 
labor market experience of the agent.
Tenure evolves stochastically and once the worker becomes an insider (i.e. has positive 
tenure) the firm is locked in: the SP needs to be paid to get rid of the worker. Job security 
legislation insulates insiders from com petition from outsiders.
The value function of an employed agent of type (z,£). whose current asset holdings 
are equal to a is denoted with V  ( i ,a ,t) .  In general, the SP will depend both on the age 
of the worker and on his tenure with the firm he is working for. We denote the SP with 
9 ( i , t ) .  Since SP are unconditional and a worker that quits is still productive, an insider 
has threat point V  (z, a -t- 9 (z, t ) , 0) as she can quit, receive the severance payment and 
obtain a new job with zero tenure immediately. On the other hand the shadow value of a 
worker cannot fall below J  (z, t) = —9 (z, t) since the firm would optimally fire the worker 
otherwise. Any wage such tha t both the worker and the firm receive a payoff strictly above 
their respective threat points is compatible with the survival of the match. We assume 
tha t wages will be determined by bilateral ex-post bargaining over the value of the match.
For tractability, we assume tha t the worker has all the bargaining power.4
As a final note, notice that, in the absence of the SP. the value of each firm is equal
b n  the benchmark m odel we assum e that the search effort is a constant, i.e. v  =  v ,  and that "age" does 
not affect the shape of the o, ( v )  functions. It follows that the job finding probability o , ( v )  =  O ( 0)  =  O (v )  
is exogenous.
4 See the discussion below.
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to zero irrespective of the worker's tenure level. In particular, wages in this economy 
correspond to the competitive ones.
4 .2 .6  M u tu a l F u n d
Since the SP are set by the government, there is nothing that prevents them to be higher 
than  the output produced by a worker. It follows that, upon separation, a firm could incur 
some losses, determined by the size of the severance payment. In order to deal with this 
aspect of the problem, we assume the existence of a mutual fund (M F ) tha t owns all the 
firms, covers their losses, pays out the severance payment upon separation and reinvests 
the flow profits into the asset market.
4 .2 .7  O th er  m ark et a rra n g em e n ts
The final good market is competitive. Firms hire capital every period from a competitive 
market. Capital is supplied by rental firms tha t borrow from workers and the mutual fund 
at the risk-free rate r and invest in physical capital.
There are no state-contingent markets to insure against unemployment and income 
risk, but workers can self-insure by saving into the risk-free asset. The agents also face 
a borrowing limit, denoted as d > 0. There are perfect annuity markets where workers 
share their m ortality risk.
4 .2 .8  G o v e rn m e n t
The government enforces an unconditional severance payment from the firm to those work­
ers who enter unemployment. The severance payment is a lump sum payment specified 
as a function 9 ( i , t )  = Such specification allows the severance payment to depend
both on productivity sa and on tenure lengths t. We assume v0 =  0, or tha t a worker 
with zero tenure is not entitled to a severance payment.
'In reality severance paym ents are usually proportional to the last wage. Our formulation makes the 
severance paym ent a function of the wage a worker would receive in the current  period. The wage in the 
current period differs from the last wage whenever a state transition has taken place in the previous period. 
Making the severance paym ent proportional to the last wage would com plicate notation substantially and 
require us to keep track of when the last state transition took place.
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4.2.9 W age settin g
Wages are determined in every period before capital is rented. The wages of workers 
with zero tenure (outsiders) are determined competitively. We assume tha t workers with 
positive tenure (insiders) have all the bargaining power and make firms a take-it-or-leave- 
it offer.6 Therefore workers are going to extract all the surplus and the value of a firm 
employing a worker of productivity su and tenure t is J  (?, t) = —0 ( i , t ) .
4 .3  S ta tio n a ry  E q u ilib rium
We first define the problem of an employed and unemployed worker and the problem of the 
firm. The individual state variables are the employment status s G S  = {e, u}. experience 
i € X, asset holdings a £ A  = [—d, a] and tenure t £ T . ‘ The stationary distribution of 
employed agents is denoted by /re(i, a, t) whereas the distribution of unemployed agents is 
//„(?', a).
4 .3 .1  P r o b le m  o f  th e  a g e n ts
In this Section we first define the problem of the agents in their recursive representation, 
then we provide a formal definition of the equilibrium concept used in this model, the 
recursive competitive equilibrium.
P rob lem  o f th e  unem ployed worker
The value function of an unemployed agent of type (i , t  = 0) whose current asset holdings 
are equal to a is denoted with U (i, a). The problem of these agents can be represented as 
follows:
' This assum ptions im plies that wages are determ ined only by productivity and severance paym ents. If 
firms had positive bargaining power wages would depend on workers' marginal utility of consum ption and 
wealth. T his would not only substantially com plicate the problem but also imply that saving decisions 
have a strategic elem ent in so far as they affect workers' future bargaining power and wages.
'A  formal argument proving that a <  oc appears for a similar economy in Huggett (1993).
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U (?,a) =  max |u (c )  — v(ib) -j- /3ozU(z, a!, 0) (4.2)
c.a'
+/3(1 -  ty )  [xVVO -  1, a') +  (1 -  tt“ ) U(i ,  a ' ) ] }
s.t.
r (1 +  r)
C CL — ------ -------CL “I-  b  (2 )
A
ao given , c >  0, —a' >  d
Unemployed agents enjoy utility from consumption, have some disutility from searching 
for a job. and face some uncertain events in the future. In the next period they can 
still be unemployed, and if so they might lose part of their skills, or they can find a job 
and be employed. We interpret b  (i) as an unemployment benefit scheme depending on 
productivity (alternatively, we could interpret it as home production). Notice tha t the 
gross interest rate (1 +  r) is divided by the survival probability A to "adjust" the returns
from investing in the risk-free asset for the probability of death. This ensures tha t at
the aggregate level there are no incidental bequests to be distributed: in steady state the 
average value of the asset holdings of people tha t die is zero.8
Prob lem  o f th e  em ployed  worker
The recursive representation of the problem of the employed worker is as follows: 
U (? ,a ,t) =  max {11(c) +  /3 (1 -  a it) [7rf TtV(i  +  l ,a ',  t +  1) +  7rf (1 -  r t )V ( i  +  l , a ;,t)-|-
c.a'
(4.3)
(1 -  7rf) t , V  ( i , a ' , t  +  1) +  (1 -  7if) (1 -  - ( ) V  ( i , a ' , t ) ]  +  fS<ritU ( i ,a '  +  0 ( M ) ) }
S.t.
/  7 (  1  “ t" r )
C +  tt +  /  — . ~CL -j- IL'it
A
c > 0, —a > d
Employed agents enjoy utility from consumption and face several uncertain events
in the future. In the next period they can still be employed, and if so they might see
s Notice that the Bellm an equations need to be appropriately adjusted when productivity reaches its 
minimum value. W hen i =  1, the object U(i  — l .a ' )  is not well defined. A similar comm ent applies for 
both the em ployed workers' and firms' value functions. The equations are trivially modified when tenure 
and/or productivity are at their boundaries. We do not report them in order to save on space.
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an increase in their tenure and/or their age. or they can be fired, receive the severance 
payments and be unemployed. Notice tha t in case a separation occurs, the SP is paid 
to the worker at the end of the period: the amount of resources that she brings into the 
following period is equal to a' +  0 (?, t ) , the sum of accumulated wealth and the severance 
payment. Finally, notice that / stands for a lump-sum tax paid by the agents currently 
employed to finance the unemployment benefit scheme.
P rob lem  o f th e  firms
We assume tha t establishments are risk neutral. In every period, after wages have been 
set, an establishment matched to a worker of type (?, t ) rents the amount of capital solving
J  (i, t ) =  max /  f(kn)£it — u'n — (r + 6) kasu  H J(i  +  1, t + 1)+ (4.4)
kit f 1 t  r
Trf (1  — — ^ i )  TtJ ( i , t  +  1)  +  ( 1  — 7rf) ( 1  — Tt )  J  (i,t)\
1 +  r  J
where ka = K lt f s lt. In the firm's Bellman equation we need to take into account all 
possible transitions the worker currently employed could go through. Beside the transitions 
outlined above, we also need to take into consideration the death of the agent, which would 
destroy the match, with no SP paid to the worker. J  (?, t) represent the expected present 
discounted stream of the firm' revenues and costs.
W age determ ination
Since the workers have all the bargaining power and make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to 
the firm, the wage u \ t leaves the firm indifferent between continuing and term inating the 
employment relationship: i.e. J  (i,t) = for any pair ( i , t ) . Hence, il'h satisfies
- 9  (?, t) = f ( k it)£it -  wit ~  (r +  <$) kit£it
— — —  {(1 — ( 7^)  [7ri Tt^('i +  1, t 4* 1) +  n f  (1 — Tt )  0(i +  1, t)
1 +  r
+ (1 — n i )  T t ®  (b t +  1) +  (1 — TTi )  (1 — T t )  9 (?, t)} +  Oi t 9  (?, t)}
To understand better how the wage determination (and their actual computation) works 
in our framework, consider a simplified example. In this illustration, severance pay­
ments do not depend on wages, th a t is 0 ( i , t )  = 9t< and productivity is a constant,
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tha t is — £,V (?,£). Bv imposing the equilibrium conditions J  (?’, 0) =  0,V? and 
J  (?, t) =  —#*, V (?, t 7  ^ 0 ), and rearranging the firms1 value functions we are able to derive 
the equilibrium expressions for wages:
u-’io =  f ( k ) s  -  ( r  + S) ks -  — (1 -  (Tio) r o0i
1 +  r
w n  =  f ( k ) s  — ( r  +  <5) ks +  6 \  — ^ { ( 1  — c q i )  [t i Oo -F ( 1  — " i )  6 \ ]  +  ( ? i \ 0 \ }
... and similarly Vt
This example is interesting since it shows tha t every period the worker pre-pays the sev­
erance payment tha t she will receive next period if laid off. so tha t the expected present 
value of the wage bill does not depend on 6 (z, t) at all, as expected. Only the time-profile 
of wages is affected.
If we consider a more general specification for the severance payments, namely 6 (?, t) = 
' ) t u ' i t -  and we let productivity vary by type, then repeating the same steps gets a set of 
equations tha t the bargained wages need to satisfy:
-ItU 'it =  f (k i t ) s it -  w it ~  (r +  S) knsu  (4.5)
~  Y T J T 7  ~  [ 7It 7’ *5 /f + l 7r * + U + l  +  ( 1  -  T t )  I t U - ' i + l . t
+  ( 1  -  7TI )  T r t t  +  i W i ' t + i  +  ( 1  -  7T f ) ( 1  -  T t )  7 t w i t ]  +  < T i t l t w i t }
From (4.5) a system of T  x I  equations is originated, whose unknown are the T  x I  wages. 
Notice however tha t the system is: 1) recursive, thanks to the fact that I  and T  are the 
maximum values of (?,£), and 2) linear in wu. hence it admits a unique solution. Notice 
tha t in general wlt = IF (wij+i, ^7 +1 .0  u'j+i.f+i). In the actual solution one can start 
solving il'jt  =  IF (w j t , w j t , w j t )* next u .y _ u  =  IF (w i—\'T ,w i t , w j t ), and =
IF  (il'j t , w J'T - i , w j t ) • Then, it is possible to obtain, recursively, the whole sequence of
{re,-*} . The consequence is tha t one never has to deal with a system of equations to get
the equilibrium wages, which is computationally simple and efficient.
T he m utual fund
The intertem poral budget constraint of the mutual fund is
j ( \  — A)9 (z, t) (Tl t d ( i e  (z, a, t) + M F ' =  (1 +  r )  M F  +  J p  (z, t) d / j , e  (z, a, t) (4.6)
119
where p (?, t) denotes the profit of a production unit of type (z, t) and M F  denotes the asset- 
value of the fund. The quantity J p ( i ,  t) dpe (?', a, t) represents the aggregate value of profits 
in steady state. The quantity / (1 — A)# (?, t) (Jitdpe (?, a, t) represents the aggregate value 
of the severance payments paid to the workers who got separated in the current period. 
In steady state. M F  =  M F '  so the fund has an amount of assets M F  tha t guarantees 
a return  which is large enough to cover the operating losses. A natural question arises: 
""Where do these funds come from?" The intuition is the following: a job has initially 
positive profits, then possibly negative profits, but ex-ante it has zero value when the 
present value of profits are discounted at rate r. It follows that if the fund reinvests the 
initial profits in the risk-free asset, it will be able to repay, in expected terms, all the future 
losses. Basically, M F  is the cumulated value of the reinvested initial profits for each job 
in the stationary distribution p e (z,a, t).
4 .3 .2  R e c u r s iv e  S ta t io n a r y  E q u ilib r iu m
D efin itio n  3 For given policies 0(i, £), b(i) a recursive stationary equilibrium is a set of de­
cision rules {ce(z, a, <), Cu(i, a), a'e(i, a, t ) , a’u(i, a), k^}  , value functions {V(z, a, £),£/(?, a), 
J  (z, t)}, a value of the mutual fund M F ,  prices {r, iva} , a lump-sum tax I and a pair of 
stationary distributions {pe( i ,a ,t ) ,  p u (i,a)} such that:
• Given relative prices {r, wa}. severance payments 0(i, t), lump-sum tax  I, and unem­
ployment benefits b(i). the individual policy functions {ce(?, a, t), Cu(i, a), a'e(i, a, t), 
a'u(i,a)}  solve the household problems (4.‘2)-(4.3) and { V ( i ,a , t ) ,U ( i ,a ) j  are the 
associated value functions.
• Given relative prices {r, u'a}, and severance payments d(i,t). ku solves the firm's 
problem (4.4) and satisfies
r + 6 = f '  (kit) (4-7)
Since the LHS of equation (4.7) is equal for every firm in the economy, it follows that 
kn (the capital stock per efficiency unit of labor) is the same across establishments, 
or ku = k for any pair (?, t).
•  The wage wa leaves the firm indifferent between continuing and term inating the 
employment relationship: i.e. J  (?, t) = —9 (?, t) for any pair (z, t ) . Hence, iL\t satisfies 
the recursive system of equations (4.5).
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•  The stationary value of the m utual fund M F  satisfies
r M F  = (1 — A) J  0 (i,t)  (Jitdiie (?', a,t) — J  p (i , t ) d(.ie (0 a, t)
which highlights how the operating losses are paid for with the asset income.
• The labor market is in flow equilibrium
/ Acritdiie( i ,a ,t)  + / (1 -  X)dpLe(i, a, t)
J l x A x T  J l x A x T
=  /  A o tdpu(i,a)
J l x A
notice tha t we need to take into consideration tha t some people die and are substituted 
by the flow of newborns, who enter the job market as unemployed.
• The asset market clears
k / 5itdpe(i ,a ,t)  = / a'e( i ,a , t )d p e(i,a, t) +  / a!u(i, a)dpu(i, a) -f M F  
J l x A x T  J l x A x T  J l x A
notice that here we need to add the supply of capital of the mutual fund.
• The goods market clears
[ f ( k ) - S k \  £ltdpe( i ,a ,t)  + /  b (?) dp.u(i,a) =
J l x A x T  J l x A
/ ce( i ,a ,t )d / ie( i ,a ,t )  + /  c^?', a)dpu(i, a)
J l x A x T  J l x A
• For 6 ( f )  =  biL'io the lump-sum tax  satisfies
J l x A  bu'iodp-u(i, a )I
J l x A x T ^ k - e  (b a i t) 
The stationary distributions {p e(i,a ,t) ,  f.iu(i,a)}  satisfy
pu ( i ,a ’) =  A ( 1 - 0  f (1 - o t)d n u (i,a) (4.8)
Ja:a'u (i ,a) — a'
+*i (1 ~ 0 i+ i) dpu (i +  l ,a )  +  /  o u dne ( i ,a , t )
J  a:a'u (i , a ) = a ' J T x { a: a ' e ( i .a , t )=a' }
+  (1 -  =  1)X {<*! = a0) /  dpe ( i ,a , t )+  dpu (i,a)
i J l x A x T  J l x A
and
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Me (*\ *) =  A / (1 -  <rit) (1 -  7T,) (1 -  Tt )dfie ( i,a ,t)
J a :a ' (i . a , t ) = a '
+  / (1 -  7Tt-i (1 -  Tt) dfie (i -  1, a, t)
J a:a'e (i — l .a . t ) = a '
/  ( 1  -  c r ^ _ ! )  ( 1  -  7iq) Tt - i d j i e 1)
J  a: a ' (i.a.t  — l ) = a '
+  /  (1 — c b -n - i)  k i - \ T t - \ d i i e (i — 1, a , t  — 1)
J a : a ’e (i — l . a . t — l ) = a '
+x(^ = l) /  o td f iu (?', a)
./ a : a ' ( i . a ) = a '
(4.9)
where \  (•) is an indicator function taking the value one if the condition in parenthesis 
is satisfied and zero otherwise.
In equilibrium the measure of agents in each state is time invariant and consistent with 
individual decisions, as given by the above two equations (4.8) and (4.9).
4 .4  P a ra m eter iza tio n
The complete param eterization of the model is reported in Table 1. We calibrate the 
model to the U S ,  where severance packages are in place only for few categories of workers.
In order to properly capture the labor market dynamics, we need to work with a 
short time period: one model period corresponds to two months. The survival probability 
is calibrated for the agents to have on average an active working life of 40 years. The 
concavity of the utility function is pinned down by the CRRA coefficient ?;, which is set to 
2.0. a common value in the literature. The borrowing limit d is endogenous to the model, 
and we stick to the N atural Borrowing Limit concept proposed by Aiyagari (1994). In the 
benchmark economy d = 0.16. We assume that the newborns enter the economy without 
any asset endowment, or ao =  0. We allow for 11 points in the age/productivity grid. 
People enter the economy at age 20 and reach at most age 60. The grid is evenly spaced, 
tha t is we allow for a jum p in age occuring on average every 4 years. It follows that 
7rf = 0.038. As for the probability of losing skills while unemployed n f,  we choose a value
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Parameter Value Target
Model Period Bimonthly
A - Survival prob 1 - 4 ^ =  09958 40 years of active working life
?/ - CRRA 2.0 Standard
d - Borrowing limit 0.16 Natural Borrowing Limit
ao - Newborn asset endowment 0
I  - Productivity levels 11; {20, 24,...,60} Working age between 20 and 60
Sit - Productivity values See Table 2 From a regression on CPS data
7 -  Prob of increasing productivity ^ 3 =  0.038 A jump every 4 years
7r^  - Prob of decreasing productivity 0.1
T  - T  +  1 Tenure levels 10; {0,2, ...,20} Maximum Tenure=20 years
Tf - Prob of increasing tenure ^ |o =  0.077 A jump every 2 years
Oi - Job finding prob 0.66 Average unemployment duration
o tt - Job losing prob 8-52”  0.019 A separation every 8 years
~)t - Severance Payment 0 Competitive Labor Market
<5 - Capital depreciation rate 0.012 Investment/Output ratio ~  20%
a  - Capital share 0.3 Labor Share
3 - Rate of time preference 0.9962 Annual interest rate~5%
Table 4.1: Calibration
equal to 10%. This implies tha t there is a 10% probability that an unemployed worker 
will see her efficiency units decreased of four years. Given the estimated parameters of the 
log wage regression, this implies an average wage loss equal to approximately 6%. Notice 
tha t we use this value only for i < 8. Since the estimated profiles are concave in age, the 
efficiency units peak at (model) age i = 8, and start declining afterwards. If we were to 
allow for a positive n^ for the ages between 9 and 11, unemployed workers facing a negative 
shock would acquire skills rather than losing them. To avoid this problem, we set = 0 
for i = 9 ,..., 11. As with the age/productivity grid, we allow for 11 points in the tenure 
grid, which starts at zero and reaches at most 20 years. The grid is evenly spaced, tha t is on 
average people experience an increase in tenure every 2 years. It follows tha t r* =  0.019. 
The job finding probability is pinned down by the average unemployment duration. 
This is approximately 12 weeks in the data, which dictates a value for Oi = 0.66. At this 
stage of the analysis, we allow for a constant separation probability, equal to  cq* =  0.019.
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This implies tha t on average a worker gets separated every 8 years. For the benchmark 
economy = 0 because it is meant to capture the US economy where SP are limited to 
few occupations. The depreciation of capital is set to replicate an investm ent/output share 
of 20%. on an annual basis. This is achieved when S = 0.012. We assume a Cobb-Douglas 
production function, hence the capital share is captured by the parameter a = 0.3. The 
rate of time preference d  is calibrated to get an equilibrium interest rate equal to 59c. on 
an annual basis.
The com putation of the efficiency units profile for each (?', t) type is no trivial task for 
this model. If one were to interpret literally the (?,£) pairs, the sa should be estimated in 
equilibrium. Since we are allowing for human capital depreciation during an unemployment 
spell (captured by a decrease in z). the variable i could not be taken to the data as 
being age. However, structurally estim ating (I  x T)  efficiency units would represent an 
intractable problem. To reduce the dimensionality of the exercise, one could rely on 
additional parametric assumptions on how 5u is related to i and t. However, here we take 
a pragmatical approach: we neglect for the moment the logical inconsistency between the 
variable i in the model and calendar age in the data.
In order to get estimates for the efficiency units, we need to rely on data tha t provide 
information on both age and tenure with the current employer. Both the NLSY and the 
February CPS include such information. We decided to use the CPS data, because they 
represent a random sample of the whole US labor force, unlike the NLSY tha t contains 
information on only one cohort.
We estimate a simple linear regression with OLS, where the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of earnings and the set of explanatory variables are the constant, and 
two third-degree polynomials in age and tenure.
As for the returns to tenure, given the pervasive selection and endogeneity problems, 
there is no consensus in the literature on their magnitude. Here we take a stand which is 
consistent with the model we are w’orking with. In the model an increase in tenure with 
the current employer is a random event, which neither the firm or the worker can affect. 
It follows th a t tenure is strongly exogenous and can be included in the right hand side 
of a log wage regression like the one in Table 2. The estimated returns to tenure on the 
February 1996 CPS data  are approximately 2% on a yearly basis. This value seems to be 
on the high end of the estimated returns to tenure.
Once we have the OLS estimates, we retrieve the by simply considering the fitted 
values of the econometric model at all the (i, t) pairs implied by their grids.
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Notice th a t in order to preserve consistency between the theoretical model and the 
data, we transformed the dependent variable and the explanatory ones to the same time 
period of the model, tha t is we estim ated log wages on a bi-monthly basis. Table 2 reports 
the results of the OLS regression.
Parameter Log Wage
Age 0.04747
(0.00245)
Age2 -0.00012
(8.15e — 06)
Age3 9.47e -  08
(8.56e -  09)
Tenure 0.00395
(0.00069)
Tenure2 -0.00001
(7.Ole -  06)
Tenure3 1.83e -  08
(1.82e — 08)
Constant 0.25533
(0.23070)
N. Obs 6160
Adj. R 2 0.332
Table 4.2: Log Earnings Regression, t statistics in parenthesis (Source: CPS Feb 1996)
4 .5  R esu lts
This Section presents the main results. First we show how the equilibrium wage profiles 
are affected by the introduction of severance payments. Then we discuss the prediction 
of the model. Finally, we compute the welfare effects induced by the severance payments. 
We consider the benchmark economy as the one without SP, and a series of counterfactual 
economies where the SP is set at in increasing level. More in detail, we consider five values 
for SP, tha t is in the five experiments we set at 3, 6, 9, 12, and 15 monthly wages.
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Figure 4.1: The effects of SP on the Wage Profile (No Tenure)
4 .5 .1  W age profiles
Figure (4.1) plots the equilibrium effects on wages derived by introducing the severance 
payments at different lewis. As discussed above, the workers pre-pay the SP with a low 
entry wage. This graph shows how untenured workers see their wage profile change during 
their life-cycle. These plots take into consideration also the General Equilibrium effects, 
since the wage profiles associated to different severance payments are compared for the 
equilibrium interest rate r. From the figure, it is possible to appreciate tha t untenured 
workers suffer a large wage loss for every productivity level they might have. The effect is 
smooth in the level of the SP: for SP equal to 15 monthly wages the drop is substantial 
and wages in the competitive environment are six times higher than in the counterfactual 
economy with SP. Another aspect of the introduction of SP is the present value of wages 
which remains unaltered. Another way of interpreting this result is to say that higher SP 
imply faster wage growth in the first years of a job match. This effect is captured in Figure 
(4.2), which plots the wage profiles for tenured workers with tenure equal to two years. It 
is possible to appreciate how the SP have now the opposite effect on wages if compared to 
before. Wages of tenured workers rise with 7 t and the rise tends to get amplified during 
the life cycle. For SP equal to 15 monthly wages rises up to 22% when compared to the 
benchmark economy.
Closely linked to the wage profile is the SP the workers are entitled to if a separation
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Figure 4.2: The effects of SP on the Wage Profile (Tenure=l)
takes place. Since G(i,t) =  7 f their behaviour is similar to Figure (4.2), which is only 
rescaled by the factor y t .
One of the endogenous outcomes of the model is the stationary distribution of worker 
types by employment status, age and tenure. Figure (4.3) reports the equilibrium marginal 
distributions over tenure and productivity. As for the former, the share of workers em­
ployed decreases smoothly with tenure and captures the main features of the data, quali­
tatively and, for low tenure values, quantitatively as well. The results related to the latter 
are somewhat less satisfactory: the model predicts th a t young workers have the highest 
shares in the pool of employment, which is not a feature of the data. These results were 
obtained on the basis of a simple and parsimonious calibration strategy, which imposed a 
constant value for 7rf, 7r“ , 7 7 , <f>i and cr^. A feasible alternative is to estimate the transition 
probabilities with a simulated method of moments. More in detail, once we "integrate out" 
the asset level, the stationary distributions over tenure and productivity can be obtained 
without solving the model, since they depend only on a set of exogenous shocks. The 
corresponding distributions in the data are easily computed, and it wxmld be possible to 
iterate on the parameters values until the squared deviations are minimized.9
9However, th is procedure might suffer from some identification issues. Unless we are able to  pin down 
some of the parameters directly from the data, the same stationary distributions might be obtained with 
different com binations of shocks, in particular the ones related to the increase and decrease in productivity 
tend to  offset each other.
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4 .5 .2  E q u ilib r iu m  E ffects
This section is devoted to discuss the equilibrium effects of SP on a set of relevant endoge­
nous variables. Tables 3 and 4 present the same results in two different formats. Each 
column presents the results related to the economy with a level of the SP indicated in the 
top of the table. In Table 3 we report the values of the endogenous variables of the model 
in levels, wdiile Table 4 reports the subset of endogenous variables that are not a share 
themselves divided by the value of output in the benchmark economy.
In Table 3 there several interesting findings. First, as expected, the values of the mutual 
fund, of the average profits and of the average disbursement in SP are all monotonically 
increasing in the level of SP. The equilibrium lump-sum tax is quantitatively small, and 
decreases in SP, both because output is increasing, but also because the average wage is 
falling, and the cost of the unemployment benefit scheme is decreasing. The same effect 
is driving the behaviour of the borrowing limit. Since the lowest possible income is the 
unemployment benefit, and this is a fraction of the untenured wage, the borrowing limit 
becomes more stringent for higher SP, exactly because those wages are decreasing. A more 
stringent borrowing limit, on the other hand, influences the agents’ saving behaviour, 
strenghtening the precautionary saving motive and increasing the asset supply in the 
economy.
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Variable SP=0 SP=3 II SP=9 SP=12 SP=15
Mutual Fund 0 0.248 0.481 0.672 0.743 0.888
Average Profits 0 0.028 0.059 0.093 0.134 0.179
Average SP 0 0.034 0.069 0.106 0.146 0.187
TAX (lump-sum) 0.017 0.015 0.012 0.009 0.006 0.004
(Natural) Borrowing Limit -0 .162 -0.142 -0.123 -0.103 -0.083 -0.056
Output 1.220 1.229 1.242 1.260 1.286 1.314
I / Y  Ratio 0.205 0.208 0.213 0.221 0.231 0.244
Labour Share (with SPj 0.700 0.709 0.716 0.722 0.726 0.727
Labour Share (without SP) 0.700 0.681 0.660 0.638 0.612 0.585
Borrowing Constrained (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 4..3: Equilibrium
Variable SP=0 SP=3 SP=6 SP=9 SP=12 SP=15
Mutual Fund 0.0 20.3 39.4 55.1 60.9 72.8
Average Profits 0.0 2.3 4.8 7.6 11.0 14.7
Average SP 0.0 2.8 5.7 8.7 11.9 15.3
TAX (lump-sum) 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.3
(Natural) Borrowing Limit -13 .3 -11 .7 -10.1 -8 .5 -6 .8 -4 .6
Output 100.0 100.7 101.8 103.2 105.4 107.7
Average wage 70.0 68.6 67.2 65.8 64.5 63.0
Table 4.4: Equilibrium normalized by output in the benchmark economy
An interesting result is related to output. W ith respect to the benchmark economy, 
output increases monotonically in the SP, with a 7.7% change for SP equal to 15 monthly 
wages. The increase in output stems from the additional supply of capital, which drives 
the interest rate down and expands the stock of physical capital.
As for the labor share, we can think of two different definitions, depending on how we 
consider the SP. If SP are included in the computation of the labor share, this increases 
monotonically in the level of SP, passing from 70% to 72.7%. Notice also the concavity 
of this relationship. Differently, if SP are excluded in the definition of labor share, this 
decreases considerably, falling to 58.5%. This is due mainly to the increase in output.
To conclude with, as in many models with incomplete markets, the percentage of agents
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tha t are at the borrowing limit is zero in all the economies considered. This is somewhat 
surprising, especially given the extremely low labor income of the untenured workers when 
the SP is high.
4 .5 .3  W elfare  E ffec ts
As shown by the previous results, the introduction of SP has im portant allocative effects, 
with several non trivial General Equilibrium forces being present at the same time. Here 
we present the results related to a measure of the equilibrium welfare effects of SP. More 
precisely, we first compute the welfare in the steady state of the benchmark economy 
using the equilibrium consumption functions. In order to compute the average welfare, 
we assume the existence of a utilitarian social welfare function. Then we consider as our 
measure of welfare cost/gain the percentage change in consumption that would equate 
the social welfare of the counterfactual economy to tha t of the benchmark one. The 
equilibrium welfare effects are reported in Table 5.
Severance Payments Average Welfare Change
SP=3 0.4%
SP=6 1.22%
SP=9 2.98%
SP=12 6.77%
SP=15 16.79%
Table 4.5: Welfare Effects of the SP
The first result is tha t the average welfare is always higher in the counterfactual 
economies. For relatively low values of SP, the average welfare change is small. More 
precisely, for values of the severance payment equal to three and six monthly wages, we 
need to  decrease consumption in each possible state of the world by 0.4% and 1.229c. 
respectively. However, the effects of SP is highly non linear and increases exponentially. 
The average results hides different effects for different groups of workers. In each of these 
simulation, because of the wage cut, the untenured workers suffer a large welfare loss, 
which in the aggregate is more than  compensated by the welfare gains of the tenured 
workers.
W hen the is SP equal to 12 and 15 monthly wages, the percentage decrease in con­
sumption th a t equates the welfare to the competitive labor market is equal to 6.77% and
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16.79%, which are extremely high. However, regarding to the plausibility of these welfare 
gains some caveats are in order. It is worth stressing tha t the simple formulation for SP 
we are working with might over-estimate substantially their effects. More in detail, we 
are assuming tha t the number of monthly wages is the same for every worker that faces a 
separation, irrespective of their actual tenure with their employer. In reality the severance 
payments tend to be capped and, more importantly, they do depend on the level of the 
tenure. For example, the value reported for Italy. 15 monthly wages, refers to worker with 
a tenure level of ten years (which is also very different from the corresponding figure in 
the US and hard to reconcile also if considering the likely equilibrium effect on the aver­
age duration of a match induced by a more restrictive EPL). On the contrary, the model 
implies a very large expenditure in SP. If we compare the average SP paid in the economy 
with 7 ^ 1 5  to the one in the economy with 7 f=3. the first is 6.38 times higher than the 
latter. This implies that, in order for the M utual Fund to be able to cover the operating 
losses, its equilibrium value has to increase by a factor of 3.58. This leads to an excess 
supply of capital, the interest rates falls substantially, leading to a large increase in the 
capital stock. This in turn tends to m itigate the fall in wages caused by the higher SP. To 
conclude with, severance payments have im portant allocative effects; their welfare effects 
are quantitatively small for plausible values of the SP, while they get large for high values 
of the SP.
4 .6  D iscu ssio n  an d  C o n c lu sio n s
In this chapter we proposed a quantitative framework to study the equilibrium effects 
of severance payments. These are an im portant labor market feature of several OECD 
Countries and have been proposed as a possible explanation of their high unemployment 
rates.
The results show th a t the introduction of severance payments influences positively the 
average welfare. However, restricting the attention to this aggregate measure hides large 
losses for the untenured workers, but also large gains for the tenured ones.
This paper has focused on stationary equilibria. It would be interesting to study 
the welfare effects of SP out of the steady-state, in a model with aggregate uncertainty. 
A recent contribution, Veracierto (2008). presents an analysis along those lines. Notice, 
however, th a t the techniques used to tackle the current problem would need to be amended
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since the whole distribution of assets would become a state variable. A feasible solution 
might be to rely on the approxim ation methods proposed by den Haan (1997) and Krusell 
and Smith (1998).
For future work we plan to endogenize the job finding probabilty. by including a search 
effort decision in the agents" problem. This extension complicates the solution of the 
model, but endogenizes a crucial margin. This extension would allow to make quantitative 
statements on the equilibrium effect of SP on the unemployment rate. Notice also that 
the current framework does not allow for search/m atching externalities in the spirit of 
Mortensen-Pissarides and included, for example, by Alonso-Borrego, Fernandez-Villaverde 
and Galdon-Sanchez (2006) in a model of tem porary Vs. permanent contracts.
In order to give the M utual Fund a less extreme role in our counterfactuals, the intro­
duction of a retirement stage could prove helpful. The saving behaviour would reflect also 
the desire for consumption smoothing during retirement, possibly leading to changes in 
the equilibrium value of the M utual Fund which would affect less drastically the interest 
rate and the accumulation of physical capital.
Finally, there is a large body of evidence showing tha t the retention probability of a 
worker is heavily affected bv some observables, such as age, and tenure. We could exploit 
this information to calibrate the separation probabilities and obtain a different response 
on the wage profiles, because this would reflect the different risks of separation. We leave 
these extensions and modifications for future work.
4 .7  A p p en d ix  A  - C o m p u ta tio n
In the actual solution of the model, we need to discretize the continuous state variable a 
(i , t  and employment sta tus are already discrete). We rely on an unevenly spaced grid, 
with the distance between two consecutive points increasing geometrically. This is done 
to allow for a high precision of the policy rules at low values of a, that is where the change 
in curvature is more pronounced.
The model with exogenous search effort is solved with a "time iteration’ procedure on 
the set of euler equations. In order to keep the computational burden manageable, we use 
150 grid points on the asset space, the lowest value being the borrowing constraint and the 
highest one being a value high enough for the saving functions to cut the 45 degree line. 
Notice tha t we do not restrict the agents’ asset holding to belong to a discrete set. As for
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the approximation method, we rely on a linear approximation scheme for the saving and 
consumption functions, for values of a falling outside the grid.
A collocation method is implemented, th a t is we look for the policy functions such tha t 
the residuals of the Euler equations are (close to) zero at the collocation points (which 
correspond to the asset grid). It follows th a t for all possible combinations of state variables 
we need to solve a non linear equation. A time iteration scheme is applied to get the policy 
functions, i.e. we compute the first order conditions with respect to a' and through the 
envelope condition we obtain a set of euler equations, whose unknowns are the policy 
functions, a'e(i, a, £), a'u(i, a).
We start from a set of guesses, a'e(i,a, t)o and a^(z,a)o, and keep on iterating until a 
fixed point is reached, i.e. until two successive iterations satisfy:
Sup \a'e(i, a, t)n+i ~  a e (b a , t ) n \  <10-6 . Vi and Vi. and
a
Sup\a'u(i,a)n+i — a'u(i, a )n | <10-6 . V?'.
a
The model with endogenous search effort is solved with a ‘successive approximation' 
procedure on the set of value functions.
We start from a set of guesses, V ( i , a , t )o and Lr(?,a)o- We compute the vector 
of parameters Q representing the Schumaker spline approximations of the value func­
tions. We solve the constrained maximization problems and retrieve the policy functions, 
a!e{i, a, i), a'u(i, a), V’(i, a). Notice th a t we do not restrict either the agents' asset holding 
or the search effort to belong to a discrete set. As for the approximation method, we rely 
on a linear approximation scheme for the saving, consumption and search effort functions, 
for values of a falling outside the grid.
We keep on iterating until a fixed point is reached, i.e. until two successive iterations 
satisfy:
S u p \V ( i ,a , t ) n+i — V ( i , a , t )n | <10-6 . Vz and Vf, and 
Sup \U(i* a )n+i -  U (i ,a )„ \<1CT6. Vi.
a
The stationary distributions are computed either relying on iterating on their defini­
tion, using a linear approximation of the distribution functions between grid-points, or by 
simulating a large sample of 100,000 individuals for 2,000 periods, which ensure tha t the 
statistics of interest are stationary processes.
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4 .8  A p p en d ix  B  - S o lu tio n  A lg o r ith m
The computational procedure used to solve the baseline model can be represented by the 
following algorithm:
• Guess Alin {b (z)}0 and compute the borrowing limit d\
• Generate discrete grids over the asset space [—d , a max];
•  Guess on the interest rate ro;
• Get the individual firms' capital dem and kn\
•  Guess on the lump-sum tax  /o:
• Get the wages
• Get the consumption and saving functions ce(z, a, t), Cu(i, a), a'e(i, a, £), a!u{i, a);
• Get the stationary distributions a, t), n u(i, a):
• Get the value of the m utual fund A I F :
•  Get the aggregate capital demand:
• Check asset market clearing; Get r\:
• Update 7q =  turo +  (1 — zj) r i (with zo arbitrary weight):
• Update l\\
•  Update Alin  {6 (z))i ^
• Iterate until market clearing;
• Check final good market clearing.
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